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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2001, Richard Birnbaum observed that management innovations, when 
introduced to higher education via the business sector, followed a lifecycle that led to 
rejection of the management innovation. The purpose of this study was to broaden our 
understanding of how characteristics that distinguish higher education from business 
organizations (power that is more dispersed; subsystems that are more loosely coupled; 
and organizational goals that are ambiguous) influenced perceived legitimacy and 
adoption of a management innovation within an institution of higher education. 
 Results of this sequential, explanatory mixed method study supported findings 
in five areas. First, the study substantiated Rogers’ (1995) innovation adoption process. 
Second, the study substantiated that as perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation increased individuals changed behaviors to align with that management 
innovation. Third, the study confirmed legitimacy increased when (1) outputs were 
defined, measurable, and linked to specific job descriptions; (2) the purpose of the 
management innovation was tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal, the university’s 
mission, the university’s existing processes, individual goals, and individual motivation; 
and (3) administrators used referent or expert power. Fourth, the study indicated that the 
use of normative processes in developing and implementing innovations increased 
perceived coupling and decreased perceived ambiguity related to the management 
innovation and encouraged the use of referent and expert power. Finally, the study 
yielded results that were consistent with Birnbaum’s (1998) suggestions for effective 
leadership within a cybernetic organization. Perhaps most important, the results of the 
study were incorporated into a practical model for policy makers and administrators.  
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SELECTED FACTORS RELATED TO PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF 
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT ADOPTION OF 
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the American Heritage Dictionary (1982), a fad “is a fashion that 
is taken up with great enthusiasm for a brief period of time” (p. 485). Miniskirts, shag 
carpet, harvest gold appliances, bouffants, baggy pants, super-sized value meals, and 
low-carbohydrate diets are images associated with fads. There are clothing fads, hair 
fads, accessory fads, electronic fads, food fads, health fads, religious fads, social fads, 
business fads, and management fads. Indeed, fads seem to surface in just about every 
aspect of our western culture.   
Fads, in most cases, appear to be unpredictable. It is difficult to identify the new 
gadget or the new style that will become a fad. Yet, the cyclical rise and fall is as 
predictable as the ebb and flow of the ocean. As the wave of one fad collapses, another 
fad soon rises and feeds on the remnant energy of the previous.  
Just as fads exist at a societal level, fads also exist at an organizational level. 
Organizational fads appear in the form of management innovations (Birnbaum, 2001). 
Since the early quests of Frederick Taylor and his concept of scientific management, 
experts have sought models to help organizations reach optimal efficiency – that is, the 
maximization and standardization of organizational outputs through “specialization, 
span of control, authority and delegation of responsibility” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 
38). In the last half of the twentieth century, a new round of management innovations 
sought to achieve not only optimal efficiency, but to also achieve optimal effectiveness. 
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Organizational effectiveness moved beyond the single focus of efficiency to include 
multiple dimensions indicating the progress of an organization toward achieving its 
overall purpose, including variables like financial systems, management strategies, 
employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction, organizational culture, and decision 
making strategies. Basically, the exemplary organizational system “would have 
mechanisms to ensure that institutions are operating legally, efficiently, and effectively” 
while satisfying “the interest of managers, those to whom the managers are responsible, 
and those who are subject to the system itself” (Birnbaum, 2001, p. 29). Because of 
these effectiveness and efficiency movements, over sixty management innovations exist 
in today’s business world (Rigby, 1998). 
Like the corporate world, higher education encountered a number of 
management innovations in the last part of the twentieth century. With a few 
exceptions, management innovations came typically to higher education via business or 
government sectors (Birnbaum, 2001). Birnbaum used a case study approach to 
examine the pathways taken by these seven management innovations and to understand 
their lifecycles once adopted in higher education. The seven academic management 
innovations studied by Birnbaum included: Planning Program Budgeting System, 
Management By Objectives, Zero-Based Budgeting, Strategic Planning, Benchmarking, 
Total Quality Management/Continuous Quality Improvement, and Business Process 
Reengineering.  
Each of the seven management innovations was examined individually as a 
separate case study. In this examination, Birnbaum sought to understand the origin of 
each management innovation, the pathway of the innovation into higher education, and 
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the lifecycle of the innovation once introduced to higher education. After examining 
each management innovation as a single case study, Birnbaum (2001) then “reviewed 
the cases iteratively using a process of explanation building to see if there were patterns 
that integrate and explain” (p. 125) the pathways and lifecycles of these seven 
management innovations. Essentially, Birnbaum reviewed the case studies individually 
and then collectively for the purpose of identifying commonalities linked to the 
adoption of the seven management innovations. Birnbaum searched for patterns that 
could provide possible insights to common beginnings of each management innovation 
within the business or government sectors, common introductions of these management 
innovations to higher education, and common adoption and implementation patterns of 
the management innovation once introduced to higher education.  
In short, Birnbaum (2001) observed that management innovations, when 
introduced to higher education via the business or government sectors, followed a 
lifecycle that led to rejection of the management innovation. The predictable rejection 
of these innovations, as observed by Birnbaum (2001), raised several questions. Why 
would an innovation that led to increased effectiveness and efficiency in the business 
world be accompanied by cyclical rejection in academia? Was it because the 
innovations just did not work, or did other factors influence rejection of the innovation? 
Why did presidents and senior level administrators continue to embrace and advocate 
the implementation of management innovations that originated in the business sector, if 
the applications of innovations were problematic? Were there characteristics that 
distinguished higher education organizations from business organizations; and if so, 
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how did these distinguishing characteristics affect the adoption of management 
innovations?  
Background to the Problem Statement 
 
It is important to define innovations and to identify the conditions under which 
innovations are adopted successfully within higher education organizations in order to 
broaden our understanding of the underlying factors that led to the rejection of these 
innovations within higher education. Rogers (1995) defined an innovation as “an idea, 
practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit for adoption” 
(p. 11). Rogers identified five characteristics associated with the successful adoption of 
innovations: relative advantage (more economical, more prestigious, more satisfying); 
compatibility (consistent with current values and experiences); complexity (easy to 
understand and use); trialability (can be experimented with on a limited basis); and 
observability (the results can be seen). Rogers also established that innovations, when 
introduced to organizations, take certain paths toward “diffusion” based on these 
characteristics. Rogers used the term diffusion to define the “process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of 
a social system” (p. 35). In effect, diffusion is the process through which innovations 
spread through an organization and is the process used by members of the organization 
to develop a mutual understanding of the innovation. Through the diffusion process, an 
innovation may be mutually accepted by most members of the organization and 
adopted, or the same innovation within another organization may be tried by the 
members of the system and rejected. Hence, the acceptance or rejection of innovation is 
contextual to the organization in which the innovation is being introduced and, more 
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specifically, is linked to individuals within the organization who socially construct the 
ultimate meaning of the innovation, regardless of whether the innovation is effective or 
not.  
Therefore, , it is important to highlight organizational characteristics that 
differentiate higher education institutions from business organizations in order to 
broaden our understanding of the factors that may contribute to the adoption or rejection 
of management innovations in higher education These differences tie primarily to five 
areas: (1) characteristics associated with the production model; (2) characteristics 
associated with the competitive market model; (3) governance and power; (4) 
organizational ambiguity; and (5) coupling of subsystems. These differences and their 
associated impact on the adoption of management innovations will be introduced in the 
following paragraphs and then discussed in greater detail in Chapter II. 
The Production Model 
First, the seven management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) sought to 
increase organizational effectiveness and efficiency by reengineering the production 
function. The success of the production function is contingent upon the ability of an 
organization to standardize outputs; to identify and standardize inputs used to produce 
outputs; to assign quantitative measures to both inputs and outputs; and to standardize 
processes that convert inputs to outputs (Jones & Taylor, 1990). Basically, defining and 
standardizing inputs, processes, and outputs are paramount to increasing organizational 
effectiveness and efficiency. Higher education organizations have greater difficulty 
defining and standardizing inputs, processes, and outputs than perhaps most business 
organizations (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & Harvey, 1993; 
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Chaffee, 1985; Cohen & March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974; Jones & Taylor, 
1990; Thuckman & Chang, 1988). Inputs and outputs, even when defined, are often 
difficult to measure quantitatively and, in the case of outputs, are often intangible 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Chafee, 1985; Jones & Taylor, 1990). As will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter II, many other issues are associated with ambiguity: ambiguity 
of institutional mission; ambiguity in the optimal level of resources needed to produce 
one unit level of output; and ill-defined and messy processes such as the educational 
and learning process. In short, higher education institutions have inputs, processes, and 
outputs that are less defined and are less standardized than most business organizations. 
Each of the innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) to some degree required 
standardized inputs, processes, and/or outputs. In effect, it may be difficult to 
implement an innovation that requires the tight coupling of the production function 
(input, process, and outputs) in higher education where the coupling of these variables 
is not so tight, if understood at all. Therefore, it appeared ambiguity tied to the 
production model possibility contributed to the rejection of the management innovations 
studied by Birnbaum. 
The Competitive Market Model 
Second, the seven management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) were 
implemented in the business sector where belief, values, and motivations are linked 
primarily to the competitive market model. The competitive market model is a tool used 
by economists to predict the behavior of markets that meet certain conditions (Baumol, 
1970). The competitive market model has three fundamental conditions: (1) consumers 
and producers within a market must be of the same relative size; (2) the commodity 
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provided by all producers within a given market must be identical; and (3) consumers 
and producers must be able to enter and exit the market freely (Baumol, 1970; Leslie & 
Johnson, 1974). Collectively, these conditions support a free and competitive market 
that is governed by supply and demand (Baumol, 1970). As will be further highlighted 
in Chapter II, higher education markets do not typically meet these three characteristics 
(Cheit, 1971; Leslie & Johnson, 1974).  Market differences lead to organizations where 
beliefs, values, and motivations are considerably different between higher education and 
business organizations. It is possible that these differences contributed to the rejection 
of management innovations studied by Birnbaum. 
Organizational Governance and Power 
Governance and power are two additional characteristics that distinguish higher 
education institutions from business organizations and potentially impact the adoption 
of management innovations. Birnbaum (1988) noted “the concept that best reflects the 
ways in which institutions of higher education differ from other organizations is 
governance” and then defined governance as “the structures and processes through 
which institutional participants interact with and influence each other and communicate 
with the larger environment” (p. 4). Power is most often defined as the capacity to 
influence (Birnbaum, 1988; Kanter, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Most 
modern academic institutions are organized based on a dual governance system that 
includes two subsystems: a faculty subsystem and an administrative subsystem 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Besse, 1973; Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). Each 
subsystem has a set of values and expectations related to governance and processes to 
facilitate decision making and resource allocation (Birnbaum, 1988; Corson, 1960; 
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Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). This dual system of governance is mirrored by a dual 
system of power structures (Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). As a result, governance 
and power in higher education organizations appear to be more pluralistic, 
decentralized, and dispersed than in business (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; 
Cohen & March, 1986). To summarize, it appeared that governance and power within 
higher education organizations differed from most business organizations and might 
possibly be a factor that explained the rejection of the seven management innovations 
studied by Birnbaum. 
Organizational Ambiguity 
An additional characteristic that distinguishes higher education from the 
business sector is organizational ambiguity. Ambiguity is tied to two main areas: goal 
ambiguity and ambiguity linked to the production model. The remainder of this section 
will focus on goal ambiguity since ambiguity tied to the production model was 
addressed in a previous section and will be covered in additional detail in Chapter II.  
Higher education institutions often have goals that are more ambiguous than 
most business organizations (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Cohen & March, 1986) and those 
goals are often conflicting (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & Harvey, 1993; Cohen & 
March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974). Goals typically are not measurable and are not 
accepted by all individuals within a given institution (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & 
Harvey, 1993; Cohen & March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974). Goal ambiguity 
becomes an issue when management innovations flow from an organizational sector 
that can establish clear and measurable goals, inputs, process, and outputs to another 
organizational sector where these elements are more ambiguous (Brock & Harvey, 
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1993; Cohen & March, 1986). The seven innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) 
required clearly articulated goals. Clear and measurable goals were foundational for 
determining success and for establishing accountability systems for the seven 
management innovations (Birnbaum, 2001). Therefore, it appeared that goal ambiguity 
may have contributed to the innovation shortcomings in higher education as studied by 
Birnbaum. 
Coupling of Subsystems 
The relationship that exists among various subsystems within an organization is 
a final organizational characteristic that potentially impacted the successful adoption of 
management innovations within higher education (Birnbaum, 2001). Weick (1976) 
referred to this relationship in terms of connectedness or coupling. Weick noted that 
subsystems are connected along a continuum that ranges from tightly coupled to loosely 
coupled. If two subsystems are tightly coupled, changes in one subsystem have a direct, 
corresponding result in the second subsystem. Conversely, if changes in one subsystem 
do not result in changes in a second subsystem, the relationship is considered loosely 
coupled. 
The coupling of subsystems in higher education organizations appears to be 
linked to the dual governance structure: a faculty subsystem and an administrative 
subsystem (Birnbaum, 1988; Besse, 1973; Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 
1979). The values and motivations of each subsystem are more different than they are 
alike (Mintzberg, 1979). This difference in values and motivations contributes to 
subsystems within higher education organizations that are more loosely coupled than 
tightly coupled. Even across higher education organizations the coupling between 
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subsystems may vary. As an example, coupling between the two subsystems within a 
community college where administrative functions are more centralized may be more 
tightly coupled than perhaps in a research institution where administrative functions are 
more decentralized; hence diversity of institutions further contributes to issues 
surrounding coupling of faculty and administrative subsystems. The seven management 
innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) were introduced via the administrative 
subsystem. As innovations moved from the administrative to the faculty subsystem, it is 
possible that a direct and corresponding change did not occur in the faculty subsystem 
due to loose coupling between the two subsystems, thus adversely impacting the 
adoption of the management innovation.  
To summarize, higher education organizations differ from business 
organizations in five areas: characteristics associated with the production model; 
characteristics associated with the competitive market model; governance and power 
structures; organizational ambiguity; and coupling of subsystems. While all five areas 
are likely to impact the adoption of management innovations in higher education, it 
appeared from this researcher’s perspective that dispersion and plurality of power, 
organizational ambiguity, and loosely coupled subsystems were likely to have the 
greatest influence on the adoption of innovations; and therefore, those areas warranted 
closer examination in light of commonly referenced organizational models. 
Organizational Models in Higher Education 
Through the years, four dominant models have served as frameworks to help 
researchers and practitioners analyze organizational characteristics and functions within 
higher education: the bureaucratic model, the collegial model, the political model, and 
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the cybernetic model (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988). While each model will 
be discussed in significant detail in Chapter II, it is important to examine initially how 
each model accommodates the three organizational characteristics that distinguish 
higher education organizations from businesses.  
Bureaucratic model. First, the bureaucratic model emerged out of structural 
theory associated with the factory system and scientific management of the early 1900s 
(Shafritz & Ott, 1996), with Frederick Taylor as the father of that movement. The 
primary purpose of structural theory is to achieve maximum efficiency and 
effectiveness through standardization of the production function (Fayol, 1916; 
McCallum, 1856; Metcalfe, 1885; Smith, 1776; Taylor, 1916; Towne, 1886). 
Standardization results from reducing organizations to smaller parts, analyzing those 
parts for effectiveness and efficiency, and establishing controls necessary to standardize 
inputs, processes, and output measures associated with that part of the organization 
(Fayol, 1916; McCallum, 1856; Metcalfe, 1885; Smith, 1776; Taylor, 1916; Towne, 
1886). Control of organizational functions and decision making within the bureaucratic 
model are linked to the hierarchical structure (Baldridge, et al., 1977, Birnbaum, 1988; 
Bolman & Deal, 1997; Shafritz & Ott, 1996). Hence, the adoption of a management 
innovation in the bureaucratic model appeared to be contingent primarily upon a leader 
of the institution or the leader of a subsystem deciding to implement the innovation. 
Once it is decided by the leader to adopt the innovation, subordinates will follow. 
Structural models do not appear to accommodate plurality of power, 
organizational ambiguity, and loosely coupled subsystems. Centralized power is 
required in order to standardize the production function of the organization and to 
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achieve a desired level of efficiency and effectiveness (Baldridge, et al., 1977, 
Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Shafritz & Ott, 1996). Clearly defined goals, 
identified inputs, standardized processes, and measurable outputs are foundational 
organizational requirements within structural models (Baldridge, et al., 1977, Birnbaum, 
1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Gulick, 1937; Mintzberg, 1979; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; 
Weber, 1922); hence, goal ambiguity and ambiguity tied to the production function are 
not accommodated by structural models. With regard to the coupling of subsystems, the 
structural models focus primarily on two subsystems: management and laborers (Fayol, 
1916; Gulick, 1937; McCallum, 1856; Metcalfe, 1885; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Smith, 
1776; Taylor, 1916; Towne, 1886; Weber 1922). It appeared that the bureaucratic 
model required these subsystems be more tightly coupled than loosely coupled in order 
to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. In short, structural models provided a 
potential framework to understand the operations of some types of higher education 
organizations, such as smaller community colleges; however, structural models did not 
appear to accommodate the three distinctive characteristics associated with most higher 
education organizations, and structural models appeared to be less likely to provide a 
framework from which to understand the adoption of management innovations in higher 
education. 
 Collegial model. Second, the collegial model grew out of human resource 
theory that emerged near the end of World War II as the result of organizational 
theorists challenging foundational assumptions of structural theory (Barnard, 1938; 
Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Simon, 1946).  While structural theorists sought to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency through reductionist approaches leading to the one-best-
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way, human resource theorists linked increased effectiveness and efficiency to the 
alignment of human and organizational needs (Barnard, 1938; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Maslow, 1943; Mayo, 1933; McGregor, 1957; Selznick, 1948; Simon, 1946). 
Essentially, people and organizations need each other. When the needs of the 
individuals working in an organization align with the needs of that organization, 
effectiveness and efficiency increase. In higher education, human resource theory gave 
birth to the collegial model. The collegial model views a higher education organization 
as a community of scholars where democratic decision making emphasizing 
thoroughness, deliberation, and consensus is paramount (Baldridge et al., 1977). 
Therefore, the successful adoption of a management innovation within a collegial 
organization would most likely be contingent upon the care given to develop consensus 
among various constituencies prior to adoption and the congruence of the innovation 
with existing values of the organization (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; 
Downey, 1996; Millet, 1962; Sanders, 1973).  
How did the collegial model accommodate the three characteristics that 
distinguish business organizations from higher education organizations? With regard to 
plurality of power, it appeared effectiveness and efficiency shifted from standardization 
of the production function to effectiveness and efficiency linked to social and 
behavioral networks. Essentially, power shifted from being linked solely to a 
centralized hierarchical structure to being more dispersed across the social and 
behavioral structures of the organization (Barnard, 1938; McGregor, 1957; Selznick 
1948; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Simon 1946). While human resource theory appeared to 
accommodate plurality of power, ambiguity tied to the production function was not 
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accommodated. Organizational success continued to be defined by measurements tied 
to the standardization of the production function (Barnard, 1938; McGregor, 1957; 
Selznick 1948; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Simon 1946). On the other hand, the literature 
indicated that human resource theory allows for subsystems that are both loosely and 
tightly coupled (McGregor, 1957; Selznick, 1948). To summarize, human resource 
theory, in general, supported two of the three characteristics that distinguish higher 
education organizations from business and provided a potential framework from which 
to analyze the adoption of management innovations in higher education. 
Political model. Political theory in higher education emerged in the 1960s. 
During this period, many institutions grew in size. As growth occurred, institutional 
missions became less clear, plurality of power increased, and goals became increasingly 
divergent (Birnbaum, 1988). The bureaucratic and collegial models did not adequately 
accommodate these new organizational characteristics (Birnbaum, 1988). Political 
theory provided a potential new framework from which to study these phenomena and 
to understand organizational processes within higher education organizations. 
Political organizations are viewed as dynamic and complex systems of political 
coalitions that include individuals who engage in politics (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; 
Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Politics is defined as an activity in which one engages 
in order to acquire or exert power necessary to promote the self-interest of an individual 
or group and to influence organizational decisions (Allen et al., 1979; Pfeffer, 1981).  
The political model is driven by the needs of individuals or groups to obtain desired 
resources and the use of power by those individuals or groups to obtain those resources 
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(Pfeffer, 1981). Therefore, the adoption of an innovation would be most contingent 
upon the political power, timing, persuasion, and diplomacy of individuals within the 
organization and the political power of the various political coalitions at the time of 
adoption.   
The political perspective generally supported the three characteristics that 
distinguish higher education organizations from businesses. Power within the political 
model is more dispersed than centralized given that power is more contingent upon an 
individual, the political skill of that individual, and the willingness of that individual to 
engage in the political process (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Brown, 1986; 
Kipnis, 1974; Mazzoni, 1991; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Scheff, 1970). 
Additionally, ambiguity tied to the production function is a characteristic supported by 
the political model (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). Goals 
and attempts to define the production function are the result of political bargaining, 
negotiating and jockeying that promotes the self-interest of individuals and coalitions 
involved in the process (Baldridge, 1997; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Michealsen, 1981; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). As a result, ambiguous 
and conflicting goals as well as conflicting production processes often emerge from the 
political process. Finally, it appeared the political model allows for subsystems that are 
more loosely coupled than tightly coupled even in higher education institutions where 
there is no agreement on organizational mission (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 
1988; Steinbruner, 1974). Dynamic political processes that are motivated by self 
interest seem to require subsystems that are more flexible and fluid (Birnbaum, 1988). 
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However, it is possible that subsystems linked to stable political coalitions might 
become more tightly coupled than loosely coupled over time (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman 
& Deal, 1997; Brown, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). In summary, the political model appeared 
to accommodate adequately the three organizational characteristics that distinguish 
higher education from business and provided a potential framework to broaden our 
understanding of the adoption of management innovations in higher education.  
Up to this point, three organizational models have been highlighted: the 
bureaucratic model, the collegial model and the political model. These models were 
unlikely to provide a guiding framework because of two overarching issues. First, these 
models provided a single paradigm through which to interpret events and understand 
relationships within an organization. Basically, while each model might in and of itself 
provide a good snapshot of an organization, no single model captured accurately the 
complex nature of a higher education organization. Second, these models reduced 
organizational understanding to a single perspective as a means to facilitate increased 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This myopic perspective is rooted in 
deterministic values rather than normative values. These single perspective models limit 
the understanding of complex organizations like colleges and universities, which have 
come to be viewed as more dynamic, normative systems (Wheatley, 1999). Dynamic 
systems require organizational models that provide increased understanding and 
analysis tied to unpredictability, self-creation, and autonomy (Birnbaum, 1988; Fleener, 
2002). In effect, complex organizations require a complex paradigm from which to 
understand organizational functions and decision-making processes. The bureaucratic, 
collegial, and political models as individual models did not support this complex 
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paradigm and thus did not provide a framework from which to broaden our 
understanding of the adoption of management innovations in higher education 
(Birnbaum, 1988).   
Cybernetic model. In 1988, Birnbaum proposed a more complex organizational 
model for higher education: the cybernetic model. Birnbaum theorized that increased 
environmental complexity within and external to an organization is met with increased 
organizational complexity. Birnbaum suggested that decision making in a complex 
organization is better facilitated through smaller, stable subsystems. In a cybernetic 
organization, linkages within each subsystem are more tightly coupled while linkages 
across subsystems are more loosely coupled. Therefore, loosely coupled subsystems 
may strategically focus on a small set of specific inputs, processes, and outputs 
(Birnbaum, 1988). Through these loosely coupled subsystems, the cybernetic institution 
may then respond to a large number of ill-defined and conflicting goals and 
accommodate dispersion of power (Birnbaum, 1988). In essence, a leader of one 
subsystem within a cybernetic organization may have increased flexibility to base 
decisions on the goals, values, and beliefs of the subsystem without impacting other 
subsystems. As noted by Birnbaum (1988), “focusing attention only on the limited 
interest of subunits enormously simplifies rationality and makes organizational life 
manageable” (p. 196).  
In such a decentralized model, what is the role of centralized processes and 
leadership? Centralized processes and leadership in a cybernetic model focus largely on 
three areas: designing data collection and communication systems; responding to 
organizational crises; and making subtle interventions (Birnbaum, 1988). A balance 
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between centralized and decentralized functions within the cybernetic system is 
achieved through subsystems that are more loosely coupled. 
Initially, it appeared Birnbaum’s cybernetic model accommodates the three 
factors that distinguish higher education organizations from business organizations. 
Additionally, the cybernetic model is more complex than the bureaucratic, collegial, and 
political models in that the cybernetic model provides multiple perspectives from which 
to analyze and understand organizational process. The cybernetic model contains 
elements of the bureaucratic, collegial, and political models as well as normative and 
deterministic elements. In essence, the cybernetic perspective sees higher education 
institutions as “learning” organizations that have the capacity to evolve; capacity to 
learn from past experiences; capacity to solve problems; capacity to develop a shared 
vision; and capacity to learn together (Johnson, 1998; Senge, 1990, 2000). Therefore, 
the cybernetic model appeared to accommodate the complexity of higher education 
organizations and served as the guiding organizational framework for this proposed 
study. 
The question now becomes, what factors might contribute to the adoption of a 
management innovation in higher education in light of the cybernetic model? It 
appeared that the adoption of a management innovation in a cybernetic organization 
was contingent upon decentralized and centralized elements of the organization. From a 
decentralized perspective, successful adoption appeared contingent upon the leadership 
of various subsystems and the congruency of the innovation with the values, beliefs, 
and goals of the subsystem. From a centralized perspective, adoption was contingent 
upon the capacity of the leadership to introduce the innovation as a response: as a 
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response to a crisis; as a response to a problem that has been identified through data 
collection procedures; as a response to an innovation that has been successfully adopted 
in one subsystem that can be shared with another subsystem encountering similar issues 
with similar values, beliefs, and goals; or as a subtle response to improve selected 
activities within a specific subsystem.  
Summary of organizational theory. Increased organizational complexity during 
the twentieth century was accompanied by organizational models that attempted to 
explain that complexity. Each model provided differing and increasingly complex views 
of power, coupling, and goal ambiguity. It was evident that organizational perspectives 
outgrew the early structuralists’ interpretations that viewed higher education 
organizations as similar to deterministic business models. Instead the literature 
supported a view where academic institutions are seen as complex organizations that are 
perhaps more normative than deterministic with subsystems that are more loosely 
coupled, thus allowing them to handle ambiguity of power and ambiguity tied to the 
production function. 
If academic organizations are more normative than deterministic, why then do 
these normative organizations continue to look to the rational paradigm for management 
innovations? The seven rejected management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) 
were rooted in the rational paradigm – that is, the innovations sought to maximize 
effectiveness and efficiency through standardization of the production function. Even in 
light of complex organizational models and understanding that better account for the 
unique organizational characteristics and dynamics of higher education, management 
innovations rooted in the rational paradigm continue to circulate through higher 
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education (Best, 2006; Birnbaum, 2001). Why?  Was it possible that rejected 
management innovations served some other purpose than increased effectiveness and 
efficiency?  
Benefits of Management Innovations 
Indeed, Birnbaum (2001) cited a number of benefits linked to rejected 
management innovations and those benefits are noted below, but will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter II. First, Birnbaum concluded management innovations provided a 
catalyst to examine, to reexamine, and to consider the potentiality of change. Second, 
the adopted management innovations elevated the importance of data at a time when 
higher education was accountable increasingly to external agencies. A third benefit, as 
noted by Birnbaum, was that the adoptions often elevated goals and values that perhaps 
had been neglected, thus reinventing the identity of higher education. Fourth, 
management innovations appeared to diversify interactions and communication within 
organizations thus increasing organizational and individual knowledge. Finally, 
Birnbaum (2001) concluded that the adoption of management innovations reinforced 
the myth of management within higher education. 
 If indeed this last benefit was true, it would mean that management innovations 
reinforced myths tied to organizational management and to an organization’s leaders. 
Specifically, the adoption appeared to support the myth that managers, and thus 
management, can influence the behavior of the organization. Therefore, if managers and 
management are perceived as influencing change through the adoption of management 
innovations, they are fulfilling the myth and thus are perceived as being legitimate.  
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 This conclusion led to several questions. Is it possible that, while organizational 
models have evolved to accompany the increasing complexity of higher education 
organization, there remains in place structures, processes, and expectations tied to 
structural theory and that these remnants manifest in the term “legitimacy”?  If so, how 
then does the adoption of innovations impact the legitimacy of an organization and its 
leaders, or conversely, how does the legitimacy of a leader, the legitimacy of an 
organization, or the legitimacy of innovation impact the adoption of the innovation? 
Additionally, what factors influence the legitimacy of an innovation and the subsequent 
adoption of the innovation? While Birnbaum (2001) hinted that legitimacy played a role 
in the adoption and rejection of management innovations, the literature did not yield any 
studies that empirically tested this hypothesis.  
Statement of the Problem 
In short, there does not exist a clear understanding of what factors influence the 
adoption of a management innovation within higher education. Additionally, there does 
not exist a clear understanding of how the perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation influences the adoption of that innovation nor does there exist a clear 
understanding of the factors that contribute to the development of perceived legitimacy 
within the context of higher education.  
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to broaden our understanding of how power, 
coupling, ambiguity, and subsystems influenced the perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption or rejection of a management innovation within the context of a 
higher education organization. 
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Research Questions 
Research questions explored by this study included the following:  
 
1. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation influence 
individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) to adopt or reject a management 
innovation within higher education? 
2. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation vary based on the 
organizational subsystem (technical and administrative) in which individuals worked?  
3. Did perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate the adoption of 
a management innovation influence how individuals perceived legitimacy of a 
management innovation?  
4. Did the perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a proposed 
management innovation influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a 
management innovation?  
5. Did the perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and outputs influence 
how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management innovation?  
6. Did the factors of power, coupling, and ambiguity interact to influence 
how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management innovation?  
A mixed method design was used to answer these six questions. More 
specifically, a two-phase, sequential explanatory design was used (Creswell, 1999, 
2003). A quantitative methodology was used in Phase I. Phase II used a qualitative 
methodology to confirm, elaborate, and explain Phase I findings (Creswell, 1999, 2003; 
Morse, 2003). The mixed method design was more quantitative driven, and qualitative 
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features provided confirmation and elaboration. Essentially, the study was more 
theoretically driven by the quantitative method than by the qualitative method. 
Definitions 
Legitimacy – A label assigned by individuals to identify the validity of the merit 
pay system. Legitimacy emerges as the result of an evaluative process used by 
individuals to determine the alignment of the merit pay system with the internalized 
norms and values of individuals (French & Raven, 1959). The results of this evaluation 
process are reflected as a positive-neutral-negative perception of the merit pay system. 
Management Innovation – For the purpose of this study, a management 
innovation was defined as an institution’s efforts to implement a merit pay system. 
Organizational Subsystem – Based on Birnbaum’s (1988) work, two 
organizational subsystems were included as part of this study: technical subsystem and 
the administrative subsystem.    
Technical subsystem – The technical subsystem was defined as the part of the 
higher education organization that was primarily responsible for implementing 
processes that converted inputs into outputs and included all full-time faculty 
(Birnbaum, 1988).  
Administrative subsystem – The administrative subsystem within a cybernetic 
organization was defined as that part of the organization that coordinates and directs the 
organization (Birnbaum, 1988). For this study, the administrative subsystem included 
full-time support staff, professional staff, mid-level administrators, and senior-level 
administrators within the organization. 
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Power – Power was defined as the capacity of an administrator to influence the 
behavior or activities of other individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) related to 
the adoption of the merit pay system. For this study three types of position power were 
of interest: legitimate, reward and coercive; and two types of personal power were of 
interest: expert and referent (French & Raven, 1959; Thambain & Gemmill, 1974; 
Warren, 1968; Yukl & Falbe, 1991).  
Legitimate power – Legitimate power was defined as the capacity of a leader to 
influence the behavior or activities of a follower based on the leader’s formal authority 
over the follower. 
Reward power – Legitimate power was defined as the capacity of a leader to 
influence the behavior or activities of a follower based on the leader’s capacity and 
willingness to provide resources and/or awards to the follower. 
Coercive power – Coercive power was defined as the capacity of a leader to 
influence the behavior or activities of a follower based on the leader’s authority and 
willingness to impose sanctions or punishments on the follower. 
Referent power – Referent power was defined as the capacity of a leader to 
influence the behavior or activities of a follower based on the desire of the follower to 
identify personally with the leader. 
Expert power – Expert power was defined as the capacity of a leader to 
influence the behavior or activities of a follower based on the knowledge and/or skills 
of the leader as perceived by the follower. 
Ambiguity – Ambiguity was defined as the degree to which individuals within a 
subsystem could clearly identify the inputs, processes, and outputs of the subsystem. 
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Individuals perceive inputs, processes, and outputs along a continuum. On one end of 
the continuum, individuals can clearly define inputs, processes, and outputs associated 
with their work as it occurs within the context of their associated subsystem. Also, 
inputs and outputs can be measured clearly. On the other end of the continuum, 
individuals perceive inputs, processes, and outputs as ambiguous, or perhaps 
indefinable, and inputs and outputs cannot be measured clearly. 
Coupling – Coupling was defined as the degree to which individuals within a 
subsystem perceived that changes in their behaviors or activities directly influenced the 
merit pay system and thereby achieved the purposes of the merit pay system.  Coupling 
exists along a continuum between tightly coupled on the one end to loosely coupled on 
the other end. 
Tightly coupled – A perception held by an individual that changes in behavior or 
activities would be accompanied by a direct and corresponding change to the subsystem 
and would move the subsystem toward achieving the goals of a proposed management 
innovation. 
Loosely coupled – A perception held by an individual that changes in behavior 
or activities would not be accompanied by a direct and corresponding change to the 
overall subsystem and would not move the organization toward achieving the goals of a 
proposed management innovation.  
Innovation Adoption – Innovation adoption was defined as the degree to which 
individuals within an organization changed behaviors and activities in order to make 
full use of the innovation (Rogers, 1995). 
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Innovation Rejection – Innovation rejection was defined as a decision made by 
individuals to not adopt an innovation (Rogers, 1995). 
Significance and Implications of the Study 
This study specifically explored the relationship between perceived legitimacy 
of a management innovation and the willingness of individuals to adopt the innovation. 
Furthermore, the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation was examined to 
broaden our understanding of how perceptions of a management innovation varied 
within a higher education organization. Finally, this study examined influence of power, 
coupling, and ambiguity on the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation. In 
short, the study was significant in that it (1) built on the work of Birnbaum (2001) in 
this area and further examined the role of legitimacy in the adoption of management 
innovations within a higher education organization; (2) provided additional insights into 
those factors that influenced the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation; and 
(3) provided a more refined perspective for leaders within higher education to use when 
considering the adoption of management innovations. 
Assumptions 
Assumptions associated with this study included: 
1. Perceived legitimacy of a management innovation is a multi-dimensional 
construct that influences the adoption of an innovation. 
2. Perceptions, like realities, influence an individual’s behavior and activities. 
3. There is a positive relationship between reality and perception.  
4. Perceptions can be documented. 
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5. Participants will respond accurately and honestly about their perceptions and 
intentions. 
Conclusion 
 The size and complexity of American higher education organizations have 
increased dramatically since the mid-1800s. Increased complexity during this time was 
accompanied by increased governance complexity. Throughout the twentieth century 
there was a growth in research related to understanding organizational structure and 
function. Organizational theory emerged in concert with the prevailing organizational 
paradigm – Frederick Taylor’s scientific management theory. Organizational theory 
grew from the simple, mechanistic view to today’s perspective where higher education 
institutions are viewed as dynamic organizations made up of complex networks of 
formal and informal subsystems.  
In the last part of the twentieth century, several management innovations were 
introduced into higher education that appeared to be incongruent with this dynamic and 
complex organizational perspective. These management innovations sought to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency through standardization of the production function 
(Birnbaum 2001; Mintzberg, 1979). Standardization of the production function 
appeared incompatible with at least three characteristics that distinguish higher 
education organizations from businesses: power that is more dispersed than centralized; 
subsystems that are more loosely coupled than tightly coupled; and multiple 
organizational goals that tend to be ambiguous and at times conflicting.  
In 2001, Birnbaum examined seven of these management innovations. Using a 
case study methodology, Birnbaum identified a cycle of adoption and rejection 
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associated with these innovations. Birnbaum noted that leaders continue to introduce 
management innovations into higher education for a number of reasons in spite of these 
documented cycles of rejection. Birnbaum concluded that the adoption of management 
innovations provides a number of benefits to organizations and theorized that increased 
legitimacy tied to the innovation, the organization, and its leaders plays an important 
role in the adoption of management innovations. Therefore, this study further explored 
the role of legitimacy in the adoption of management innovations within higher 
education and explored variables that potentially influenced the perceived legitimacy of 
a management innovation.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
Organization 
Chapter II will develop a conceptual framework for the proposed study. The 
chapter contains six sections. Each section will discuss related theories and relevant 
studies and will support the variables of interest to be examined within this study. The 
six sections of this chapter include (1) the lifecycle of management innovations within 
higher education; (2) governance and power within higher education; (3) ambiguity tied 
to the production function within higher education; (4) coupling of subsystems within 
higher education; (5) the evolution of organizational theory in higher education; and (6) 
the role of legitimacy in the adoption of management innovations.  
The Lifecycle of Management Innovations in Higher Education 
As noted in Chapter I, Birnbaum (2001) examined lifecycles of seven 
management innovations within higher education organizations. The seven management 
innovations studied by Birnbaum included Planning Program Budgeting System, 
Management By Objectives, Zero-Based Budgeting, Strategic Planning, Benchmarking, 
Total Quality Management/Continuous Quality Improvement, and Business Process 
Reengineering. Initially, Birnbaum examined each management innovation as an 
individual case study. Birnbaum’s examination focused on understanding the lifecycle 
of the management innovation within the business sector, the migration of the 
management innovation from the business sector to higher education, and the lifecycle 
of the management innovation within higher education. Birnbaum examined each 
management innovation as a single case study and then used explanation building 
processes (Yin, 2003) to identify patterns across the seven case studies. These iterative 
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processes allowed Birnbaum to develop two primary observations about the pathways 
and lifecycles of the seven management innovations. First, Birnbaum observed that the 
seven management innovations followed a similar pathway from the nonacademic to 
the academic sector. Second, Birnbaum observed that once adopted by the academic 
sector, the seven management innovations experienced a similar lifecycle.  
Based on these two observations, Birnbaum (2001) developed a five-stage 
lifecycle model of management innovations in higher education. Each of these stages is 
discussed in the following paragraphs. The adoption of Total Quality Management 
(TQM) will be used to further illustrate Birnbaum’s model. The purpose of using TQM 
is not to provide a complete understanding of its philosophy and tenets, but instead the 
adoption of TQM is used to assist the reader in understanding better the pathway and 
lifecycle of management innovations in higher education. 
The first stage of Birnbaum’s (2001) model is the creation stage, which includes 
three main aspects: the creation of a crisis, the identification of a management strategy 
to address the crisis, and isolated implementations of a management strategy. Birnbaum 
found that the creation of the crisis was usually linked to a change in the larger social 
system. For example, the early 1980s were marked by economic unrest: the gross 
national product was falling; unemployment exceeded ten percent; nearly one-third of 
America's industrial plants lay idle; there was a significant oil crisis; and countries like 
Germany and Japan were gaining a greater share of world trade (United States 
Department of State, 1999). Total Quality Management became the solution for 
American companies to respond to the economic crisis (Melissaratos & Arendt, 1995). 
TQM was seen as “a revolution in the way Americans manage and work in 
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organizations” (Schmidt & Finnigan, 1992, p. 94). TQM was seen as a simplistic 
philosophy of continuous organizational and individual improvement (Chafee & Sheer, 
1992) that should be implemented across every sector of society (Schmidt & Finnigan, 
1992). Because of its simplicity and demonstrated success in Japan, it was argued that 
TQM could not be dismissed as just another management fad (Seymour, 1992). TQM 
emphasized the establishment of control processes to ensure conformance to 
requirements (Birnbaum, 2001). “In this context, ‘conformance’ means reduction in 
variation, while ‘requirements’ of course are shaped by customers” (Ewell in Birnbaum, 
2001, p. 93). Through this system of processes designed to reduce variation in outputs, 
TQM was viewed as a management innovation that would further improve 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency (Birnbaum, 2001).  
The economic crisis of the early 1980s grew quickly to a social and educational 
crisis. In 1983, the U. S. Department of Education published A Nation at Risk, which 
linked the economic crisis in part to a failure of the educational system. By 1987, 
Congress passed Public Law 100-107: The Malcolm Baldridge National Quality 
Improvement Act of 1987. The Act created the Baldridge National Quality Award to 
recognize organizations that “substantially benefited the economic or social well-being 
of the United States through improvements in the quality of their goods or services 
resulting from the effective practice of quality management” (Section 16, Paragraph B). 
In 1988, the first round of Baldridge Awards received nearly 12,000 requests for 
applications (Schmidt & Finnigan, 1992). The number of requests increased to 200,000 
in 1990.  
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In 1991, a Wall Street Journal article reported that TQM received the highest 
satisfaction levels out of more than a dozen management innovations in a survey of over 
300 large companies (Bleakley, 1993). Also in 1991, Ted Marchese’s article in the 
American Association for Higher Education declared “TQM Reaches the Academy.”  
Total Quality Management…an American set of ideas, engine 
behind the Japanese economic miracle, agent for the dramatic turnabouts 
at Ford and Motorola…suddenly it’s at work in more than half the 
Fortune 1000 firm. . . . It’s the “preferred management style” of the 
federal government. . . .You’ll find it in hotels, city government, your 
local hospital. . . . It’s in the air. . . .Can the academy be far behind? (In 
Birnbaum, 2001, p. 97) 
Marchese’s question was rhetorical. The obvious answer helped set the stage for 
the adoption of TQM throughout higher education and signaled that the creation stage 
was well underway. 
In the second stage, the narrative evolution stage, Birnbaum (2001) found that 
narratives about the successes of the seven management innovations became 
embellished and were more widely disseminated through consultants, early adopters, 
and professional meetings. The rhetoric of the narrative evolution stage for TQM was 
simplistic and intense. Business and government advocated the transference of TQM to 
higher education (Brigham, 1995), and higher education soon recognized that the 
adoption of TQM was necessary to appease business and governing boards (Jelinek, 
Forster & Sauser, 1995). Isolated success stories within higher education indicated 
positive adoptions and early successes associated with TQM (Bemowski, 1991; Entin, 
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1993; Seymour, 1991). Articles promoted TQM as a means of “restoring the pillars of 
higher education” (Bemowski, 1991, p. 37). Small groups of “academic zealots, true 
believers, and leaders at dozens of institutions” were heralded for carrying the torch of 
TQM (Keller, 1992, p. 48). By 1992, the Chronicle of Higher Education reported that 
colleges and universities throughout America were reporting successes tied to the 
adoption of TQM (Mangan, 1992).  Also in 1992, the American Association for Higher 
Education used TQM as a thematic banner at its 1992 national conference. To 
summarize, the advocacy of TQM by professional organizations and individual 
institutions, when coupled with increased and intense rhetoric tied to the successes of 
TQM, signaled that the adoption of TQM had entered the narrative evolution stage. 
Thirdly, Birnbaum (2001) observed a time lag between initial implementation of 
an innovation and objective validation of the innovation’s successes. Because of this 
time lag, it is in the third stage that the number of organizations implementing the 
innovation peaked. Indeed, it was not until the middle part of the 1990s that articles 
began to discount the success claims of TQM, nearly a decade after the first success 
claims of TQM surfaced in the business world (Birnbaum, 2001). With TQM success 
stories abounding and absent of opposing evidence, TQM became the management fad 
of the early 1990s. In 1993, Marchese, referring to TQM, noted that “By now it’s hard 
to find a campus without a knot of people trying to implement the thing” (p. 10). That 
same year, seventy percent of universities and colleges claimed to be using TQM (El-
Khawas, 1993). Newt Gingrich referred to TQM as one of the “Five Pillars of American 
Civilization” in his speeches for reelection to the U. S. House of Representative in 1993 
(Ferguson, 1998). Also in 1993, an entire issue of Change focused on TQM, and TQM 
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workshops were available throughout the country (Birnbaum, 2001). In short, the 
adoption of TQM by higher education organizations grew rapidly in the early 1990s. 
This growth occurred prior to the publication of objective articles that examined 
critically the successes of the innovation. 
After the adoption of management innovations reach their peak, Birnbaum 
(2001) identified a fourth stage in which skepticism associated with the innovation 
outweighed optimism. Birnbaum labeled this stage the narrative deevolution stage. 
Keller (1992 in Birnbaum, p. 96) noted that “American corporations, which have spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the past decade [on TQM programs]…have divergent 
feelings about their expenditures….[TQM is seen as] a mania from management hell, at 
best a waste of time and at worst harmful to organizations.” By 1993 in the business 
sector, there were a number of publications that highlighted organizations whose quality 
programs were abandoned due to the lack of producing any meaningful results 
(Birnbaum, 2001; Brigham, 1993; Mathews, 1993). The TQM failure rate in the 
business sector was as high as 80 percent (Schmidt & Finnigan, 1992) and only about 
one-fifth of TQM programs yielded tangible results (Harari, 1993). Marchese, who 
advocated TQM in 1991, concluded that the end of TQM was near in 1996. Marchese 
(1996) noted that “dozens of institutions that began a quality journey ended it; others 
persisted but have little to show for it…In sum, the most important management 
development of the past two decades has so far had only modest impacts on American 
higher education” (p. 4).  Marchese (1996) concluded TQM’s “emphasis on customer 
focus, data, teamwork, and systems thinking runs counter to the internally focused, 
opinionated, problem-chasing world of campus life” (p. 4). Similarly in 1997, a 
   35 
 
Business Week article declared TQM was dead (Byrne, 1997).  In essence, innovations 
in the fourth stage are often declared failures and are abandoned.  
Finally and in reaction to the claims of failure, Birnbaum (2001) observed that 
early innovators sought a resolution of dissonance – early innovators often engaged in a 
dialogue to account for the failings of the innovation. As noted by Birnbaum (2001), 
those individuals and organizations who were early advocates of the seven academic 
management innovations often cited poor leadership, stubborn followers, improper 
implementation, lack of resources, incorrect processes, or even implementation of a bad 
version of the innovation as reasons for the innovation’s failure. In other words, the 
innovation could have been successful if the conditions surrounding the implementation 
of the innovation were different. Birnbaum observed that such reasons provided an 
opportunity to modify the innovation and to reintroduce the innovation under the guises 
of a new and improved version. In response to the failings of TQM, a number of 
strategies and services in the business sector were developed by consultants and 
management firms specializing in turning around failed TQM initiatives via a better 
version of TQM (Jacob, 1993; Mathews, 1993 Schmidt & Finnigan, 1992). These new 
and improved versions were often designed to address shortcomings of the previous 
version. For example, one shortcoming of TQM within higher education was the name: 
Total Quality Management. While most institutions could relate to and understand the 
importance of quality, the words total and management presented difficulties 
(Birnbaum, 2001). Very few issues are total within higher education because of its 
loosely coupled subsystems and faculty autonomy (Birnbaum, 2001). Faculty are not 
managed in higher education; instead they are administered or served (Birnbaum, 
   36 
 
2001).  In essence, the shortcomings of the name lead to a new management innovation 
titled “Continuous Quality Improvement”: an evolutionary iteration of Total Quality 
Management. Once the new version was adopted, the management innovation entered a 
second phase and the five stages (creation, narrative evolution, time lag, narrative 
devolution, and resolution of dissonance) were replayed. 
To summarize, Birnbaum (2001) used a case study methodology to examine the 
lifecycles of seven management innovations within higher education. Birnbaum 
observed that the seven management innovations entered higher education 
organizations via the business sector. These management innovations were adopted in 
higher education with a hopeful intent to resolve emerging institutional and governance 
issues. A few claims of success linked to the innovation were then circulated throughout 
academia via early adopters of the innovation, consultants, publications, and 
professional conferences, which led to widespread adoption of the innovation. 
Widespread adoption occurred before independent research substantiating the success 
of the innovation could be conducted and published. As the independent research was 
published and as stories about adoption difficulties circulated, there arose increased 
skepticism tied to the management innovation. Eventually, new adoptions of the 
management innovation stopped and, in most cases, organizations ceased activities 
related to the adoption of the innovation. Finally, Birnbaum observed that champions of 
the management innovation (i.e., early adopters and consultants) often cited a number 
of contextual variables (i.e.,  poor leadership, stubborn followers, improper processes, 
lack of resources, or even implementation of a bad version of the innovation) that 
contributed to the failures of the innovation. The identification of these contextual 
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shortcomings then provided the basis for an evolutionary iteration of the same 
innovation.  
Through Birnbaum’s work it is evident that management innovations when 
introduced via the business world tend to follow a lifecycle that leads to rejection of the 
management innovation in academia. This lifecycle raises several questions. Why 
would an innovation that leads to increased effectiveness and efficiency in the business 
world be accompanied by cyclical rejection in academia? Why do presidents and senior 
level administrators continue to embrace and advocate the implementation of 
management innovations that originate in the business sector, if the applications of 
innovations are problematic? Are there characteristics that distinguish higher education 
organizations from business organizations; and if so, how do these distinguishing 
characteristics impact the adoption of management innovations?  
Rogers (1995) is often cited for his distinguishing work related to the adoption 
of innovations. In his book, Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers identifies characteristics 
associated with the adoption of innovations. First, innovations are evaluated by 
individuals based on their relative advantage. Individuals ask if the innovation is more 
economical, more prestigious or more satisfying. Second, individuals examine 
compatibility of the innovation to ensure alignment of the innovation with current 
values and experiences. Third, complexity is considered. If the innovation is easy to 
understand and use, the likelihood of adoption increases. If the innovation is complex, 
the likelihood of adoption decreases. Fourth, the adoption of an innovation is increased 
if individuals can experiment with the innovation on a limited basis. Rogers labeled this 
characteristic as trialability. Finally, individuals want to make sure the results of 
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adopting the innovation are observable. If these five factors are positively associated 
with an innovation, the adoption of the innovation is increased.  
Rogers (1995) observed that innovations follow certain paths based on these 
characteristics. Diffusion can be described as the process through which an innovation 
spreads through an organization and is the process used by members of the organization 
to develop a mutual understanding of the innovation (Rogers, 1995). Individuals in one 
organization through the diffusion process may choose to adopt the innovation while 
individuals in another organization may choose to reject the innovation. In essence, the 
acceptance or rejection of innovation is contextual to the organization in which the 
innovation is being introduced.  
 Therefore, an examination of those factors that distinguish higher education 
institutions from business organizations is an important first step toward understanding 
the potential factors that influenced the acceptance or rejection of a management 
innovation in higher education. As noted in Chapter I, there are several characteristics 
that differentiate higher education institutions from business organization including 
elements tied to the production model, the competitive market model, governance and 
power, organizational ambiguity, and the coupling of subsystems. For the purpose of 
this study, it appeared that three of these characteristics (governance and power, 
organizational ambiguity tied to the production function, and the coupling of 
subsystems) had the greatest potential impact on the adoption of management 
innovations. Therefore, these variables were addressed in this study and are discussed in 
more detail in the following sections.  
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Governance and Power within Higher Education 
Governance and power are considerably different when comparing higher 
education institutions to business organizations. Birnbaum (1988) defined governance 
as “the structures and processes through which institutional participants interact with 
and influence each other and communicate with the larger environment” (p. 4). 
Birnbaum also noted that “the concept that best reflects the ways in which institutions 
of higher education differ from other organizations is governance” (p. 4). From a legal 
perspective, governance of a higher education institution rests with the governing board 
(Kaplin & Lee, 1995). In the infancy of higher education, governing boards consisted of 
small groups of clergy, administrators, and faculty, and these boards were often the 
primary source of decision making (Birnbaum, 1988).  During this period of shared 
responsibilities among clergy, administrators, and faculty, the collegial model perhaps 
best represents the governance approach.  
As institutions grew in size and as enrollment increased by more than 500 
percent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, institutions became more 
complex (Golden & Katz, 1999). The mission of higher education moved beyond just 
teaching. In the late eighteenth century, a research component was added to the 
university mission with the establishment of research centers like Johns Hopkins 
University and the creation of universities with only a graduate program like Clark 
University (Boyer, 1990; Golden & Katz, 1999). Additionally, the mission of the higher 
education grew to include a service component with the passage of the Morrill Acts of 
1862 and 1890 (Boyer, 1990; Golden & Katz, 1999). The Morrill Acts also signaled a 
shift in enrollments from private to public institutions (Boyer, 1990; Golden & Katz, 
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1999). As the mission of higher education expanded, new disciplines were created 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Boyer, 1990; Golden & Katz, 1999). The new disciplines required 
more specialized faculties who expected and needed greater control over their own 
work than perhaps the traditional teaching faculty (Mintzberg, 1979). With increased 
division of labor required by specialization and the growing organization, the 
bureaucratic model became the dominant perspective from which to view organizations 
during this period (Birnbaum, 1988). 
As universities grew in complexity, governance became more decentralized 
(Birnbaum, 1988). Decentralization provided a means for institutions to be flexible 
administratively and responsive to the varying needs of specialized faculty whose 
teaching, research, and service often required innovation and creativity (Mintzberg, 
1979). With decentralization, faculty had more power and control over their own affairs 
and administrators began to play more of a supporting role (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Ultimately, what emerged was a dual system of governance and power divided among 
the academic and nonacademic aspects of the institution (Besse, 1973; Corson, 1960; 
Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979).   
As will be discussed in much greater detail later in this chapter, the perspective 
from which researchers and others viewed organizations evolved concurrently with 
governance and power perspectives. The evolution of organizational theory grew from a 
collegial perspective to the bureaucratic, to the political, to the cybernetic. Each turn of 
the evolutionary clock seemed to be an attempt by organizational theorists to account 
for the increasing complexity and growth of higher education institutions (Birnbaum, 
1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997).  
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However, for the remainder of this subsection, we will return to a discussion on 
governance by a more thorough examination of the dual system of governance and 
power. 
Governance 
In general, most modern academic institutions are organized based on a dual 
governance system (Besse, 1973; Birnbaum, 1988; Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; 
Mintzberg, 1979). This dual governance system includes two subsystems: a faculty 
subsystem and an administrative subsystem (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979). Each 
subsystem has a set of values and expectations related to governance (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). Each subsystem also has a set of 
processes to facilitate decision making and resource allocation (Mintzberg, 1979). As a 
result, it appears that governance within a higher education institution is often more 
pluralistic than in business organizations in terms of the number of individuals and 
processes that must be accommodated in decision making and resource allocation 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1986). Logically, governance 
variations exist due to the diversity of higher education institutions, but on the whole, 
the literature does support a governance perspective that is more pluralistic in higher 
education than in business. Governance is also more dispersed in higher education than 
in business with the expectation that individuals at all levels in both the faculty and 
administration be involved in decision making and resource allocation decisions 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1986). Decentralized 
governance provides a means for higher education institutions to be flexible 
administratively and responsive to the varying needs of the organization (Birnbaum, 
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1988; Mintzberg, 1979). Flexibility allows the institution to respond to multiple and at 
times conflicting institutional goals (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979). Flexibility also 
enables the institution to meet varying needs of faculty whose teaching, research, and 
service often require innovation and creativity (Birnbaum, 1988; Boyer, 1990, 
Mintzberg, 1979). To summarize, organizational governance is a characteristic that 
distinguishes most higher education institutions from business organizations. 
Governance in most institutions can be characterized as having two fully developed 
structures. The dualistic structures provide the basis for decision making, including 
decisions related to the adoption of management innovations. Perhaps most notably, it is 
within this dualistic structure that the role of power has evolved, and as will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs, most certainly influences the adoption of 
management innovations within higher education. 
Power 
Power is most often defined as the capacity to influence (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Kanter, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Kelman (1958) identified three 
processes that govern power: instrumental compliance, internalization, and personal 
identification. Instrumental compliance exists when an individual complies with a 
request out of anticipation of a reward or to avoid punishment. Internalization occurs 
when an individual is intrinsically supportive of the requested action or when the 
requested action is congruent with the individual’s values. Personal identification 
occurs when an individual responds favorably to an action because the individual has 
adopted the same attitude as the person making the request or desires to be like the 
person making the request. Through Kelman, influence is viewed as a social interaction 
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process. Indeed, several works (Blau, 1974; Hollander, 1958; Jacobs, 1970) have 
examined this social interaction under the umbrella of social exchange theory. At its 
most basic level, influence and power within the context of social exchange theory are 
based on an exchange of benefits between individuals within an organization (Yukl, 
2002). Influence and power of a given individual is “directly propitiate to the group’s 
evaluation of the person’s potential contribution relative to that of other members” 
(Yukl, 2002, p. 154). In essence, the role of individuals with power and how they 
choose to use that power became a potential component in understanding why 
individuals adopt or reject management innovations.  
What is the connection between influence and power in the adoption of 
management innovations? In light of Kelman (1958), individuals comply with requests 
based on the influence of those making the request and to the degree that the request 
meets some need of both the influencer and those being influenced. Therefore, it is 
possible that influencers are more likely to exert power when the request is mutually 
beneficial to both the influencer and those being influenced. With regard to 
management innovations in higher education, individuals are more likely to exert power 
to encourage adoption of innovations when the innovation is mutually beneficial to both 
influencer and the individual being influenced. Conversely, the use of influence, or 
power, will be minimized when innovations are not mutually beneficial. 
So who are the influencers in organizations? Influence can be based on an 
individual’s proximity to an organization (Mintzberg, 1983), an individual’s position 
within the organization (Bass, 1960; Etzioni, 1961; French & Raven, 1959; Kanter, 
1979; Mintzberg, 1983; Yukl & Falbe, 1991), and an individual’s personal 
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characteristics (French & Raven, 1959; Hickson, Hinnings, Lee, Schneck & Pennings, 
1971; Kelman, 1958; Patchen, 1974; Yukl, 2002). With regard to an individual’s 
proximity to the organization, Mintzberg (1983) identified two proximities: those who 
located within an organization and those who are external to an organization. Internal 
influencers are those full-time employees who are responsible for making as well as 
executing the daily decisions and practices of the organization (Mintzberg, 1983). 
External influencers are not employees of the organization but, nonetheless, seek to 
affect the behavior of individuals within the organization by influencing organizational 
behavior (Mintzberg, 1983). Therefore, the adoption of management innovations may 
be influenced by individuals from within an organization and by individuals that are 
external to the organization. 
The adoption of management innovations may also be influenced by power that 
is linked to an individual’s position within the organization (Bass, 1960; Etzioni, 1961; 
French & Raven, 1959; Kanter, 1979; Mintzberg, 1983; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). Yukl 
(2002) identified five types of power associated with an individual’s position: 
legitimate, reward, coercive, information and ecological. Legitimate power is based on 
an individual’s formal authority over other individuals or activities (French & Raven, 
1959; Mintzberg, 1983; Yukl, 2002).  While an individual’s legitimate power may exist 
simply due to formal position within the organizational hierarchy, legitimate power has 
been found to be contingent upon the consent of subordinates (French & Raven, 1959; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Yukl, 2002).  Individuals have reward power when others perceive 
them as having access and control to important resources and awards and when others 
perceive the willingness of the individual as having the capacity and willingness to 
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make such rewards (French & Raven, 1959; Yukl, 2002). Coercive power is linked to 
an individual’s authority to impose physical or emotional sanctions or punishments on 
others (French & Raven, 1959; Yukl, 2002). Information power, much like reward 
power, is linked to an individual’s control over a specific type of resource, information 
(French & Raven, 1959; and Yukl, 2002). Unlike reward power, information power can 
be used to influence behavior upward, downward, and laterally within an organization 
(Yukl, 2002). Ecological power is more indirect and is linked to control over the 
physical environment, technology, and the organization of work (Yukl, 2002). By 
reengineering items like the work environment, work flow, work activities, reporting 
relationships, and information systems, it has been demonstrated that individual’s can 
influence the motivation and behavior of others (Cartwright, 1965; Lawler, 1986, 
Oldham, 1976; Hackman & Oldham, 1980; Mintzberg, 1983). To summarize, Yukl 
identified five types of power associated with an individual’s position that can influence 
individual behavior and motivation within organizations. Because the adoption of 
management innovations often requires changes in behavior, power associated with an 
individual’s position may have the potential to influence the adoption or rejection of 
management innovations.  
  In addition to power associated with an individual’s position, power may also be 
associated with an individual’s personal characteristics (Yukl, 2002). Yukl identified 
two types of power associated with an individual’s personal characteristics: referent 
power and expert power (Yukl, 2002). Referent power is linked to the desire of one 
individual (follower) to identify with another individual (leader). In this leader-follower 
relationship, the power of the leader is contingent upon the desire of the follower to 
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identify with the leader. Basically, the power of the leader to influence a follower’s 
behavior, attitudes, and/or beliefs increases when the desire of the follower to identify 
with the leader is greater (French & Raven, 1959). Therefore, it appeared that referent 
power of leaders was a variable that should be examined as related to the adoption of 
management innovations. 
 Expert power is a second form of power associated with an individual’s 
characteristics. French and Raven (1959) noted expert power is linked to knowledge or 
perception of knowledge held by an individual. Yukl also included individual skills as a 
source of expert power and noted both knowledge and skills must be task oriented. 
Others have also noted that expert power is relevant to the perceived availability and 
accessibility of other sources of knowledge and/or skill (Hickson et al., 1971; Patchen, 
1974). In effect, a leader’s expert power increases when sources of knowledge and/or 
skill are less available and accessible. Because the adoption of management innovations 
often requires increased knowledge and skills tied to the innovation, the perceived 
expert power of a leader might influence the adoption of a given innovation and was a 
variable of interest in this study. 
To summarize, Yukl (2002) identified five types of power associated with 
position and two types of power linked to an individual’s personal characteristics that 
can be used to influence behavior. One must therefore question, how does the use of 
power influence the adoption of innovations? Does the impact vary between the two 
categories? Does the impact vary based on the various types of power within each 
category? As will be discussed in the next paragraph, it does appear that the impact of 
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power on the adoption of innovations varies based on the type of power used by leaders 
to influence followers. 
Several studies indicate that legitimate, reward, and coercive power are 
correlated with changing behavior of individuals (French & Raven, 1959; Thambain & 
Gemmill, 1974; Warren, 1968; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). However, the literature also 
reveals that the change in behavior linked to the use of legitimate, reward, and coercive 
power is highly dependent upon individuals influencing the adoption (French & Raven, 
1959; Thambain & Gemmill, 1974). Additionally, the resulting change in behavior is 
not accompanied by commitment, especially when leaders only use legitimate power 
(Thambain & Gemmill, 1974). Essentially, the use of reward, coercive, and legitimate 
power may lead to adoption; however, that adoption might be short lived. This short-
lived adoption may be linked to the power and influence of individual leaders. As 
individuals leave the organization and/or as the locus of power changes, it is likely that 
the innovation will be dismissed and behavior will revert to the previous standard. On 
the other hand, expert and referent power have been positively correlated with 
subordinate satisfaction, performance change, and attitudinal commitment to the 
innovation (Warren, 1968). The use of expert and referent power to influence the 
adoption of management innovations is likely to increase the diffusion and 
sustainability of innovation in an organization.  
Additionally, power is dynamic and is contextual (Etzioni, 1961; Mintzberg, 
1983; Patchen, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981). Higher education organizations are often 
characterized as normative organizations. Normative organizations tend to value and 
support the use of referent and expert power (Etzioni, 1961). As a contrast, coercive 
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organizations, like prisons, predominately use coercive power (Etzioni, 1961). 
Historically, utilitarian organizations, such as businesses, tend to emphasize the use of 
reward and legitimate power (Etzioni, 1961). The use of referent and expert power 
within normative organizations is shaped by social relationships of individuals within 
the organization as well as the social norms that “sanction the power distribution and 
which define it as normal and acceptable” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 361).  Individuals within 
normative organizations tend to choose selectively to become involved in a given issue 
(Pfeffer, 1981). Those issues that have the most direct impact, either positively or 
negatively, are the issues with which individuals within an organization chose to 
become involved (Mintzberg, 1983; Patchen, 1974; Pfeffer, 1981). Coupled with the 
autonomy afforded the faculty within the dualistic higher education organization, 
faculty can very easily ignore management innovations that focus on the needs of the 
organization and, in fact, may choose to use professional influence to weaken support 
for innovations that threaten the social norms, accepted practices, and reasoning of the 
faculty subsystem (Mintzberg, 1979). In short, the literature indicates that the use of 
referent and expert power may have greater potential to influence the adoption of 
management innovations within normative organizations, like higher education.   
As a conclusion to this section, governance and power within higher education 
appear to be substantially linked to its dualistic structure. The dualistic structure 
includes two fully developed subsystems: one linked to professional faculty and largely 
normative; and a second linked to the administrative support system and largely 
utilitarian (Besse, 1973; Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). At the heart of 
the faculty subsystem is the faculty member who demands autonomy (Mintzberg, 
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1979). This demand for autonomy is likely to influence the adoption of a management 
innovation introduced by the administrative subsystem, especially if the innovation 
restricts autonomous behavior of faculty. 
It appears this dual system of governance and power impacts the diffusion of 
management innovations within higher education. Management innovations studied by 
Birnbaum (2001) had their genesis in the business sector. Given that business 
organizations tend to be more utilitarian, their social norms tend to value the use of 
reward and legitimate power perhaps more greatly than referent and expert power 
valued by higher education (Etzioni, 1961). Management innovations were introduced 
to higher education by common players that served as leaders in the business world and 
as leaders in higher education, most often as members of governing boards (Birnbaum, 
2001; Rogers, 1995). These external influencers see “problems with coordination, 
discretion, and innovation…resulting from a lack of external control of the professional 
and his profession” (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 67). In essence, external influencers link 
organizational problems to the inability of the academy to govern itself. To solve these 
problems, external influencers (business leaders serving on governing boards) proposed 
innovations related to more direct supervision, standardization of processes, or 
standardization of outputs (Mintzberg, 1979).  
Management innovations of this type flow through the organization via the 
administrative support system (Birnbaum, 2001). As these innovations trickle down 
through the system, they eventually impact the faculty subsystem through controls that 
lead to increased centralization and formalization of structures (Birnbaum, 2001; 
Mintzberg, 1979). At the intersection of the faculty and administrative subsystems, the 
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academic administrator must balance the tensions between the needs of the faculty and 
the needs of administration (Mintzberg, 1979). Unless the innovation is perceived as 
necessary to the faculty subsystem, or even worse, if the innovation is perceived as a 
threat to faculty autonomy, the innovation will likely not be adopted and may even be 
resisted (French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1979). If the academic administrator 
chooses to use power to move forward with the innovation, the risk is alienation of the 
professional operating core (Mintzberg, 1979). It is logical to conclude that the dual 
power structures of higher education impact the diffusion of management innovations 
within institutions of higher education. Power within higher education organizations 
differs from most business organizations and could possibly be a factor that explains the 
rejection of the seven management innovations studied by Birnbaum. Therefore, power 
was a variable of interest in this study. Because the literature indicated that the use of 
different types of power by leaders and the proximity of power impacts the adoption of 
management innovations, the study examined five types of power: legitimate, reward, 
coercive, expert, and referent.  
Organizational Ambiguity Tied to the Production Function within Higher Education 
Organizational ambiguity is a second characteristic that distinguishes higher 
education institutions from business organizations (Birnbaum, 2001) and was a variable 
of interest in this study. Organizational ambiguity in higher education is tied to the 
production function of the organization. The production function of an organization 
focuses on maximizing outputs through the standardization of inputs and technical 
processes (Birnbaum, 2001; Shafritz & Ott, 1996). At the heart of production function 
are four key elements: the ability to clearly articulate organizational goals; the ability to 
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standardize inputs and outputs; the ability to establish quantitative measures for both 
inputs and outputs; and the ability to identify and standardize processes that convert 
inputs to outputs (Birnbaum, 2001; Jones & Taylor, 1990; Shafritz & Ott, 1996). As 
will be discussed in the remainder of this section, the ability of higher education 
organizations to address these four elements of the production function is often more 
difficult than in most business organizations.  
First, organizational goals in higher education can be more ambiguous and more 
conflicting than in business organizations (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & Harvey, 
1993; Cohen & March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974). Goal ambiguity might be 
attributed to academic leaders who do not recognize or see the need for clarity; 
however, Cohen and March (1986) concluded that various organizational processes 
(e.g., processes used to develop normative mission statements and processes that 
establish and legitimize objectives) actually contribute to goal ambiguity. Cohen and 
March identified effective goals as having three elements: (1) goals must be clear and 
must articulate clear procedures and processes to measure progress toward their 
achievement; (2) goals must be problematic; that is goals must provide opportunity for 
success as well as failure; and (3) goals must be accepted by all significant groups 
within the institution. It is the third criterion that appears to cause the greatest difficulty. 
Cohen and March observed that goals generally emerge from normative processes as 
broad general statements that erode the first and second criteria in order to gain 
consensus. These normative processes generate goals that are broad, consensus-building 
statements (Cohen & March, 1986). If specific goals do emerge from these processes, 
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such goals are often not supported by the organization’s major constituencies (Cohen & 
March, 1986).   
Additionally, academic institutions often have conflicting goals. Conflicting 
goals, in part, grow out of the traditional tri-fold mission of higher education: teaching, 
research, and service. In 1966, Clark Kerr was among the first to note the divergent 
missions and the complex communities of the university when he referred to the higher 
education as a multiversity. Each mission and community of the multiversity has a 
different purpose that requires corresponding goals, management structures, decision-
making processes, and institutional resources (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & Harvey, 
1993; Cohen & March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974; Kerr, 2001). The multifaceted 
mission when coupled with growth, diversification, and specialization of higher 
education further contributed to conflicting goals (Birnbaum, 1988; Boyer, 1990). 
Birnbaum  (1988) noted “As colleges and universities become more diverse, 
fragmented, specialized and connected with other social systems, institutional missions 
do not become clearer; rather, they multiply and become sources of stress and conflict 
rather than integration” (p. 11). In essence, Birnbaum recognized that conflicting goals 
were naturally linked to the evolutionary growth of higher education’s mission. Because 
of the normative goal development processes discussed in the previous paragraphs, 
many academic institutions have embraced goals that often conflict with other 
established goals or purposes (Birnbaum, 1988; Boyer, 1990). These conflicting goals 
typically are not measurable, are not problematic, and are not accepted by all 
individuals within the institution (Birnbaum 1988, 2001; Brock & Harvey, 1993; Cohen 
& March, 1986; Gross & Grambsch, 1974). To note that academic institutions have 
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poor and conflicting goals is not an attempt to reveal an inconsistency that is in need of 
fixing. Instead, it is to highlight that this inconsistency is a valued and important 
characteristic of academic institutions (Cohen & March, 1986). While goals might not 
be as clearly stated nor as measurable as perhaps in business organizations, nonetheless, 
institutional goals are reflective of the diverse mission of academic institutions. In short, 
the absence of clearly articulated goals and the presence of conflicting goals are 
organizational characteristics that distinguish higher education institutions from 
business organizations as tied to the production function and potentially influence the 
adoption of management innovations in higher education.  
While the primary purpose of this section of the literature review is to examine 
difference between higher education and business, it appears that some of the same 
differences might exist between government and business. As an example, the federal 
government has difficulty defining goals and this difficulty is possibly due to the 
plurality of its constituents. Both higher education and government organizations seem 
to muddle toward some undefined goal and serve their constituents to the best they can 
even in the midst of ambiguity tied to the production function.   
The ability to standardize inputs and outputs is a second area within the 
production function that distinguishes higher education institutions from business 
organizations. Defining and standardizing inputs within higher education has become 
increasingly difficult (Baldridge et al., 1977). A major confounding aspect of the 
production model is that the primary input in higher education, the student, is non-
standardized (Baldridge et al., 1977). Institutions of higher education have little control 
over the quality of this input, and as a result, students come with varying abilities, 
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interests, and backgrounds. Additionally, higher education has difficulty defining and 
standardizing outputs. Outputs in higher education “differ substantially in kind and 
quality” (Jones & Taylor, 1990, p. 51). Inputs and outputs in higher education are ill-
defined and nonstandardized – a characteristic of the production function that is more 
evident in higher education than in most business organizations. 
The ability of higher education to quantify both inputs and outputs is a third 
characteristic that distinguishes higher education institutions from business 
organizations (Jones & Taylor, 1990). Many of the inputs and outputs within higher 
education are difficult to measure quantitatively (Jones & Taylor, 1990). For example, 
how does one validly quantify and control for the quality of students applying for 
admission? What factors should contribute to the quantification? How should academic 
intensity and quality of the high school curriculum impact that overall quality rating? 
Even if a quality characteristic like academic intensity and the quality of the high school 
curriculum could be quantified and even if standards could be set related to this 
characteristic, should a student be rejected from admission if the standard is not met? 
Perhaps more difficult than quantifying inputs is quantifying outputs. Many of the 
desired outputs of higher education are not easily quantifiable and are often intangible 
(Chaffee, 1985; Jones & Taylor, 1990). For example, Astin (1985) noted that “true 
excellence lies in the institution’s ability to affect the students…to make a positive 
difference in their lives. The most excellent instructions are…those that have the 
greatest impact…on the student’s knowledge and personal development” (pp. 60-61). 
Accordingly, a measurement of an institution output should include elements that 
quantify the institution’s ability to make a positive difference in a student’s life, to 
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impact the student’s knowledge and to impact the student’s personal development. The 
question then becomes how to quantify each of these elements? Which elements should 
be of greater importance? Additionally should these be the only factors considered in 
measuring an institutions output? What about outputs related to research, community 
outreach, economic development, and cultural enlightenment? In short, it appears that 
the ability to quantify inputs and outputs within higher education organizations is 
perhaps more difficult than in the business sector; and thus may be a factor that 
contributes to the rejection or management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001).  
The ability of higher education to identify the technical relationship between 
inputs and outputs is the final element of the production function that distinguishes 
higher education institutions from business organizations (Jones & Taylor, 1990). 
Essentially, the production model is reliant upon the ability of the organization to 
identify processes that convert inputs to outputs. In higher education there are several 
complicating factors that impact the organization’s ability in the identification of these 
processes. First, inputs are often used to produce multiple outputs (Jones & Taylor, 
1990). For example, students when viewed as inputs are linked to the production of 
graduates, the development of faithful alumni that will contribute back to the 
organization, and the production of community cultural events, just to identify a few. 
The production model is based on the principle that when a “homogeneous product is 
being produced, the assumption of the link [between inputs and outputs] is reasonable” 
(Jones & Taylor, 1990, p. 51). This assumption is false when variations in outputs tie to 
a single input, thus making it difficult to understand the linkage between inputs and 
outputs. The standardization of processes necessary to increase efficiency and 
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effectiveness is difficult absent of this understanding. Secondly, when there is a clear 
understanding of the linkage between outputs and inputs, processes can be standardized 
(Jones & Taylor, 1990). Unfortunately, within higher education there are many 
variations in process – there does not appear to be any one best technical process to 
convert inputs to outputs (Baldridge et al., 1977; Jones & Taylor, 1990). For example, 
there exist tremendous variations in university curricula and pedagogy, which are often 
identified as the primary process used to convert students (inputs) into graduates 
(outputs). Variations in these technical processes is further complicated by the difficulty 
in determining their effectiveness (i.e., how effective did the process change inputs to 
outputs?). Thirdly, a university’s inputs (students) can also become the university’s 
technical process (staff or instructors) and eventually the university’s output (graduates 
and alumni) (Jones & Taylor, 1990). In short, there are at least three factors that 
influence the standardization of processes within higher education: a single input can 
produce multiple outputs; multiple processes to convert inputs to outputs; and inputs 
that can be both the technical process and the output. It appears these three factors 
adversely impact higher education’s capacity to determine efficiency and effectiveness 
within the context of the production model, and thereby adversely impact the adoption 
of management innovations.  
To summarize, academic institutions exhibit four ambiguities tied to the 
production function that differ from business organizations: goal ambiguity; ambiguity 
of inputs and outputs; ambiguity of measuring inputs and outputs; and ambiguity tied to 
the technical process that convert inputs to outputs. So what is the issue related to 
ambiguity? An issue arises when management innovations flow from an organizational 
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sector that can easily establish clear and measurable goals, inputs, processes, and 
outputs to another organizational sector where these elements are more ambiguous 
(Brock & Harvey, 1993; Cohen & March, 1986). The seven innovations studied by 
Birnbaum (2001) flowed from business organizations to higher education institutions. 
These innovations were linked to rational models that required clearly articulated goals, 
inputs, processes, and outputs. These elements of the production model were 
foundational for determining success and for establishing accountability systems for the 
seven management innovations (Besse, 1973; Birnbaum, 1988). As previously 
highlighted, academic institutions tend to value ambiguity of goals, inputs, processes, 
and outputs – a value that is culturally and organizationally linked to the diverse 
mission of the university. Essentially, ambiguity tied to the production function of the 
university may have made it difficult for academic organizations to determine the 
success of the seven management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001). Perhaps 
more profoundly, the absence of clear and measurable organizational goals, inputs, 
processes, and outputs may have made it difficult to determine if the management 
innovation was appropriate for the institution or even if the innovations had the desired 
impact.  
It is logical to hypothesize that ambiguity tied to production function of the 
university contributed to the shortcomings of the seven management innovations 
studied by Birnbaum (2001). Therefore, ambiguity was a variable of interest in this 
study. Because the literature indicated that ambiguity was tied primarily to the 
production function, the study examined perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and 
outputs within subsystems of the higher education organization.  
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Coupling of Subsystems within Higher Education 
As highlighted in Chapter I, the relationship between various subsystems within 
a higher education organization may influence the adoption of management innovations 
(Birnbaum, 2001). Therefore, coupling of subsystems will be a variable of interest in 
this study. Weick (1976) described the relationship between two subsystems along a 
continuum that ranges from tightly coupled to loosely coupled. Tightly-coupled 
relationships exist when changes in one subsystem have a direct, corresponding result in 
the second subsystem (Weick, 1976). Loosely coupled relationships are evident when 
changes in one subsystem do not have a direct and corresponding result in a second 
subsystem (Weick, 1976). As an example, suppose the university assessment committee 
meets and decides that it is important for all degree programs to administer capstone 
exams to determine the level of student learning within each academic program. If this 
decision leads to the implementation of capstone exams across the campus, the 
connection between the university assessment committee and the university’s academic 
programs would be considered tightly coupled. Conversely, it is important to consider 
another situation where the president, through executive memorandum, decrees that 
capstone exams must be put in place across campus as part of the university’s new 
accountability program. If the decree is met with resistance and results in limited or no 
change, the relationship between the administrative subsystem and the academic 
subsystem would be considered loosely coupled.  
While these two examples are simplistic and present tight and loose coupling as 
dichotomous variables, in reality, operational relationships function along a continuum 
between tightly and loosely coupled. The degree of tightness or looseness is most likely 
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contributable to two conditions: “the extent to which subsystems have common 
variables between them and the extent to which the shared variables are important to the 
subsystem” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 39). Basically, if subsystems have common elements 
and if those common elements are important to each subsystem, the relationship will 
tend to be more tightly coupled. Thus, change in one subsystem would cause 
corresponding change in the other subsystem. On the other hand, if subsystems share 
only a few, unimportant elements, the relationship will be more loosely coupled, and 
corresponding change in each subsystem would be minimal. 
Coupling in higher education organizations is further complicated by structural 
components (Birnbaum, 1988). As previously discussed, most higher education 
organizations typically include two, fully developed subsystems: the faculty subsystem 
and the administrative subsystem (Mintzberg, 1979). The values of each subsystem are 
more different than they are alike (Mintzberg, 1979). Autonomy valued by the faculty 
subsystem is perhaps seen as a barrier to organizational effectiveness and efficiency 
valued by the administrative subsystem (Birnbaum, 2001, Mintzberg, 1979). The 
relationship between the two subsystems in most cases can be characterized as being 
loosely coupled (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001). Therefore, one may infer that management 
innovations introduced by the administrative subsystem are less likely to influence 
direct change in the faculty subsystem. 
Additionally, coupling in higher education is contextual. Organizations are not 
only impacted by the way in which subsystems are connected, but are also impacted by 
the “intentions, preconceptions and wills” of individuals within the subsystem 
(Birnbaum, 1988, p. 38). Basically, the coupling of one subsystem to another subsystem 
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is dynamically linked to the individuals within each subsystem. As individuals within 
each subsystem change and/or as the perceived needs of individuals change, coupling of 
that subsystem to another subsystem is impacted. This contextual element of coupling 
led Birnbaum to refer to higher education organizations as being more probabilistic than 
deterministic. In essence, it is difficult to predict with great certainty the outcome of a 
management innovation introduced to the system or to predict the future state of the 
organization linked to the introduction of the management innovation even though the 
historical and present conditions of an organization might be known and even though 
the historical and present conditions of the various subsystems within the organization 
might be known (Birnbaum, 1988). To summarize, it appears as though the acceptance 
or rejection of a management innovation within higher education could be impacted by 
the coupling of the administrative and faculty subsystems within the organization, 
which in turn is impacted by the wants, needs, and desires of individuals within each 
subsystem. 
Just as subsystems within the organization can be tightly or loosely coupled, 
relationships between various subsystems of an organization can also be tightly or 
loosely coupled with external subsystems (Birnbaum, 1988; Weick, 1976). Subsystems 
within the university interact with an external environment that includes many 
subsystems with a wide range of interests, expectations, and demands (Birnbaum, 
1988). For example, a governing board might impose a mandate to improve graduation 
and retention rates within nursing programs to meet better the demand for more nurses 
within its service area. Simultaneously, it is quite conceivable that an external 
credentialing board insists that the nursing program implement a more rigorous 
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academic curriculum to improve the quality of graduates. How does an organization 
manage these seemingly conflicting mandates? Birnbaum (1988) and Weick (1976) 
contend that loosely coupled subsystems within the university make it easier for the 
university to respond to conflicting demands. One subsystem can respond to a demand 
and can change without impacting other subsystems so long as the two subsystems are 
loosely coupled.  
To understand further the impact of coupling on the adoptions of management 
innovations in higher education organizations, the adoption path taken by management 
innovations should be considered. Management innovations are most often introduced 
to institutions through external subsystems and in reaction to a perceived crisis 
(Birnbaum, 2001). Subsystems external to an institution often include professional 
organizations, state level committees, and state legislatures who share common 
concerns and reactions to an economic crisis (Birnbaum, 2001). Next, these external 
subsystems introduce to the internal, administrative subsystem a cure for the crisis. The 
external subsystem (i.e., the governing board) and the internal, administrative 
subsystem (i.e., the executive administrative team) share many common components 
tied to the effective, efficient, and legal operation of the institution, and most of these 
components are of high importance. Thus, the relationship between the governing board 
and the administrative team in this instance could be considered tightly coupled, and 
one would expect that the governing board and the administrative team to move forward 
with the adoption of the innovation based on external subsystem’s request and pressure. 
As Chief Academic Officers (CAO) prepare to move forward with adoption, they 
realize that while they share many important components with the president they also 
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share important components with the academic unit. The issue for CAOs then becomes 
how to negotiate balance between two subsystems to which they are tightly coupled. As 
the decree to adopt the management innovation is passed from the CAO to the 
Academic Dean and then to the Department Chair, the relationships between the 
administrative subsystem becomes more loosely coupled and the relationship to the 
faculty subsystem becomes more tightly coupled. At this point of tension, the 
department chair must decide if and how to proceed with the adoption of the innovation. 
Is it possible for academic administrators to balance this tension? Is it possible for 
academic administrators to move forward with adoption of the management innovations 
in such a way that the values of the administrative subsystem are met and in such a way 
that the values associated with autonomy are supported by the professional operating 
core are not infringed? Is so, how is balanced achieved?  
To summarize, the literature seems to indicate that the adoption of the 
management innovation is potentially contingent upon the perceived degree of coupling 
that exists between the proposed management innovation and the organizational 
subsystem in which an individual is located. The more tightly coupled a management 
innovation is to a subsystem, the greater the likelihood of adoption. Conversely, the 
more loosely coupled a management innovation is to a subsystem, the less likelihood of 
adoption. Therefore, the study examined how individuals in a given subsystem within a 
higher education organization perceived the degree of coupling of their subsystem to a 
proposed management innovation. 
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The Evolution of Organizational Theory in Higher Education 
Overview of the Section 
The literature reveals at least three characteristics that distinguish higher 
education institutions from business organizations: power that is more dispersed than 
centralized; organizational ambiguity associated with the production function; and 
subsystems that are more loosely coupled than tightly coupled. The use of multiple 
organizational theories is important in understanding the contextual functions of these 
characteristics and their impact on the adoption of management innovations (Birnbaum, 
1988). Organizational theories are important because they provide an abstraction of the 
reality in which organizations function (Baldridge, et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; 
Bolman & Deal, 1997).  A single organizational theory will often highlight 
organizational functions from a single reality while diminishing other realities 
(Baldridge, et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997). Logically, the use of 
multiple theories facilitates an examination from multiple perspectives, thus providing a 
more comprehensive understanding of these characteristics and their function 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997). As a result, the fifth section of this chapter 
will focus on examining these characteristics and their functions from the perspectives 
of four organizational theories: structural theory, human resource theory, political 
theory, and systems theory.  
This section is divided into four subsections. Each subsection will focus on a 
single organizational theory and will (1) highlight the evolutionary development of the 
theory; (2) overview the theory’s major aspects and assumptions; and (3) provide a 
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discussion of how each model accounts for power, ambiguity tied to the production 
model, and the loose coupling of subsystems within the model.  
Structural Theory and the Bureaucratic Model 
 Evolution of structural theory and the bureaucratic model. Structural theory 
emerged in concert with the industrial revolution (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). The industrial 
revolution was fueled by the advancement of technology and the development of 
industrial machines. Industrial machines were expensive and were justified by increased 
production to offset their purchase and maintenance. The emphasis on increased 
production presented managers with new challenges. “Managers had to arrange for 
heavy infusions of capital, plan and organize for reliable large-scale production, 
coordinate and control activities of large numbers of people and function, contain 
costs,…and maintain a trained and motivated workforce” (Shafritz & Ott, p. 31). 
Basically, the success of managers was linked to optimizing the production function of 
the organization.  
 To optimize the production function, managers came to view the factory as an 
extension of its large machines (Wheatley, 1999). Within the factory machine existed 
production machines, and within the production machines existed smaller, specialized 
machines. Correspondingly, factory laborers performed mechanized functions as 
extensions of these machines. Because of the machine metaphor, managerial success 
was linked to finding the one best way to maximize efficiency of the production 
function (Shafritz & Ott, 1996).  
 It was the quest for the one best way that gave birth to structural theory. More 
specifically, it was the work of Adam Smith that gave rise to the discipline of 
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organizational theory and the structural perspective of organizations (Shafritz & Ott, 
1996; Toynbee, 1956). In the late eighteenth century at the dawn of the industrial 
revolution, Smith (1776) examined organizational efficiency within the context of a pin 
factory. Smith’s 1776 work, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, explored organizational structure as a means of increasing production through 
specialization and division of labor. Smith observed that the production function within 
a factory can be divided into smaller tasks (specialization), and these smaller tasks may, 
in turn, be assigned to individual laborers (division of labor). Through these specific 
assignments, laborers can specialize and better master the assigned task. 
Correspondingly, increased mastery contributes to increased effectiveness and 
efficiency of the overall production function.  
 Citing a pin manufacturing example, Smith (1776) noted that the making of a 
pin could be divided into eighteen different operations. Each operation could then be 
assigned to a laborer, and in some cases, two or three operations could be assigned to 
the same laborer. Smith observed that ten laborers, each assigned to specific operations, 
could produce 48,000 pens daily. Absent of this division of labor, Smith noted that the 
same ten men would be fortunate to produce 200 pens. In short, Smith’s work was 
among the first to cite specialization and division of labor as a structural solution to 
increase effectiveness and efficiency of the production function. 
In the 1800s, the literature identifies at least three key individuals responsible 
for further advancing organizational theory from a structural perspective: Daniel 
McCallum, Henry Metcalfe, and Henry Towne (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). Daniel 
McCallum, as superintendent of the New York and Erie Railroad, was the first to 
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systemize one of America’s largest industries. McCallum (1856) identified six 
principles key to the formation of organizations. The following principles were noted in 
a written report made by McCallum in the Annual Report of the New York and Erie 
Railroad Company for 1855 (p. 47). 
 A proper division of responsibilities 
 Sufficient power conferred to enable the same to be fully carried out, that 
such responsibilities may be real in their character. 
 The means of knowing whether such responsibilities are faithfully 
executed. 
 Great promptness in the report of all derelictions of duty, that evils may 
at once be corrected. 
 Such information, to be obtained through a system of daily reports and 
checks that will not embarrass principal officers, nor lessen their 
influence with their subordinates. 
 The adoption of a system, as a whole which will not only enable the 
General Superintendent to detect errors immediately, but will also point 
out the delinquent. 
In effect, McCallum moved beyond specialization and division of labor (Smith, 
1776) to include responsibilities for managers, power to execute those responsibilities, 
and a system of reporting deficiencies in the execution or responsibilities. Using these 
principles, McCallum developed perhaps the first organizational chart as a tool to 
achieve structural efficiency (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). 
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In the 1880s, the works of Metcalfe (1885) and Towne (1886) were perhaps the 
first to link organizational management to science. Metcalfe, a captain in the United 
States Army, advocated the systematic collection of data to increase production 
efficiency. Through the systematic collection and analysis of data, Metcalfe applied the 
principles of scientific inquiry to improve production efficiency. At about the same 
time, Towne, in a presentation to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME), encouraged the establishment of a forum to facilitate the “publication of 
papers and reports; and …meetings for the discussion of papers and interchanges of 
opinion” (p. 49) related to the “management of works” (p. 48). ASME adopted Towne’s 
proposal and took a leadership role in the scientific study of the “management of 
works.” In short, the works of Metcalfe and Towne further paved the way to studying 
organizations using the principles of scientific inquiry, thus elevating the study of 
organizations and management to a recognized discipline.  
The elevation of management to a science was a catalyst to more comprehensive 
structural theories. In 1916, Henri Fayol, a French engineer, published General and 
Industrial Management. Though not translated to English until 1949, the work is 
perhaps the earliest example of a comprehensive structural theory (Shafritz & Ott, 
1996). Fayol proposed the universal application of his comprehensive structural theory. 
Fayol’s theory identified six organizational structures: “technical (production of goods); 
commercial (buying, selling, and exchange activities); financial (raising and using 
capital); security (protection of property and people); accounting; and managerial 
(coordination, control, organization, planning, and command of people)” (Shafritz & 
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Ott, p. 34). It appears that Fayol’s six-structures signaled a departure from the simple, 
mechanistic perspective of organizations that prevailed in the 1800s. 
Though Fayol’s theory presented a comprehensive structural perspective of 
organizations, it appears that he recognized the elevated importance of the managerial 
structure. Fayol noted that “whilst the other functions bring into play material and 
machines, the managerial function operates only on the personnel” (p. 53), and went on 
to observe that the managerial function is contingent upon a “certain number of 
conditions termed indiscriminately principles, laws, and rules” (p. 53). Fayol identified 
a number of managerial principles to be used to maintain “soundness and good working 
order” of the organization. However, Fayol cautioned against rigid applications of these 
principles.  
…a suggestion of rigidity, for there is nothing rigid or absolute in management 
affairs, it is all a question of proportion. Seldom do we have to apply the same 
principle twice in identical conditions; allowance must be made for different 
changing circumstance, for men just as different and changing and for many 
other variable elements. (p. 52) 
Essentially, while Fayol’s major contribution was the presentation of one of the 
earliest comprehensive structural theories, it also appears Fayol was perhaps among the 
first to note managerial approaches were contingent upon organizational conditions. 
Across the Atlantic in the United States, Frederick Winslow Taylor was 
promoting a more rigid managerial approach – scientific management. Taylor (1916), 
building on the work of Metcalfe (1885) and Towne (1886), encouraged managers to 
use scientific inquiry as a means to study production functions and to maximize 
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efficiency within organizations. As an example, Taylor (1916) in an address titled The 
Principles of Scientific Management discussed the study of coal shoveling. At 
Bethlehem Steel Works, Taylor observed men shoveling rice coal. Each shovel load of 
rice coal weighed 3 ¾ pounds; however, these same men when working with iron ore 
shoveled 38 pounds in each load. As an observer, Taylor questioned why the difference 
in weight and wondered what weight could be used to achieve optimum efficiency. 
Through a series of experimental activities, Taylor identified an optimum weight of 21 
pounds. At 21 pounds, the ore piles reached a maximum height in the shortest amount 
of time. As a result of the experiment, 21-pound shovels where made to correspond to 
the materials being shoveled, and work flows in the steel yard were reorganized to 
ensure that each man had the appropriate shovel for the work being performed. Because 
of this experiment and the resulting changes, production at Bethlehem Steel increased.  
In essence, Taylor (1916) concluded efficiency could be achieved when 
managers engaged in the scientific examination and modification of production 
functions. Correspondingly, the responsibilities of the scientific manager was to (1) 
identify production functions, (2) identify the one best way to perform those functions, 
and (3) train workers and organize work flow necessary to standardize the one best way 
within that production function. Over time, the scientifically managed organization 
would emerge as the one best manufacturer for a given product. Indeed, scientific 
management sought to optimize organizational efficiency by increasing output through 
standardization of best way processes. 
Scientific management was pushed to center stage in the early 1900s due to a 
series of railroad rate hearings (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). The eastern railroad companies 
   70 
 
were appearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission because of requested rate 
increases. There was significant opposition to the rate increases. During the hearings, a 
consultant who had applied the principles of scientific management at the Santa Fe 
Railroad indicated that the eastern railroads could save a million dollars a day by simply 
applying the principles of scientific management (Urwick, 1956). Because of the 
hearings, scientific management became one of the first management innovations to 
become a national movement (Shafritz & Ott, 1996).    
Structural organizational theory was introduced to higher education in 1910 at 
the dawn of scientific management, when Morris Cooke, a mechanical engineer, was 
commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to 
examine efficiencies within higher education (Birnbaum, 2001). Cooke traveled to 
several universities and examined organizational structures and functions at each 
university. After these visits, Cooke (in Birnbaum, 2001) wrote,  
There are very few, if any, of the broader principles of management 
which obtain generally in the commercial world which are not, more or 
less, applicable in the college field, and as far as was discovered, no one 
of them is now generally observed. (p. 16)  
In other words, Cooke noted the absence of contemporary business management 
strategies in higher education and noted no barriers to prevent the usage of such 
strategies. More specifically, Cooke proposed that institutions establish standards to 
measure efficiencies and then establish processes to reach those standards.  
Cooke specifically suggested the establishment of the credit hour to measure 
institutional efficiency. Within a short time, the credit hour recommendation was 
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adopted by most institutions (Birnbaum, 2001), and most institutions started collecting 
data on many operational aspects and most institutions added businesspersons as 
trustees (Allen, 1917; Birnbaum, 2001). In addition, Cooke was among the first to 
question academic autonomy, and noted, “The college professor must take the position 
that he is not an individual set apart, and that in the long run he must be governed and 
measured by the same general standards that generally obtain in other occupations” 
(Cooke in Birnbaum, 2001, p. 16). In essence, Cooke’s work was perhaps one of the 
earliest management innovations to track from business to higher education and 
signaled the start of the race toward increased effectiveness and efficiency within higher 
education (Birnbaum, 2001).   
From the work of Adam Smith, Daniel McCallum, Henry Metcalfe, Henry 
Towne, Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor, it is evident that structural theory emerged in 
concert with the prevailing paradigm of the time – a rational paradigm focused on a 
quest for optimal organizational effectiveness and efficiency through the 
standardization of the production function (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). With the industrial 
revolution of the nineteenth century came a new array of production and managerial 
problems to be solved. According to Shafritz and Ott (1996), “The beliefs of early 
management theorists about how organizations worked or should work were a direct 
reflection of the societal values of their times” (p. 31), and the prevailing value of the 
time was scientific inquiry. In essence, scientific inquiry became the means by which 
mechanical engineers, industrial engineers, and economists of the late 1800s examined 
the inner workings of the factory in light of production-related goals. In a discussion 
about the factory system and the pressures of the time, Shafritz and Ott (1996) wrote,  
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Under the factory system, organizational success resulted from well-
organized production systems that kept machines busy and costs under 
control. Industrial and mechanical engineers – and their machines – were 
the keys to production. Organizational structures and production systems 
were needed to take best advantage of the machines. Organizations, it 
was thought, should work like machines, using people, capital and 
machines as their parts. Just as industrial engineers sought to design “the 
best” machines to keep factories productive, industrial and mechanical 
engineering-type thinking dominated theories about “the best” way to 
organize production. (p. 31) 
By the 1930s and 1940s, structural theory evolved to accommodate growing 
organizations (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). The work of Luther Gulick and Max Weber 
signaled a departure from a mechanistic view where organizations were viewed as 
simple machines to a view where organizations were viewed as a composite of 
subdivisions (Shafritz & Ott, 1996).  
In 1937, Luther Gulick proposed to increase organizational efficiencies through 
division of work and managerial responsibility. In his Notes on the Theory of 
Organization, Gulick (1937) noted that “work division is the foundation of 
organization” (p. 86).  Gulick recognized that an organization built around subdivisions 
required an “effective network of communication and control …[linked by the] 
executive at the center and the subdivisions of work” (p. 89). Basically, Gulick realized 
that a large organization with multiple subdivisions must have communication and 
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authority structures that link subdivisions with the chief executive controlling the 
organization. Glick (p. 89) proposed four steps to achieve this type of organization: 
1.  Define the job to be done. 
2.  Provide a director to see the objective is realized 
3.  Determine the nature and number of individualized and specialized work 
units into which the job will have to be divided…subdivision depends partly 
upon the size of the job...and upon the status of technological and social 
development at a given time. 
4.  Establish and perfect the structure of authority between the director and the 
ultimate work subdivisions. 
In essence, Gulick recognized that larger organizations required subdivision, that 
subdivision should be based on the job to be performed, and that a subdivided 
organization required a system of authority and communication to ensure 
standardization of processes and outputs.  
Max Weber, on the other hand, viewed organizations as “networks of social 
groups dedicated to limited goals and organized for maximum efficiency" (Baldridge, et 
al., 1977, p. 132). Weber (1922) was among the first to recognize the difference 
between formal work organizations, like factories, and less formal work organizations, 
like hospitals and universities. Weber introduced the term “monocratic bureaucracy” to 
describe these less formal organizations. Weber (1922, pp 80-81) identified the 
following six characteristics of a bureaucracy: 
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1.  There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are 
generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative regulations 
(division of labor). 
2.  The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a 
firmly ordered system of super- and subordination in which there is a 
supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones (hierarchy). 
3.  The management of the modern office is based upon documents, which are 
preserved in their original or draught form (policies and procedures).  
4.  Office management, at least all specialized office management – and such 
management is distinctly modern – usually presupposes thorough and expert 
training (specialization). 
5.  When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full 
capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that the obligatory time in the 
bureau may be firmly delimited.  
6.  The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less 
stable, more or less exhaustive and which can be learned. 
In essence, Weber saw the need for subdivision of growing bureaucratic organizations 
as a means of increasing organizational efficiency. Subdivision occurred around social 
systems prescribed by administrative regulations. These subdivisions required a 
management hierarchy that used established policies and procedures to standardize 
practices. 
 To summarize, both Gulick (1937) and Weber (1922) explored the use of 
subdivision as a means of establishing rationality within growing organizations. 
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Through structured lines of authority, communication and written procedures, 
organizations could better ensure standardization of processes and ensure 
standardization of outputs or services. 
Henry Mintzberg is the final structural theorist that will be examined. It appears 
that Mintzberg (1979), like Weber and Gulick, theorized that increased organizational 
complexity required increased subdivision and standardization. Mintzberg noted that in 
a simple organization standardization and efficiency can be achieved by operators who 
are “largely self sufficient” (p. 232).  As organizations grow in complexity and as 
division of labor occurs there is need for a manager to “coordinate the work of the 
operators” (p. 232).  Again as the organization grows with additional subdivisions and 
additional managers, there becomes a need for not only managers of operators, but 
managers of managers or in other words, an administrative hierarchy. As the 
organization grows yet again, a second administrative structure emerges in the form of 
analysts who become responsible for standardization of work processes, management, 
outputs and skills. In his 1979 book, The Structuring of Organizations, Mintzberg 
identified five interdependent social networks that emerge from a complex organization 
like the one described above:  
1. Operating core: operators who carry out the basic work of the organization – 
the input, processing, output, and direct support task associated with 
producing the products or services. 
2. Strategic apex: Those managers who are at the very top of the administrative 
hierarch, together with their personal staff. 
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3. Middle line: Those managers that join the strategic apex to the operating 
core. 
4. Technostructure: Analysts who carry out their work of standardizing the 
work of others, in addition to applying their analytical techniques to help the 
organization adapt to its environment. 
5. Support staff: Staff that support the functioning of the operating core 
indirectly. 
Mintzberg (1979) noted the structure of an organization is contingent on two 
factors: complexity and stability. Depending on the complexity and stability of its 
environment, an organization may take on one of four organizational types (see Figure 
1): machine bureaucracy (low complexity, high stability); professional bureaucracy 
(high complexity, high stability); simple structure (low complexity, low stability); and 
adhocracy (high complexity, low stability).  
Figure 1. Mintzberg’s organizational structures 
 
  Complexity 
  Low High 
Stability 
High Machine Bureaucracy Professional Bureaucracy 
Low Simple Structure Adhocracy 
 
Mintzberg (1979) labeled higher education as a professional bureaucracy given 
that it functions within a highly stable and highly complex environment. The operating 
core of the professional bureaucracy requires operators that are highly knowledgeable 
and skilled. As noted by Mintzberg,  
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The Professional Bureaucracy relies for coordination on the standardization of 
skills and its associate design parameter, training and indoctrination. It hires 
duly trained and indoctrinated specialists – professionals – for the operating 
core, and then gives them considerable control over their own work. In effect, 
the work is highly specialized. (p. 50)  
In effect, at the heart of the professional bureaucracy is the operating core where 
power and authority are rooted in professional expertise (Mintzberg, 1979). The 
professional bureaucracy is highly democratic because of the power of the professional 
(Mintzberg, 1979). Professionals seek to control their own specialized work and to 
control "administrative decisions that affect them" (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 56). Mintzberg 
even noted that professional bureaucracies often have "parallel administrative 
hierarchies, one democratic and bottom up for the professionals, and a second machine 
bureaucratic and top down for support staff” (p. 57), thus establishing that professional 
bureaucracies often have a plurality of power. Structurally, the only other fully 
developed aspect of the professional bureaucracy is the strategic apex. Basically, the 
strategic apex in the professional bureaucracy is the administrative support structure 
whose primary role is to serve the operating core (Mintzberg, 1979). Within the 
professional bureaucracy, middle line managers provide the link between the 
professional operating core and the strategic apex (Mintzberg, 1979; Birnbaum, 1988). 
In higher education organizations, middle line managers are often staffed by 
professionals associated with the professional operating core such as academic 
department chairs and deans. The technostructure is defined as that part of the 
organization that plans, coordinates, and formalizes the work of the professional 
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operating core (Mintzberg, 1979). Technocrats in higher education include those 
individuals who assist faculty with instructional development, curriculum development 
or course modification. The role of support staff within the professional bureaucracy is 
to provide direct and indirect support to the operating core (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Essentially, the purpose of middle management, technocrats, and support staff is to 
serve the specialized professionals within the operating core who require very little 
direct supervision.  
In essence, Mintzberg (1979) theorized that organizations include five basic 
structures. The organization and coordination among these structures is contingent upon 
the complexity and stability of the environment in which an organization functions. 
Mintzberg noted that organizations like hospitals and higher education institution 
function in an environment that is highly complex and highly stable and labeled such 
organizations professional bureaucracies. The largest and most developed structure 
within the professional bureaucracy is the operating core. The operating core is made up 
of highly skilled and knowledgeable professionals. These professionals have 
standardized professional skills and norms and require little supervision. Therefore, 
standardization of processes and outputs rests largely in the hands of the professional 
operating core.  
To summarize, structural theorists provide organizational views that emerged 
contemporaneous with the factory system and scientific inquiry. Structuralists viewed 
standardization of the production function as a means of achieving organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness. As organizations grew in size and complexity, terms like 
division of labor, job descriptions, span of control, organizational hierarchy, 
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specialization, policies, and procedures became the tools by which structuralists sought 
to standardize management, communication, and authority in an effort to control 
organizational processes and outputs. Structuralists like Weber and Mintzberg 
eventually realized that the internal and external environment in which an organization 
functions impacts its structure and tried to design organizational models that account for 
environmental issues like stability and complexity. But even the purpose of these 
models was to identify and to design structures that reinforce standardization at the 
appropriate level within the appropriate structures. In short, structural theorists focused 
on dissecting an organization into appropriate parts as a means to establish controls 
necessary to achieve standardization of technical processes and outputs. To further 
understand the structural theory and its potential impact on the adoption of management 
innovations, it is important to examine the assumptions associated with structural 
theory. 
In essence, this section of Chapter II has provided an overview of structural 
theory. This overview highlighted the evolution of structural theory from the initial 
works of Adam Smith in 1776 through the works of Taylor. This section also explored 
the linkage of structural theory with the bureaucratic organization model. Finally, the 
section ended with a discussion about the contributions of Gulick, Weber, and 
Mintzberg to structural theory. The next section will move into a more detailed 
discussion concerning the underlying assumptions of the structural theory and will be 
followed by a section that examines how the theory accommodates the three 
organizational characteristics of higher education. 
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Assumptions of structural theory and the bureaucratic model. 
 Structural theory appears to be built on a set of core assumptions associated with 
the production function of organizations. In 1997, Bolman and Deal articulated the 
following six assumptions associated with structural theory: 
1. Organizations exist to achieve established goals and objectives 
2. Organizations work best when rationality prevails over personal 
preferences and external pressures. 
3. Structures must be designed to fit an organization’s circumstances 
(including its goals, technology, and environment). 
4. Appropriate forms of coordination and control are essential to ensuring 
that individuals and units work together in the service of organizational 
goals. 
5. Appropriate forms of coordination and control are essential to ensuring 
that individuals and units work together in the service of organizational 
goals. 
6. Problems and performance gaps arise from structural deficiencies and 
can be remedied through restructuring. 
Primarily, structural theory assumes that effectiveness and efficiency can be 
achieved through the manipulation of organizational structure necessary to reinforce the 
standardization of inputs, processes, and outputs. As will be discussed in the next few 
paragraphs, the literature seems to indicate that structural theory is built on assumptions 
that conflict with at least two of the three characteristics that distinguish higher 
education from business organizations. 
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Power, ambiguity, and coupling within structural theory. The literature 
potentially indicates power within the examined structural theories is more centralized 
than decentralized and is more contingent upon position than the individual. Based on 
the previously noted assumptions, centralized power linked to position within the 
organizational hierarchy is required in order to standardize the production function of 
the organization and to achieve a desired level of efficiency and effectiveness. The 
exception would be Mintzberg’s professional bureaucracy where power is decentralized 
and is linked to knowledge and expertise of individual within the professional operating 
core (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997, Mintzberg, 1979). In general, while the 
literature indicates that the majority of structural theories require power structures that 
are more centralized than decentralized and more based on position than individuals, 
Mintzberg’s professional bureaucracy does appear to address adequately the 
decentralized power structures and powers tied to expertise that exist within most higher 
education organizations.  
 The literature indicates that structural theory requires goals, inputs, processes, 
and outputs that are more defined than ambiguous. Clearly defined goals, identified 
inputs, standardized processes, and measurable outputs are foundational organizational 
requirements within the examined structural theories (Baldridge, et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 
1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Gulick, 1937; Mintzberg, 1979; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; 
Weber, 1922). Articulation of the production function is linked to achieving 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency (Baldridge, et al., 1977, Birnbaum, 1988; 
Bolman & Deal, 1997; Shafritz & Ott, 1996). In essence, increased standardization of 
the production function leads to increased effectiveness and efficiency. Conversely, 
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ambiguity of the production function results in decreased effectiveness and efficiency.  
Ultimately, it appears structural theory is less likely to accommodate ambiguity tied to 
the production function that is more evident in higher education organizations than in 
business, and thus structural theory might be of little interest in understanding the 
rejection of management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001). 
With regard to the coupling of subsystems, the literature indicates structural 
theory requires subsystems that are more tightly coupled than loosely coupled. 
Structural theory primarily focuses on two subsystems: management and laborers. 
Gulick (1937) did recognize that growing organizations required further subdivision of 
labor; however, even within these subdivisions there was still a primary focus on 
structures that tightly linked these subdivisions with management. Weber’s (1922) 
monocratic bureaucracy and Mintzberg’s (1979) professional bureaucracy looked at 
organizational structures based more on a social network perspective than a purely 
production function perspective. Because of this, Weber and Mintzberg incorporated 
subsystems that included specialized laborers that perhaps required less direct 
supervision than historically nonskilled workforces. Mintzberg went even further in 
explaining how organizations are structured by identifying two additional subsystems: 
technostructure and support staff. Mintzberg even contended that highly specialized 
laborers (professional operating core) were perhaps more reliant upon the 
technostructure and support staff to complete job functions than middle management or 
senior level executives (strategic apex). Because of these relationships, it appears that 
the professional operating core might be more tightly coupled to the technostructure and 
support staff than to middle managers and the strategic apex. Birnbaum (1988) noted 
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that “tight coupling in one part of an organization leads to loose coupling in another” (p. 
121).  
 Conclusion of structural theory and the professional bureaucracy. As a 
conclusion to this discussion on structural theories and the professional bureaucracy, the 
literature indicates that early structural theorists focused on the standardization of the 
production function to achieve organizational effectiveness and efficiency. These early 
structures required centralized power and the tight coupling of the organization’s two 
subsystems: management and laborers.  Essentially, early structural theories do not 
adequately account for the three distinguishing characteristics of higher education 
organizations: power that is more decentralized than centralized; ambiguity tied to the 
production function and subsystems that are more loosely coupled than tightly coupled. 
However, it does appear that later structural theories, like Weber and Mintzberg, 
evolved to account for the growing complexity of organizations, and more specifically, 
the increased specialization and expertise of laborers. Most promising in addressing the 
complexity of higher education organizations was Mintzberg’s professional 
bureaucracy. While the professional bureaucracy did continue to some degree to require 
standardization tied to the production function of organization, the profession 
bureaucracy did move toward providing a structural model that recognized the reality of 
decentralized power and power tied to expertise; additional subsystems beyond 
management and laborers; and the coexistence of loosely coupled and tightly coupled 
subsystems within a single organization. Therefore, for the purpose of the study, the 
literature indicated that some elements of Mintzberg’s professional bureaucracy might 
serve as a model to understand how decentralized power and loosely coupled 
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subsystems influenced the adoption of management innovations within higher 
education.  
Human Resource Theory and the Collegial Model 
 Evolution of human resource theory and the collegial model. Some have noted 
that the rise of human resource theory began near the end of the World War II (Shafritz 
& Ott, 1996). It was during this period some organizational theorists began to challenge 
the foundational assumptions of structural theory (Barnard, 1938; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; 
Simon, 1946). The literature indicates that at least three organizational theorists 
contributed to this initial questioning and paved the way for eventual emergence of 
behavioral theory: Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and Peter Selznick. 
Chester Barnard was perhaps the first to signal a departure from the fundamental 
assumptions of structural theorists. In 1938, Barnard authored The Functions of the 
Executive. In this work, Barnard “sought to create a comprehensive theory of behavior 
in formal organizations that was centered on the need for people in organizations to 
cooperate – to enlist others to help accomplish tasks that individuals could not 
accomplish alone” (Shafritz & Ott, p. 97). Essentially, Barnard viewed the individual as 
the foundational element within an organization, a significant departure from viewing 
the production function as the foundational element. Such a theoretical departure began 
to link organizational efficiency to the willingness of individuals to cooperate to achieve 
organizational goals rather than efficiency linked to standardization of inputs, processes, 
and outputs. Similarly, the role of management in this view of organization moved from 
standardization of the production function and enforcement of the standardization to a 
role that supported cooperativeness of individuals within organizations. Indeed, Barnard 
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argues that failure of leaders to establish a cooperative system allows the “egotistical 
motives of self-preservation and of self-satisfaction” (p. 101) to become dominant 
within individuals who will ultimately lead to organizational “dissolution, or changes of 
organizational purpose” (p. 101). Basically, establishing a system of cooperation is 
paramount to the success of the organization. Bernard noted that to establish a system of 
cooperation requires managers to engage in three fundamental activities and as such 
viewed the role of an organizational leader as three-fold: to create and maintain a sense 
of organizational purpose; to develop formal and informal communication systems; and 
to foster cooperation through varied incentives and persuasion.  
In 1946, the Public Administration Review published an article titled “The 
Proverbs of Administration” written by Herbert Simon. In this article, Simon questioned 
structural theory at a very foundational level. Simon noted that good scientific theory 
should not only explain what is true, but should also provide an explanation of what is 
false. Simon elaborated, 
If Newton had announced to the world that particles of matter exert either an 
attraction or repulsion on each other, he would not have added much too 
scientific knowledge. His contribution consisted in showing that an attraction 
was exercised and in announcing the precise law governing its operation. (p. 
112)  
In making this statement, Simon accused contemporary structural theorists of 
propagating organizational proverb instead of organizational theory.  Simon noted that 
proverbs are used to rationalize “behavior that has already taken place or justifying 
action that has already been decided upon” (p. 112).  
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Simon (1946) found structural theories and their administrative principles to be 
inconsistent, conflicting, and lacking “application to concrete problems of 
administrative organization” (p. 113), especially when applied to organizations like 
health departments and city government.  Specifically, Simon noted that the principles 
of specialization, administrative hierarchy, span of control, and organizational structure 
based on purpose, process, clientele, and place lack contextual understanding and 
conflict with organizational realities as well as the principles of efficiency. As an 
example, Simon noted the following about specialization, 
In appears that the simplicity of the principle of specialization is a deceptive 
simplicity – a simplicity which conceals fundamental ambiguities. For 
“specialization” is not a condition of efficient administration; it is an inevitable 
characteristic of all group effort, however efficient or inefficient that effort may 
be. (p. 113) 
Through quotes like the one above, Simon signaled that organizational effectiveness 
and efficiency might be linked more to social or behavioral structures than to traditional 
production functions, thus questioning the fundamental, production-based assumptions 
of structural theorists.  
 In 1948, the American Sociological Review published an article by Philip 
Selznick titled “The Foundation of the Theory of Organization.”  Selznick was among 
the first to formally acknowledge that organization’s have irrational aspects by noting 
that formal organizational structures “never succeed in conquering the nonrational 
dimensions of organizational behavior” (p. 127). Selznick further elevated the 
importance of nonrational dimensions by noting that it is “indispensable to the 
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continued existence of the system of coordination and at the same time the source of 
friction, dilemma, doubt, and ruin” (p. 127). In short, Selznick offered that 
organizations should be viewed from two perspectives: (1) the formal organization that 
should be viewed as economy; and (2) the informal organization that should be viewed 
as an adaptive social system. The formal, or economy, view is consistent with the 
structuralists views of organizations in which production functions can be manipulated 
for the purpose of increased effectiveness and efficiency. The informal, or the adaptive 
social system, view is linked to the myriad of internal and external relationships that 
exist within an organization. Selznick noted, while an organization can be analyzed 
from these two distinct perspectives, both “are empirically united in a context of 
reciprocal consequences” (p. 128).  Selznick argued that organizations are cooperative 
systems “constituted of individuals interacting as wholes in relation to a formal system 
of coordination.” In effect, the reality of organizations results from reciprocal 
interactions of two subsystems: the formal and the informal. These two subsystems are 
more tightly coupled than loosely coupled (i. e., changes in one subsystem will have a 
direct and corresponding effect in the other).  Ultimately, Selznick identified the 
following three ideas that should be incorporated into organizational theory: 
1. The concept of organizations as cooperative systems, adaptive social 
structures, made up of interacting individuals, subgroups, and informal plus 
formal relationships; 
2. Structural-functional analysis, which relates variable aspects of 
organizations (such as goals) to stable needs and self-defensive mechanisms; 
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3. The concept of recalcitrance as a quality of the tools of social, involving a 
break in the continuum of adjustment and defining an environment of 
constraint, commitment, and tension.  
 At the heart of Selznick’s (1948) theory of organization was the realization that 
organizations are made up of individuals who may or may not hold the same goals and 
desires of the organization and that these individuals function within a context of a 
social system full of interactions internal and external to the organization. Therefore, 
Selznick realized that the introduction of innovations elicits socially constructed 
responses that influence the adoption or rejection of the innovation. Management 
innovations that threaten the stability or existence of the organizations must work 
through a process that Selznick titled cooptation, which is “the process of absorbing 
new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a 
means of averting threats to its stability or existence.” Essentially, cooptation is 
reflective of tensions that exist between formal controls, represented by structure and 
leadership, and social power, represented by the “subjective and objective factors which 
control the loyalties and potential manipulability of the community” (p. 136). Selznick 
theorized that when management innovations meet mutual needs of both the formal and 
informal subsystems those innovations are more likely to be adopted. Conversely, 
management innovations that threaten the informal systems and social power within 
that subsystem, the innovation will likely be rejected or will lead to compromises that 
insure stability of social power or an acceptable sharing of power between the formal 
and informal subsystems. There are four factors from Selznick’s work that are 
important to this study:  (1) organizations contains formal and informal subsystems; (2) 
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these subsystems may be tightly coupled or loosely coupled; (3) the adoption of 
management innovations in organizations is influenced by social behaviors; (4) when 
management innovations align with the needs of both the formal and informal 
subsystems, the innovation is perceived as legitimate and is likely to be adopted, thus 
inferring that legitimacy to some degree is socially constructed.  
Building on the work of Simon, Barnard, and Selznick organizational theory 
began to be linked to human and social psychology by the early part of the twentieth 
century. Hugo Munsterberg, a German-born psychologist, used behavioral psychology 
as a means to explore the relationship between employee characteristics (abilities, 
behaviors, and attitudes) and the psychological conditions within organizations and the 
impact of the two on employee productivity (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). Beginning in the 
1960s, the applied behavioral scientists explored the nexus between employee growth 
and development and organizational growth and development (Shafritz & Ott, 1996). 
By focusing on the relationship between the individual and the organization, the 
behaviorist perspective shifted and gave rise to human resource theory.  
Primary authors associated with human resource theory include Elton Mayo, 
Abraham Maslow, and Douglas McGregor. Elton Mayo and his team of researchers are 
most closely associated with a series of studies that occurred at the Hawthorne plant of 
the Western Electric Company beginning in 1927. Mayo’s primary contribution was a 
new view from which to explore organizations. From Mayo’s perspective, as noted by 
Shafritz and Ott (1996),  
the organization is not the independent variable to be manipulated in 
order to change behavior (as a dependent variable). . . . Instead, the 
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organization must be seen as the context in which behavior occurs. It is 
both an independent and a dependent variable. The organization 
influences behavior just as behavior shapes the organization. The 
interactions shape conceptualizations of jobs, human communication and 
interaction in work groups, the impact of participation in decisions about 
one’s own work, roles, and the roles of leaders. (p. 151) 
Mayo was among the first theorists to detect the important role that relationships 
between individuals and subsystems play within organizations.  
Another important author that contributed to an understanding of organizations 
from a  behaviorist perspective was Abraham Maslow. Maslow was an existential 
psychologist who established that an understanding of an individual’s needs is a critical 
starting point when discussing individual motivation. In his 1943 article “A Theory of 
Human Motivation”, Maslow identified three premises related to individual needs. First, 
Maslow noted that individuals have five basic needs (italicized portions taken from 
Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 104):  
1. Physiological (need for oxygen, water, food, physical health and 
comfort) 
2. Safety (need to be safe from danger, attack, and threat) 
3. Belongingness and love (need for positive and loving relationships with 
other people) 
4. Esteem (need to feel valued and to value oneself) 
5. Self-actualization (need to develop to one’s fullest, to actualize one’s 
potential)  
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Maslow noted that these needs are related and are arranged in a hierarchy. In other 
words, an individual cannot seek to meet the next need until the previous need had been 
realized. Second, Maslow theorized that the hierarchy is the underlying motivator of 
human behavior – humans seek opportunities and engage in activities that help the 
realization of these needs. Thirdly, the removal of any need once it is realized is 
perceived as a psychological threat, and equally important, the limitation of cognitive 
activities that help in the realization of the basic needs is perceived as an equal threat.   
In the 1960s, a professor from MIT, Douglas McGregor, viewed Maslow’s 
(1943) work from an organizational theorist perspective and hypothesized that 
employment was a means by which individuals sought fulfillment of needs. Professor 
McGregor (1957) introduced organizational theorists to the concept that laborers in 
trying to fulfill these needs wanted to be productive and ultimately demonstrate 
behaviors that fulfill managerial expectations. To illustrate this principle, McGregor 
developed Theory X and Theory Y. Each theory is based on a set of dichotomous 
managerial assumptions related to employee motivation. Theory X is reflective of 
classical structural theory: employees dislike work, avoid work, prefer to be led, resist 
change, and generally, are sluggards. Theory X managers emphasize direction, 
manipulation, and control (McGregor, 1957). Conversely, Theory Y individuals are 
self-directing, highly-committed individuals who genuinely find work to be satisfying. 
Theory Y managers seek to “arrange organizational conditions so that people can 
achieve their own goals best by directing their efforts toward organizational rewards” 
(McGregor, 1960, p. 61). McGregor warned that managerial assumptions related to 
these two theories and the outward manifestations of these assumptions by managers 
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lead employees to respond accordingly. As a summary, “Theory X places exclusive 
reliance upon external control of human behavior, while Theory Y relies heavily on 
self-control and self-direction” (McGregor, 1957, p. 180). Either way, follower 
behavior becomes self-fulfilling prophecies linked to the perspectives of their leaders 
(Shafritz & Ott, 1996). Because of his work, McGregor was hired as a consultant to 
design a new plant for Procter & Gamble in Augusta, Georgia. The plan was organized 
around Theory Y principles of open communication, peer-management, and peer-
controlled compensation systems (Bolman & Deal, 1997). Once the new plant was 
operational, it was “30 percent more productive than any other P & G plant” (Waterman 
in Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 101) 
To summarize, the organizational behaviorist perspective emerged following the 
work of Elton Mayo and developed as a major organizational theory due to the notable 
works of Maslow and McGregor. Organizations were called upon to recognize 
“people’s skills, attitudes, energy, and commitment as vital resources capable of either 
making or breaking enterprises” (Bolman & Deal, 1997, p. 101). The behaviorist 
perspective recognized that a symbiotic relationship exists between an organization and 
individuals within that organization. This perspective calls for organizational creativity 
where the individuals within an organization arrive at beliefs, attitudes and practices are 
mutually beneficial and that propel both the individual and the organization to a higher 
level. 
Out of the behaviorist theories grew the collegial organizational model for 
higher education. The collegial model promotes a culture where the university is viewed 
as a “community of scholars” (Baldridge et al., 1977). Millet (1962) noted that the 
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concept of such a community “presupposes an organization in which functions are 
differentiated and in which specialization must be brought together . . . not through a 
structure of superordination and subordination of persons and groups but through a 
dynamic of consensus” (p. 235). In 1973, Sanders further identified a collegial 
institution as one “marked by a sense of mutual respect for the opinions of others, by 
agreement about the canons of good scholarship and by a willingness to be judged by 
one’s peers” (in Birnbaum, 1988, p. 87). Downey (1996) further noted that the 
collegium is a “complex network of assumptions, traditions, protocols, relations, and 
structures within the university which permit the professoriate to control and conduct 
the academic affairs of the institution” (p. 6). In short, the collegial model and its 
community of equals reflect the practical realization of human resource theory within a 
University setting. 
The collegial institution and its community of equals have several key 
characteristics. Democratic decision making emphasizing thoroughness, deliberation, 
and consensus is paramount. Thoroughness requires significant interaction facilitated 
through networks “of continuous personal exchanges” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 94). The 
greater the interaction between the members of the community, the more they like each 
other (Hackman, 1976). Greater interaction also contributes to the emergence of 
common values and group norms (Birnbaum, 1988; Homans, 1950, 1961; March & 
Simon, 1958).  
Leaders in the collegial model are elected not appointed. Since leaders are 
elected, they are seen as servants rather than bosses. These servants have special powers 
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and responsibilities to the institution and to the collegiums, and thus are often seen as 
the "first among equals" (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988). 
As the first among equals, leaders are valued for their expertise and their ability 
to bring additional resources to the group. Leaders gain respect and trust from the 
collegium by conforming to group norms and by bringing additional resources and 
prestige to the collegium. Thus, expert and referent power are the means by which 
leaders exert influence. There is little room for reward, coercive, and legitimate power 
within the collegial model (Birnbaum, 1988; Baldridge et al., 1977). 
Interaction is paramount in the collegial model. Decision making requires “full 
participation of the academic community” (Baldridge et al., 1977, p. 134). Therefore, 
the effective leader is a highly dynamic person skilled in the art of interpersonal 
relationships (Baldridge et al., 1977). The effective leader must coordinate interaction 
across the collegium and must be willing to engage in such interaction. Birnbaum 
(1988) concluded that an effective leader in the collegium is one who respects group 
norms, conforms to group expectations of leadership, respects established channels of 
communication, does not give an order that will not be obeyed, listens, reduces status 
differences, and encourages self-control.  
To summarize, this section of Chapter II has provided an initial overview of 
human resource theory. This overview highlighted the evolution of human resource 
theory from the early works of Chester Barnard in the late 1930 through the works of 
Maslow and McGregor. Finally, this section ended by linking the emergence of the 
collegial organization model to human resource theory. The next section will move into 
a more detailed discussion concerning the underlying assumptions of the human 
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resource theory and will be followed by a section that examines how the theory 
accommodates the three organizational characteristics of higher education.  
Assumptions of human resource theory and the collegial model. Human resource 
theory appears to be built on a set of core assumptions associated with the production 
function of organizations. In 1997, Bolman and Deal articulated the following four 
assumptions associated with human resource theory: 
1. Organizations exist to serve human needs rather than the reverse. 
2. People and organizations need each other: organizations need ideas, energy, 
and talent: people need careers, salaries, and opportunities. 
3. When the fit between individual and system is poor, one or both suffer: 
individuals will be exploited or will exploit the organization – or both will 
become victims. 
4. A good fit benefits both: individuals find meaningful and satisfying work, 
and organizations get the talent and energy they need to succeed. (pp. 102-
103) 
Primarily, human resource theory assumes that organizational effectiveness and 
efficiency is linked to the alignment of human needs and organizational needs. As will 
be discussed in the next few paragraphs, the literature seems to indicate that human 
resource theory is built on assumptions that conflict with at least two of the three 
characteristics that distinguish higher education from business organizations.  
Power, ambiguity, and coupling within human resource theory. First, the 
literature indicates that power within the examined human resource theories is (1) more 
dispersed than centralized, and (2) is more contingent upon the individual as opposed to 
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the position, though elements of both are evident. The emergence of human resource 
theory in the nineteenth century represented a shift from effectiveness and efficiency 
linked to standardization of the production function to effectiveness and efficiency 
linked to social and behavioral structures and the impact of those structures on the 
production function (Barnard, 1938; Mayo, 1933; McGregor, 1957; Selznick, 1948; 
Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Simon, 1946). The emphasis on social and behavioral structures 
within organizations also represented a shift in power within the organization. If the 
success of organizations is tied to “people’s skills, attitudes, energy, and commitment” 
as noted by Bolman and Deal (p. 101), then power is more closely linked to the 
individual than to the structure of the organization. Correspondingly, power is more 
closely tied to individuals within organizations than to organizational structure, thus 
representing a shift from centralized power to power that is more dispersed.  
Yukl’s (2002) taxonomy of power also provides a framework from which to 
examine power within human resource theory. As previously established, Yukl 
identified five types of power tied to position (legitimate, reward, coercive, information, 
and ecological) and two types of power tied to individuals (referent and expert). Based 
on the discussion in the previous paragraph it seems logical that referent and expert 
power as defined by French and Raven (1959) might be of greater importance in human 
resource theory than perhaps power tied to position. Indeed, power within human 
resource theory appears to be linked to the capacity of individuals to construct a work 
environment that meets the needs of individuals and the organization. The construction 
of such an environment is developed through consensus of individuals. Consensus is 
linked to willingness of individuals to identify with the behavior, attitudes, and/or 
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beliefs of others in the group, thus referent power is important. Additionally, consensus 
is linked to the personal knowledge of individuals within the group. The greater the 
knowledge that an individual might have about a given situation, the greater the 
possibility that person might be able to develop consensus – thus the greater the power. 
Indeed it does appear the referent and expert power are elevated in human resource 
theory.  
However, what is the role of power? Is power linked to an individual’s position 
minimized in human resource theory? Power linked to position is still evident within 
human resource theory even though power appears to be more dispersed than 
centralized and even though power linked to formal authority is minimized. For 
example, to meet the needs of employees requires that leaders have access to resources 
in order to meet those needs. Access to resources in organizations is often linked to 
position. In that regard, it appears reward (the capacity of an individual to have access 
to resources) and information power (the capacity an individual to information) are 
equally important in human resource theory. Additionally, ecological power – the 
capacity to control the physical environment, technology, and organization of work – 
appears to be elevated. If consensus requires the reorganization of work, power would 
be linked to those individuals who have authority to control work organization. In short, 
it appears that power within human resource theory is more dispersed than centralized, 
and thus accommodates one of the characteristics that distinguishes higher education 
organizations from business organizations. Also it appears that three types of power 
linked to position (reward, information, and ecological) and two types of power linked 
to an individual’s characteristics (referent and expert) are perhaps more elevated and 
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prove useful in understanding the role of power in the adoption of management 
innovations. 
Second, the literature indicates that human resource theory continues to require 
standardization of the production function to determine effectiveness and efficiency. 
The primary assumption of human resource theory is that organizational effectiveness 
and efficiency is linked to the alignment of human needs and organizational needs. The 
alignment of those needs is obtained through consensus. Consensus is achieved through 
discussions that lead to the standardization of the production function necessary to meet 
the needs of the organization and the individual. In essence, efficiency and effectiveness 
is still achieved through standardization of the production function. However, 
standardization of the production function in human resource theory is a function that is 
shared between leader and follower, or in other words standardization to some degree is 
socially constructed. As a contrast, standardization of the production function in 
structural theory was strictly a function of leadership.  
If the standardization of the production function is a socially constructed 
process, is it possible for ambiguity tied to the production function to exist? On the 
surface, it would appear that if the consensus building process leads to the acceptance of 
ambiguity tied to the production function, then yes, ambiguity tied to the production 
function would be acceptable. However, as will be illustrated in the following two 
examples, the capacity of an organization to standardize the production function is 
paramount to the success of human resource theory.  
The first example is often used to illustrate the power of human resource theory 
(Bolman & Deal, 1997). In 1985, New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc (NUMMI) 
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opened a automobile manufacturing plant in Fremont, California. The plant was a joint 
venture between General Motors and Toyota. Management of the plant was provided by 
Toyota and the production model was designed around a human resource philosophy of 
“symbolic egalitarianism: workers and executives wore the same uniforms, parked in 
the same lots, and ate in the same cafeteria” (Bolman & Deal, p. 135). More 
specifically, the plant was organized around the tenets of Deming’s Total Quality 
Management. The new plant used a workforce of 5,000 former General Motors 
employees who had been laid off within the previous year. In the old plant, indicators of 
quality were nearly non-existent (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Holusha, 1989; Lawrence & 
Weckler, 1990). Within two-years, the Fremont plant was GM’s poster plant for quality: 
labor costs were down, productivity was up, absenteeism was down, the quality of cars 
produced was significantly improved, relationships between the union and the 
management were improved, and employee satisfaction was high (Bolman & Deal, 
1997; Holusha, 1989; Lawrence & Weckler, 1990). From all indications, it appears that 
the plant was a triumph for human resource theory and Total Quality Management, 
which lead GM to expand the program to other plants where similar successes were 
often replicated (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Hampton & Norman, 1987). 
A second example involves the application of human resource theory and TQM 
in higher education. For the purpose of the example, I will use a hypothetical small, 
liberal arts college with an enrollment of approximately 2,000 undergraduate students 
and 85 full-time faculty. Downey College contains an academic unit with two schools 
and nine departments. Management in the academic unit includes a vice president for 
academics, an assistant vice president, a dean for each school and nine department 
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chairs. Downey is steeped in the collegial model of governance where decisions are a 
result of thoroughness, deliberation, and consensus. The community of scholars within 
the college interact on a formal and informal basis to arrive at common understandings. 
Downey’s mission and functions have evolved over time to include three aspects: to 
provide high-quality teaching and learning opportunities for its students; to generate 
research that contributes to the betterment of society; and to engage in service that 
supports the university and its external community. While discussions within the 
college have periodically focused on more specifically defining the mission, there has 
been general consensus that the meaning of the mission should be left to the discretion 
of the various subunits and individuals within those subunits. Diversity in interpretation 
of Downey’s mission has evolved to be expected and honored.   
Overtime, Downey has been pressured by external individuals and groups to 
adopt indicators of effectiveness and efficiency tied to its mission. With mounting 
pressure, the college decided to engage in processes that moved toward identifying such 
indicators. In that process, the faculty within one subunit brought forth a strategy that 
seemed to honor autonomy of subunits while perhaps addressing external pressures. The 
subunit noted that this strategy, Total Quality Management, emphasized participation 
and diversity in the determination of organizational quality. After much review, 
scrutiny, and discussion, the college decided to move forward with the implementation 
of TQM. All agreed that TQM would be the process used to define quality measures 
linked to the universities three fold mission and to eventually identify common 
processes to help better achieve these indicators. Months into the TQM process, there 
emerged a number of quality indicators tied to the high-quality teaching that were 
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ultimately adopted by the college: percent of faculty with a terminal degree, percent of 
faculty submitting syllabi to a central location, and results from student satisfaction 
surveys. After several more months, it became evident that consensus related to other 
indicators would be difficult to achieve and a compromise was reached. The quality 
indicators in both of the remaining areas were linked to the percentage of departments 
achieving standards as established within the university’s subunits. It also became 
evident that the identification and standardization of processes would be equally 
difficult, and ultimately the TQM process was abandoned nearly three years after its 
adoption.  
In comparing the two examples, one might question why the management 
innovation, TQM, could be successfully adopted in some organizations and not in 
others. For the purpose of this discussion, one should question the role of the production 
function in the adoption of TQM. More specifically, was the standardization of the 
production a prerequisite for the successful adoption of TQM? Indeed, the literature on 
this issue seems to indicate that human resource management must be accompanied by 
standardization of the production function (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001; Bolman & Deal, 
1997). The NUMMI plant was able to use human resource theory (participative decision 
making) to standardize processes needed to address mutual needs of the organization 
(production of a standardized, high-quality product) and individuals. Conversely, 
Downey, with a rich tradition of collaborative decision making, was not able to 
standardize process in part due to difficulties tied to identifying common needs of the 
organization and the individuals. In normative organizations, like Downey, it is difficult 
to impose deterministic elements tied to production function. It might even be possible 
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to hypothesize that the collegial environment at Downey can only function and govern 
in areas that are not linked to the standardization of production function. Once the 
collegium moves toward standardization, the collegium becomes dysfunctional. 
Essentially, functionality of the collegial organization is contingent upon ambiguity of 
the production function.  
To summarize, the literature indicates that human resource theory continues to 
require standardization of the production function to determine effectiveness and 
efficiency. Standardization of the production function is necessary to facilitate the 
process of collaborative decision making which is tantamount to the success of human 
resource theory. In general, it appears that human resource theory does not appear to 
account adequately for ambiguity tied to the production function associated with most 
higher education organizations. On the other hand, the collegial model and its 
functionality appears to be contingent upon ambiguity tied to the production function, 
and is, therefore, a possibly appropriate perspective from which to view higher 
education and the adoption of management innovations. 
Third, the literature indicates human resource theory allows for subsystems that 
are both loosely coupled and tightly coupled. Selznick (1948) indicated that there 
existed two subsystems within organizations: the formal and informal. The formal 
subsystem is linked to organizational structure and the informal subsystem linked to 
social structure. These two subsystems are more tightly coupled than loosely coupled. 
Selznick’s observation appears to be at the heart of human resource theory which calls 
upon the alignment of organizational needs (formal subsystem) to individual needs 
(informal subsystem) as a means of achieving effectiveness and efficiency. In other 
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words, the increased meeting of individual needs is met by a corresponding increase in 
the meeting of organizational needs; and conversely, decreased meeting of individual 
needs leads to decreased meeting of organizational needs. 
Additionally, Selznick contended formal and informal subsystems each 
contained subgroups. Subgroups within the formal subsystem appear to correspond to 
structural elements linked to areas like division of labor and specialization. Subgroups 
within the informal system are determined by relationships within the organization as 
determined by the needs, values, and beliefs of individuals within the organization. 
Unlike structuralists, human resource theory indicates that the subgroups within the 
formal and informal subsystems are more loosely coupled than tightly coupled. 
Naturally, this coupling occurs within the larger context of the formal and informal 
subsystems. For example, changes in the organization of the wheel assembly line at 
NUMMI are likely to have a direct and corresponding change on the organization of the 
finance department, so long as the changes better meet the needs of the individuals in 
that unit and the needs of the plant.  The loose coupling of subgroups within the formal 
and informal subsystems is foundational to McGregor’s Theory X and the organization 
of the NUMMI plant. So long as subgroups within the organization adopt innovations 
that are of mutual beneficence to the individuals and the organization, those innovations 
are less likely to have an adverse impact on other subgroups, and in fact, the potential 
for positive impact is greatly increased given the tight coupling of the formal and 
informal subsystem. In essence, if the tire assembly plant implements an innovation that 
better meets the needs of the individuals within that unit and the needs of the 
organization, it is unlikely to have a direct and corresponding impact on the finance 
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department. However, because it will have an impact on the informal subsystem, that is 
the needs of individuals will be better met, the change is likely to have a direct and 
corresponding effect upon the formal organization over time. Subsystems within human 
resource theory appear to be linked to formal and informal subsystems. 
To summarize, the literature indicates that human resource theory in general 
supports two of the three characteristics that distinguish higher education organizations 
from businesses. Specifically, human resource theory recognizes that (1) power is more 
dispersed than centralized and (2) subsystems are viewed as both loosely coupled and 
tightly coupled. However, human resource theory does not accommodate ambiguity tied 
to the production function. 
Political Theories and the Political Model 
 Evolution of political theory and the political model. Thus far, two 
organizational models have been examined: the bureaucratic model and the collegial 
model. The bureaucratic model is governed by formal policies, formal authority and 
formal channels of communication that reinforce rational decision making necessary to 
achieve organizational goals (Baldridge et al., 1977, Pfeffer, 1981).  Within the 
collegial model, communication, resource allocation, authority, and governance is 
shared among a community of equals where organizational activity and decisions are 
“achieved not through a structure of superordination and subordination . . . but through 
a dynamic of consensus” (Millett, 1962 in Baldridge et al., 1977, p. 134). Bureaucratic 
and collegial models share three underlying assumptions: (1) the primary purpose of an 
organization is to accomplish established goals; (2) those with formal authority within 
organizations are responsible for establishing goals; and (3) rational processes and 
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formal rules provide the basis of decisions, interactions, and behaviors (Pfeffer, 1981; 
Shafritz & Ott, 1996). In the 1960s, political theorists, like Cyert, March, and Baldridge, 
began to challenge these organizational assumptions by examining organizations from a 
political coalition perspective. By 1981, Pfeffer described the old set of assumptions 
and their corresponding models as being “naïve, unrealistic and therefore of minimal 
practical value” (p. 352). Before entering further into a discussion on the assumptions of 
political models, it is important to define politics and to describe the basis of political 
activity within organizations.  
 First, the term politics has been defined a number of ways. Pfeffer (1981) noted 
politics “involves those activities taken within an organization to acquire, develop, and 
use power and other resources to obtain one’s preferred outcomes in a situation in 
which there is uncertainty or dissensus about choices” (p.362). Allen et al., (1979) 
proposed that politics involves “intentional acts of influence to enhance or protect the 
self-interest of individuals or groups” (p. 77). These two definitions share the following 
commonalities: (1) politics requires action or activity; (2) the object of that activity is 
linked to either acquiring or exerting power; and (3) self-interest is the motivating force 
of that activity. Therefore, politics is defined as an activity in which one engages in 
order to acquire or exert power necessary to promote the self-interest of an individual or 
group and to influence organizational decisions. 
With politics defined, the next question becomes, what is the organizational 
context in which political activity occurs? From a political theorist perspective, 
organizations are made up of many individuals who have diverse needs, varied interests, 
values, preferences, perspectives, experiences, and perceptions of reality (Bacharach & 
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Lawler, 1980; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Hickson et al., 1976; Mintzberg, 
1979; Pfeffer, 1981). These individuals, over time, are linked through a dynamic and 
complex system of coalitions (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & 
Deal, 1997; Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Coalitions reflect the efforts of individuals to acquire power necessary to influence an 
organization’s response to historical and current conflicts (Baldridge et al., 1977; 
Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). To 
summarize, political activity within an organization occurs within a complex web of 
coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962).   
This observation leads to the next series of questions: (1) “What is a coalition?” 
and (2) “Why do coalitions form?” A coalition is “a set of people who bargain among 
themselves to determine a certain distribution of organizational power” (Mintzberg, 
1983, p. 414). Coalitions form because of (1) limited organizational resources; (2) 
enduring differences; (3) conflict; (4) self-interests; and (5) the pursuit of power 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 
1997; Hickson et al., 1976; Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; 
Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). More specifically, coalitions form, in part, due to limited 
organizational resources around which most major organizational decisions are made 
and for which individuals within the organization must compete (Baldridge et al., 1977; 
Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997). Second, enduring differences exist among 
individuals (Bolman & Deal, 1997). These enduring differences are linked to the 
diverse interests, values, preferences, perspectives, experiences, and perceptions of 
reality associated with each individual (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Birnbaum, 1988; 
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Bolman & Deal, 1997; Hickson et al., 1976; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Third, 
conflict occurs at the intersection of limited resources and enduring differences 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal 1997).  Absent of sufficient resources, conflict 
arises over policy decisions and resource allocation processes (who gets what and how); 
and thus conflict becomes a necessary tenant of the political model not to be viewed as 
a problem, but rather as a natural outgrowth of limited resources and enduring 
differences (Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997). Fourth, self-interest 
becomes the primary concern of individuals when faced with conflict (Baldridge et al., 
1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; 
Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). Finally, no single individual or group has the power to 
directly influence the resolution of the conflict. As noted by Birnbaum (1988), “Some 
groups are stronger than others and have more power, but no group is strong enough to 
dominate all the others all the time” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 135). Therefore, the pursuit of 
power becomes the means by which individuals and groups seek to protect their self-
interest while resolving conflict (Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). In 
short, political activity occurs within a complex system of coalitions. These coalitions 
form because limited resources and enduring difference create conflict tied to resource 
allocations and policy discussions. Individuals form coalitions in order to acquire the 
power necessary to influence organizational decisions that are of common interest to 
members of the coalition and that tie to these conflicts.  
With coalition defined and with an understanding of why coalitions form, the 
discussion now focuses on how coalitions form. First, the literature indicates coalitions 
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emerge from a bargaining or negotiation process that includes assessment of power – 
reflective assessment of one’s own power and the power of a potential coalition partner 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1983); assessment of interests (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman 
& Deal, 1997; Hickson et al., 1976; Mintzberg, 1983); analysis of potential benefits and 
costs (Birnbaum, 1988); and negotiations or bargaining (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & 
Deal, 1997). Because of this continual process coalition formation is a complex process 
of assessment, analysis, and negotiation used by individuals and groups to amass power 
necessary to influence decisions within organizations, to obtain resources, and to protect 
self-interest. Coalitions within the political model are fluid (Pfeffer, 1981). Fluidity is 
rooted in the need to constantly reassess the potential contributions of any given 
individual or group toward helping another individual or group obtains identified 
resources. Coalitions are formed and negotiations are conducted on the basis of mutual 
dependency and mutual beneficence. Hence, coalitions are a temporary exchange of 
dependency for beneficence (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Baldridge, 1977; Birnbaum, 
1988; and Pfeffer, 1981).   
For the purpose of further understanding, a return to Downey College might be 
helpful. At Downey College there exists a College of Education and Psychology and 
within the college exist four departments: Education, Psychology, Educational 
Administration, and Sports Administration. The Education Department is responsible 
for seventy percent of the college’s credit hour production. The other three departments 
equally share the remaining thirty percent. The dean of the college, pressured by the 
administration, decides to implement a performance-based budgeting. At the heart of 
the performance-based approach is recruitment, retention, and graduation of students. 
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The Education Department quickly embraces the approach, and the chairperson 
immediately exerts influence to link performance with the number of students recruited, 
retained, and graduated. The chair of the Psychology Department learns of the 
Education Department’s plan and tries to exert his influence by advocating a plan that 
links performance to the percentage of growth. The dean dismisses the percentage-
based approach by noting the university is interested in overall growth in the number of 
students, not percentages. In response, the Psychology Department chair visits with the 
other two department chairs to explain the dean’s response to his percentage-based 
proposal and to explain how the number-based proposal places their small departments 
at a disadvantage. From the meeting, the chairs of the small departments agree to 
endorse the percentage-based proposal and to meet with the dean, which leads to a 
subsequent meeting of the dean and all four department chairs. In the meeting, the dean 
proposes a formula-based approach that rewards both percentage and numerical growth.  
The chair of the large department continues to endorse the number-based approach and 
openly opposes the percentage- and formula-based approaches. After much discussion 
and comprise, a revised formula-based proposal is endorsed by all departments and 
adopted by the college.  
In this fictional vignette, the College of Education and Psychology consisted of 
four diverse departments. Each of the departments contained faculty and staff with 
diverse experiences, knowledge, and perspectives. Yet within each department was a 
common need to secure resources based upon a proposed performance-based funding 
system. In essence, each department represented a coalition formed around a resource 
allocation need. The strongest coalition (i.e., the coalition with the most power and 
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influence) was the largest department. However, by forming a coalition of small 
departments, the smaller departments were able to increase power and to influence the 
outcome of the proposed policy.  
 To summarize, individuals and groups engage in political activity as a means to 
acquire, develop, and exert power. Power is necessary to influence policy discussions, 
resource allocations, and the resolution of conflict within organizations. Since no single 
individual or group has sufficient power to influence such decisions and to protect their 
self-interest, individuals and groups amass power by forming coalitions with other 
individuals and groups who share common needs and interests. In essence, a political 
organization can be viewed as consisting of many sub-coalitions. 
In light of the previous paragraphs that provide a general overview of the 
political model, it is now more appropriate to return to a discussion about assumptions 
tied to the bureaucratic and collegial models.  As a reminder, bureaucratic and collegial 
models share three underlying assumptions: (1) the primary purpose of an organization 
is to accomplish established goals; (2) those with formal authority within organizations 
are responsible for establishing goals; and (3) rational processes and formal rules 
provide the basis of decisions, interactions, and behaviors (Pfeffer, 1981; Shafritz & 
Ott, 1996). Pfeffer (1981) characterized the assumptions tied to these models as “naïve, 
unrealistic, and therefore of minimal practical value” (p. 352). In light of Pfeffer’s 
comments, the following paragraphs will examine each assumption within the context 
of political theory. 
First, the primary purpose of bureaucratic and collegial organizations is the 
accomplishment of goals. However, the literature characterizes organizational goals 
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within the political model as multiple, confusing, conflicting, transitory, and self-
absorbent (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Michealsen, 
1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). These 
characteristics result from political processes in which coalitions bargain, negotiate, and 
jockey to influence the process as a means of self-preservation (Baldridge et al., 1977; 
Bolman & Deal, 1997; Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & 
Lipsky, 1997). In essence, the primary purpose of political organizations is policy 
formation which leads to the establishment of goals, rather than the pursuit of actual 
goals (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997). Basically, the 
process of goal setting supersedes the pursuit of actual goals. A more detailed 
discussion of this goal setting process is discussed later in this section. 
Second, goals within the political model are not established by those in formal 
authority. Those with formal authority do not necessarily have the prerequisite power to 
summarily establish organizational goals (Baldridge et al, 1977; Birnbaum, 1988, 
Bolman & Deal, 1997; Pfeffer, 1981). Power within political theory is more closely 
linked to individuals than to organizational structures, and correspondingly, power is 
often more dispersed than centralized (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Brown, 
1986; Kipnis, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Scheff, 1970). Absent of power 
linked to structural hierarchy, goals emerge from dynamic and fluid processes that 
involve many individuals and groups.  
  Finally, rational processes and formal rules are not the primary sources that 
govern decisions, interactions, and behaviors within the political model. Pfeffer (1981) 
observed that rational processes “focus attention on the development of technologies to 
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more effectively achieve a goal or set goals such as profit or efficiency” (p. 363). In 
effect, rational processes seek to improve efficiency and effectiveness through the 
standardization of the production function. Legitimacy of rules that govern 
organizational behavior also emerges from these rational processes (Baldridge et al., 
1977; Pfeffer, 1981). Early political theorists recognized that rational processes did not 
accurately accommodate the reality in which many organizations function: conflicting 
goals, unclear technologies, divergent beliefs, dispersed power, and self-interest of 
individuals (Baldridge, et al., 1977; Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1966; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Instead these theorists proposed a model in which decisions, interactions, and beliefs 
emerge from dynamic political processes. The political decision making process is 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
To summarize, the political model diverges from the assumptions shared by the 
bureaucratic and collegial models. At the heart of the political model is the political 
process which gives rise to organizational goals, decisions, interactions, and behaviors. 
At the heart of the political process are individuals who seek power necessary to 
influence decisions, to acquire resources, and to protect their self-interest.  
 The political model and process raise several concerns relevant to understanding 
the adoption of management innovations in higher education. First, the political process 
appears to be inefficient in that the political processes consume significant time, energy, 
and resources while yielding very little in return. The process is extremely fluid – 
almost a come-and-go process – where individuals choose to become involved based on 
the perceived importance placed on a given issue. Fluidity requires a significant 
expenditure of organizational resources and individual energy, which ultimately 
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contributes to low levels of participation and indifference (Baldridge et al., 1971; 
Birnbaum, 1988). Second, the political process potentially contributes to fragmentation 
(Birnbaum, 1988). Competition over resources and reluctance to share existing 
resources contributes to fragmentation (Birnbaum, 1988). Fragmentation is also linked 
to a negotiation process that requires individuals and groups to compromise continually. 
Even well intended compromise leads to political winners and losers, which over time 
means that the politically strong get stronger and the weak get weaker. Third, 
inefficiencies and fragmentation contribute to low levels of accountability, in the 
political system determining who is responsible for what is extremely difficult. Finally, 
the political model fails to recognize the potential role of rational decision making and 
organizational structure (Baldridge et al., 1977). It is highly unlikely that all 
organizational issues can be most effectively addressed via the political process. In 
summary, the political model appears to contribute to fragmentation of the organization, 
inefficiencies and lack of accountability, and fails to recognize the role of rational 
processes and organizational structure.  
However, the political model does seem to have several advantages that may be 
of relevance to this study. First, the political model accommodates the three 
characteristics that distinguish higher education organizations from business 
organizations: dispersed power; ambiguity tied to the production function; and loosely 
coupled subsystems. Second, the three disadvantages (fragmentation, inefficiencies, and 
lack of accountability) appear to support a stable system. As noted by Birnbaum (1988), 
“No one knows the totality of what is happening, and their activities often resemble 
random movements that cancel each other out and provide stability” (p. 139). Finally, 
   114 
 
the political model supports important symbolic elements, confirms valued traditions, 
and reaffirms historical myths (Edelman, 1967; Birnbaum, 1988).  
To summarize, this section of Chapter II has provided an initial overview of 
political theory. This overview highlighted the major differences between political, 
bureaucratic, and collegial models. In addition, the section operationally defined 
politics, examined issues tied to political activity within organizations, and provided 
additional insights into the function of coalitions within the political model. Finally, the 
section ended by drawing attention to the potential advantages and disadvantages of the 
political model as related to the adoption of management innovations. The next section 
will move into a more detailed discussion concerning the underlying assumptions of the 
political model and will be followed by a section that examines how the political model 
accommodates the three organizational characteristics of higher education.  
Assumptions of political theory and the political model. Political theory is built 
on a set of core assumptions that primarily focus on the transitory jockeying for power 
necessary for individuals and groups to influence policy decisions necessary to address 
their needs and to protect their self-interest. In general the literature identifies the 
following core assumptions: 
1. Organizations are viewed as super-coalitions that contain many sub-
coalitions (Baldridge, 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Cyert & March, 1963; 
March, 1962; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). 
2. Sub-coalitions are made up of individuals and groups with varied interests, 
values, preferences, perspectives, experiences, and perceptions of reality 
   115 
 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Hickson et al., 1976; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981).  
3. Policy formation is the single most important function of the organization. 
Policy decisions are the conduit through which resources are allocated 
within organizations, and therefore become the primary source of conflict 
within organizations. Policy decisions also become the primary method 
through which organizational goals, priorities, and strategies for achieving 
those goals are established (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman 
& Deal, 1997). 
4. As conflict increases, political activity increases because individuals and 
groups seek to acquire and exert power necessary to influence policy 
decisions in ways that reflect their interests, values, preferences, 
perspectives, experiences, and perceptions of reality. Therefore, self-interest 
is seen as the primary motivation for individuals to become involved in the 
political process of policy formation (Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal, 
1997; Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & 
Lipsky; 1977). 
5. Political activity is also linked to availability of resources and homogeneity 
of individuals within the organization. Political activity is inversely related 
to the availability of resources: as resources increase conflict decreases. 
Political activity is also inversely related to homogeneity of individuals 
within organizations. When individuals are more homogeneous, political 
activity decreases (Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997). 
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6. Individuals and coalitions with the greatest power, who choose to engage in 
political activity, receive the greatest reward. Conversely, individuals and 
coalitions with the least amount of power or individuals and coalitions who 
choose not to engage in political activity receive the least award (March, 
1966; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Primarily, political theory assumes that organizations can best be examined and 
understood as political systems – that there exist within organizations the same 
characteristics as found in local, state, and federal political systems (Baldridge, 1977). 
In essence, organizations are seen as containing the same dynamics, conflicts, 
motivations, and structures found in political systems. Political theory assumes that 
policy formation is the single most important activity of the organization. Policy 
formation is seen as the primary means of resource allocation, which establishes 
organizational goals and establishes strategies for achieving those goals. Therefore, 
policy formation is the greatest source of conflict with an organization. Political theory 
also assumes that self-interest is the primary motivation for individuals within 
organizations, and individuals choose to become involved in policy formation only as a 
means to protect that interest. Finally, politically theory assumes that the acquisition and 
assertion of power is the most effective way for individuals to influence the policy 
formation process.  
Based on these assumptions, how does political theory account for decentralized 
power, ambiguity tied to the production function, and loose coupling of organizational 
subsystems within higher education organizations? Additionally, how do these 
assumptions impact the adoption of management innovations in higher education? As 
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will be discussed in the next few paragraphs, the literature seems to indicate that 
political theory is built on assumptions that accommodate the three characteristics that 
distinguish higher education from business organizations.  
Power, ambiguity, and coupling within political theory. First, power is the 
primary organizational force within the political model (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & 
Deal, 1997; Pfeffer, 1981). As noted by Bolman and Deal (1997), “Even though 
different groups in an organization have conflicting preferences, they also have shared 
interests in avoiding continuously destructive conflict. So, they agree on ways to divide 
power and resources, and those settlements are reflected in the design of the 
organization” (p. 199). Essentially, organizational structure reflects the negotiation of 
power and resources through historical political activity. Therefore, power within 
political theory has two primary characteristics that are of importance to this study: (1) 
power is more dispersed than centralized; and (2) power is more appropriately viewed 
as an individual phenomenon than as a structural phenomenon.     
Power within the political model tends to be more dispersed than centralized 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1983, Pfeffer, 1981). First, power is no longer solely 
linked to organizational structure and the accompanying legitimate authority provided 
to managers (Bolman & Deal, 1997). Instead, power tied to position is viewed as “only 
one of many available sources of organizational power, and power is aimed in all 
directions – not just down through the hierarchy” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 353). In fact, 
Bolman & Deal (1997) noted that the over usage of power linked to an individual’s 
position lessons an individual’s ability to maneuver politically and even generates 
resistance. Second, power is linked to multiple sources (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 
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1983, Pfeffer, 1981). As noted by Birnbaum (1988), “Power is diffused rather than 
concentrated and many individuals and groups have power of different kinds and in 
different situations” (p. 133). In part, Birnbaum links diffused power to three factors: 
individuals, coalitions, and situations. With regard to individuals, diffused power is 
contributable to three factors: (1) power requires the expenditure of political energy; (2) 
political energy within a given individual is finite; and (3) organization structures are 
built on large bases with smaller upper tiers (Mintzberg, 1983; Scheff, 1970). In 
essence, power has the potential to be more dispersed because the bottom structure of 
most organizations has a larger number of individuals with specialized skills or 
knowledge who collectively have a larger pool of political energy (Mintzberg, 1983; 
Scheff, 1970). Third, the role of coalitions in the political process further disperses 
power (Birnbaum, 1988). Coalitions  provide an increased source of energy for political 
activity. While it is possible for lower-level participants to form coalitions that can 
potentially become more influential than their higher-ranking superiors (Birnbaum, 
1988); it is also possible for higher-ranking superiors to form coalitions with other 
superiors or lower-level participants to amass the power and political energy required to 
influence successfully a given issue. Fourth, dispersed power is dynamically linked to 
the myriad of issues and conflicts that arise within an organization (Birnbaum, 1988). 
The rise and fall of power follows the ebb and flow of conflict and issues within the 
organization. While today’s conflict with the state legislature might require expertise 
(power) of the president, tomorrow’s conflict with an external accrediting body very 
well might require the expertise (power) of the academic department being accredited. 
Hence, power in the political model is more decentralized than centralized due to the 
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transitory nature of conflicts that require a variety of resources, knowledge, and skills in 
order to be resolved. Finally, power is more dispersed because of the arena affect. As 
noted by Mintzberg, 1983, individuals “pick and choose their issues concentrating their 
effort on the ones more important to them, and of course, those they think they can win” 
(p. 414). This picking and choosing translates to individuals defining arenas in which 
they choose to engage in political skirmishes while deferring other arenas and political 
skirmishes to others. What emerges within an organization are various political arenas 
that become the fields on which issues and conflicts are resolved (Mazzoni, 1991). Each 
arena will have different rules, have different players, and focus on different issues 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Mazzoni, 1991). The emergence of these 
arenas further contributes to the diffusion of power. As highlighted in this paragraph, 
power within the political model is more dispersed than centralized due to five factors: 
power is more associated with individuals than with organizational structure; power 
emanates from multiple sources; coalitions provide an increased supply of political 
energy; and power linked to the myriad of issues that surface within organizations.  
A second characteristic of power within the political model is the linkage of 
power to individuals rather than to organizational structures (Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Brown, 1986; Kipnis, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Power linked to the 
individual is contingent upon three factors: (1) individual sources of power; (2) 
individual willingness to become involved in the political process; and (3) individual 
political skill. First, the literature identifies several sources of power: control of 
resources; control of technical skills; control of a specific body of knowledge; control of 
agendas; control of meaning and symbols; and/or control or access to individuals with 
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control of the first five (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Mintzberg, 1983). The greater the need 
within the organization for a limited resource, specialized skill or specific knowledge, 
the greater the potential power of individuals (Pfeffer, 1981). Hence, an individual’s 
power is contingent upon the scarcity or importance of a given resource, skill, or body 
of knowledge (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981). Second, this 
type of power is contingent upon the willingness of an individual to exert political 
influence. Individuals with power (i.e., control of a valued resource, skill or knowledge) 
must first choose when and how to use that power (Mintzberg, 1983). In essence, 
“politics involves those activities or behaviors through which power is developed and 
pursued in organizational settings. Power is a property of the system at rest: politics is 
the study of power in action” (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 362). Therefore, political activity within 
organizations at any given time is reflective of individuals with power who have chosen 
to exert political energy as a means to influence a given policy discussion or to resolve 
conflict (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1983). Those individuals who choose to get 
involved have greater potential to influence the framing of a given issue, the decision 
making process, and the ultimate decision or compromise that is reached (Brown, 1986; 
Bolman & Deal; 1997; Pfeffer, 1981). In essence, political power is the exertion of 
power by individuals as a means to shape the organizational reality in which they work 
(Bolman & Deal, 1997). Finally, power is contingent upon the political skill of an 
individual. Political skill determines the effectiveness to which individuals leverage 
their power to influence decisions and policies (Mintzberg, 1983). Political skill is 
influenced by such factors as charm, physical strength, attractiveness, and charisma 
(Kipnis, 1974; Mintzberg, 1983). To summarize, an individual’s power within the 
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political model is contingent upon three factors: the basis of the individual’s power; the 
degree to which that individual is willing to expend energy necessary to capitalize on 
that power; and the political skill of the individual.     
To understand the implication of power linked to an individual’s personal 
characteristics on the adoption of management innovations within the political 
framework requires understanding why and when individuals choose to get involved in 
the political process (Pfeffer, 1981). First, Mintzberg (1983) noted that individuals 
when confronted with change exercise three options: (1) loyalty – stay and contribute as 
expected; (2) exit – leave the system; and (3) voice – stay and try to change the system. 
Mintzberg went on to define voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape 
from an objectionable state of affairs” (p. 413). In light of Mintzberg’s observation, two 
additional questions emerge: when is a situation objectionable and when do individuals 
and groups exercise the voice option? Baldridge et al., (1977) hinted that objectionable 
situations might include limited access to resources, attacks by outside pressure groups 
and attempts by internal groups to assume power. With regard to the second question, 
the literature indicates that individuals identify arenas in which they choose to become 
involved (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Mazzoni, 1991; Patchen, 1974). As noted by Bolman 
& Deal (1997), “Arenas help determine what game will be played, who will be on the 
field and what interest will be pursued” (p. 198). Essentially, voice would be exercised 
when issues are objectionable and when these issues are within a prescribed political 
arena. Next, individuals tend to engage in the political process when issues are of 
importance and when the likelihood of their involvement will yield positive results 
(Baldridge et al., 1977; Michealsen, 1981; Patchen, 1974; Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977). 
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In short, individuals tend to become involved in the political process when an issue is 
objectionable, is within a prescribed political arena, is of personal interest and when 
success is likely. Therefore, it appears that the political process may only influence the 
adoption or rejection of management innovations when these four criteria are met. To 
broaden our understanding of the potential impact of political processes on the adoption 
of management innovations, it becomes important to examine power using Yukl’s 
(2002) taxonomy.  
As previously established, Yukl (2002) identified five types of power tied to 
position (legitimate, reward, coercive, information, and ecological) and two types of 
power tied to individuals (referent and expert). Based on the previous two paragraphs, 
an examination of referent and expert power within the context of political theory is 
warranted. As the reader might recall, referent power is contingent upon the desire of a 
follower to identify with the leader (i.e., the greater the desire of the follower to identify 
with the leader the greater the leader’s power to influence the follower’s behavior, 
attitudes, and/or beliefs) (French & Raven, 1959). In part, political power is linked to 
the capacity of an individual to build political coalitions with other individuals or 
groups. The process of coalition building involves social interaction (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Walton & McCredie, 1965). Indeed, coalition building has been identified as a key 
difference between more and less successful managers (Kotter, 1982; Bolman & Deal 
1997). In this social interaction, individuals “try to assess their own power, the power of 
potential coalition partners, the degree to which the interest of the parties coincide, and 
the potential costs and benefits” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 142). The success of these social 
interactions is linked to how individuals perceive their self-interest will be promoted 
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(i.e., the greater the likelihood of self-promotion the greater the likelihood of forming a 
coalition). Effectively, an individual’s power increases when other parties identify with 
the individual, thus increasing the importance of referent power. Similarly, expert 
power linked to political knowledge and skill is of great value. Specifically, the 
literature indicates political power increases with increased knowledge of given issues; 
increased knowledge of external and internal resources; increased awareness of others’ 
interest and needs; and increased political skill (Hickson, et al., 1971; Kipnis, 1974; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Patchen, 1974). To summarize, a great amount of power within the 
political model is contingent upon a given issue and the degree to which others can 
identify with an individual in light of that issue as well as the individual’s level of 
knowledge and skills tied to the specific issue. Most certainly, referent and expert 
power are important in political theory.   
However, does power linked to position play a role in political theory? Power 
associated with an individual’s position continues to play an important role even in light 
of power that is more decentralized and pluralistic and even though structural power is 
of less impact. For instance, power within the political model has been linked to control 
of resources, skills, knowledge, agendas, meaning, symbols, and individuals (Bolman & 
Deal, 1997; Mintzberg, 1983). Access and control to several of these (resources, 
knowledge, agendas, and individuals) are linked to position. Therefore, it appears that 
reward power (access to resources), information power (access to information), and 
ecological power (control of organizational structure) are of elevated importance in 
political theory. Of less importance are legitimate power (authority) and coercive power 
(sanctions or punishments). To summarize, the literature appears to indicate that power 
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within political theory is more dispersed than centralized, and thus is consistent with 
one of the distinguishing characteristics of higher education. Also, the literature 
indicates that three types of power linked to the position category (reward, information, 
and ecological) and two types of power linked to an individual’s characteristics 
(referent and expert) are of increased importance and perhaps would provide greater 
understanding tied to the adoption of management innovations in higher education.  
Second, ambiguity tied to the production function is a characteristic supported 
by the political model (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997; 
Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). 
Ambiguity is most evident in the identification of organizational goals. Goal setting 
within the political model is transitory at best. Goals of the organization are seldom set 
by those with formal authority, but rather are negotiated between individuals and groups 
of individuals (coalitions). Through the political process, goals emerge from iterative 
interactions of bargaining, negotiating, and jockeying (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Pfeffer, 
1981). The political process involves coalitions whose members bring diverse 
perspectives, needs, and demands to the process (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Pfeffer, 1978). 
The underlying motive of participation in the political process is self-interest 
(Baldridge, 1977; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Michealsen, 1981; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1981; Weatherly & Lipsky; 1977). What evolves from this political process of self-
preservation is “a confusing multiplicity of goals, many in conflict” (Bolman & Deal, 
1997, p. 167).  Goals are also transitory due to shifting power. As coalitions change and 
as power shifts from one coalition to another, goals and priorities change and often 
contribute to conflicting goals (Pfeffer, 1981). Given that conflict is a necessity in 
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political systems, conflicting goals and technologies are both products of and fuel for 
the political model (Pfeffer, 1981).  
Standardization of other production functions and associated measures of 
effectiveness and efficiency appear to be linked primarily to the perspectives of those 
involved in the political process. As noted by Pfeffer (1978),  
Since organizations are coalitions, and the different participants have varying 
interests and preferences, the critical questions becomes not how organizations 
should be designed to maximize effectiveness, but rather, whose preference and 
interests are to be served by the organization. . . . What is effective for students 
may be ineffective for administrators. What is effectiveness as defined by 
consumers may be ineffectiveness as defined by stockholders. The assessment 
of organizations is dependent upon one’s preferences and one’s perspective. (In 
Bolman & Deal, 1997, pp. 198-199) 
According to Pfeffer (1978), determinants of organizational efficiency and effectiveness 
are linked to individual preferences and perspectives, and these preferences and 
perspectives influence the standardization of such determinants through political 
processes. Baldridge (1977) noted that individuals and coalitions are often more focused 
on political activity involved in goal setting than any associated process concerned with 
determining organizational efficiency and effectiveness to reach those goals. 
Organizational efficiency and effectiveness discussions within the political system are 
also limited due to unclear technologies (Birnbaum, 1988). Due to the complexity and 
fluidity of the political process, contingency of issues, limited resources, conflicting 
technologies, and diversity of perspectives, it is possible to infer that any 
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standardization of the production function is minimal at best and nonexistent at worse. 
In essence, it appears that political theory does not require the standardization of the 
production function, and therefore provides a potential framework from which to 
understand how ambiguity tied to the production function impacts the adoption of 
management innovations in higher education. 
Third, the literature indicates political theory allows for subsystems that are 
more loosely coupled than tightly coupled. As might be concluded from the previous 
paragraphs, the political model is perhaps the most loosely coupled of the three models 
discussed thus far. Birnbaum (1988) referred to the political model as a “shifting 
kaleidoscope of interest groups and coalitions” (p. 132). As interactions occur in the 
form of negotiations and compromise, stated goals, outcomes, and purposes are 
constantly changing. In fact, outcomes are more likely to be by-products of the process 
then they are to be intended outcomes (Steinbruner, 1974). As noted by Birnbaum 
(1986), 
The parties to political process have different preferences. As they interact 
through negotiations, compromises, and coalition formation, their original 
objectives change. Since the groups with which type interact are also modifying 
their positions, the social environment in which they are functioning changes 
more quickly than they can respond to. It is impossible to predict in advance 
which of many alternative outcomes will in fact take place. The actual outcome 
is likely to be the resultant by-product of many forces and may be neither 
intended nor preferred by any of the participants. (p. 144)  
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Birnbaum notes that it is difficult to predict the outcome of a given issue once that issue 
is introduced to the political system and its loosely coupled subsystems. For the purpose 
of this study, one could conclude that the same would hold true for the introduction of a 
management innovation within a political system; it would be difficult to predict the 
adoption or rejection of a management innovation introduced into a political system and 
any resulting impact on that system.  
Superficially, it appears that an organization from a political perspective is a 
large super-coalition that consists of many dynamic, loosely coupled sub-coalitions. 
However, is such a perspective always evident? Do tightly coupled subsystems exist 
within the political framework? Indeed, political systems by their very nature could not 
exist absent of tightly coupled sub-coalitions. These sub-coalitions are tightly coupled, 
interdependent subsystems (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1997). Absent of 
interdependency, there can be no political activity. Absent of tightly coupled 
subsystems with common needs coalescing around a common issue, there can be no 
political activity. Therefore, tight coupling appears to be more closely linked to 
organizational issues and common needs than to organizational structure.  
It is also conceivable that this interdependency – tight coupling – can increase 
over time due to continuing common needs, reoccurring issues, and enduring 
differences (Bolman & Deal, 1997). In addition, a number of political theorists have 
supported the possibility of tight coupling tied to organization structure (Bolman & 
Deal, 1997; Brown, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981).  Baldridge (1977) noted that early political 
models ignored the importance of tightly-coupled bureaucratic processes, especially 
those processes associated with day-to-day operations. In addition, the literature also 
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reveals that political systems are described along a continuum of loosely coupled 
(underbounded) subsystems to tightly coupled (overbounded) subsystems (Alderfer, 
1979; Bolman & Deal, 1997; Brown, 1983). Power within overbounded systems is 
centralized and processes are tightly regulated. Conversely, power within underbounded 
systems is decentralized and processes loosely regulated. Pfeffer (1981) noted that 
power relations within organizations evolve to become permanent features. Because of 
specialization and division of labor, subsystems responsible for continually executing 
mission critical functions develop tightly coupled relations with other subsystems. 
These tightly-coupled relations often become permanent features of the political 
organization. Ultimately these subsystems become tightly coupled and linked to 
organizational structure (Pfeffer, 1981).  
To summarize, the literature indicates that political theory generally supports the 
three characteristics that distinguish higher education organizations from businesses. 
Specifically, political theory recognizes that (1) power is more dispersed than 
centralized; (2) ambiguity is tied to the projection function; and (3) subsystems are 
viewed as both loosely coupled and tightly coupled. 
Up to this point, three organizational models have been highlighted: the 
bureaucratic model, the collegial model, and the political model. Each model provides a 
single framework, or lens, through which individuals can interpret events and 
understand relationships within an organization (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 
1997). While each model might in and of itself be correct, does a single-lens model 
accurately capture the complex nature of an organization? Furthermore, what if the 
models are rooted in paradigms that might not be entirely appropriate for higher 
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education? It appears these models are unlikely to provide a guiding framework because 
of two overarching issues. 
First, these models provide a single perspective for analysis in order to increase 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The bureaucratic and collegial models 
reduce purpose and function to align with organizational structures so as to facilitate 
increased effectiveness and efficiency through rational decision making and 
deterministic processes. These classical models assume structure and function occur 
within bounded, closed systems with little interaction or feedback from their external 
environment (Fleener, 2002; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Scott, 1961; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; 
Thompson, 1967; Wheatley, 1999). Similarly, the political model reduces purpose and 
function to align with the self-interest of individuals so as to facilitate increased 
effectiveness and efficiency through political decision making and power-based 
processes. The theoretical underpinning of all three models continues to rely heavily on 
simple stimulus-response analysis within bounded systems and subsystems. These 
deterministic perspectives limit the understanding of complex organizations like 
colleges and universities, which have come to be viewed as more dynamic, normative 
systems (Wheatley, 1999). Dynamic systems require organizational models that provide 
increased understanding and analysis tied to unpredictability, self-creation, and 
autonomy (Birnbaum, 1988; Fleener, 2002). Even as early as 1935, individuals like 
Lawrence Henderson, were advocating complex methods of analyses that include 
“simultaneous variations of mutually dependent variables” (p. 13) (Kast & Rosenzweig, 
1972; Katz & Kahn, 1962; Scott, 1961; Thompson, 1967).   
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Second, all three models are single-lens models that may limit analysis and 
understanding tied to complex organizations and complex issues like the adoption of 
management innovations. Basically, while each model might in and of itself provide a 
good snapshot of an organization, no single model accurately captures the complex 
nature of higher education organizations. The literature underscores the importance of 
using organizational models that provide multiple-lenses from which to analyze and to 
broaden our understanding of organizational complexity (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & 
Deal, 1997; Pfeffer, 1981). In effect, complex organizations require a complex 
paradigm form which to understand organizational functions and decision-making 
processes. Such models emerged in the twentieth century in tandem with the 
introduction of systems theory. Therefore, the purpose of this section is five-fold: (1) 
discuss the emergence of the systems theory; (2) identify the major characteristics of 
systems theory; (3) discuss Richard Birnbaum’s cybernetic model; (4) discuss power, 
ambiguity, and coupling within the cybernetical model; and (5) discuss implications of 
systems theory and the cybernetical model on the adoption of management innovations.  
The Emergency of Systems Theory  
Systems theory emerged in the early twentieth century as a parallel, yet 
alternative, discussion to other organizational theories (Doll, 1993; Fleener, 2002). Two 
early proponents of systems theory included Henri Bergson and Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy. Henri Bergson was born in 1859, the same year Darwin’s Origin of Species 
was published. Bergson, a philosopher, proposed a natural-systems perspective to 
examine psychosocial relationships within biological and naturalistic processes 
(Fleener, 2002). Bergson wondered if organic, or natural, systems as opposed to 
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mechanical systems might provide an alternative perspective from which to analyze and 
understand phenomena. Bergson (1907/1911) challenged mechanistic pursuits of 
understanding by proposing a creative and interactive world that was much greater than 
the sum of its parts (Doll, 1993; Fleener, 2002). As noted by Bergson (1907/1911) 
The only question is whether the natural systems which we call living beings 
must be assimilated to the artificial systems that science cuts out within inert 
matter, or whether they must not rather be compared to the natural system which 
is the whole of the universe. That life is a kind of mechanism I cordially agree. 
But is it the mechanism of the parts artificially isolated within the whole of the 
universe or is it the mechanism of the real whole? The real whole might well be, 
we conceive, an indivisible continuity. The systems we cut out within it would, 
properly speaking, not then be parts at all; they would be partial views of the 
whole. And, with these partial view put end to end, you will not make even a 
beginning of the reconstruction of the whole, any more than, by multiplying 
photographs of an object in a thousand different aspects, you will reproduce the 
object itself. (p. 31) 
In other words, Bergson (1907/1911) contended that the essence of a natural 
system is always greater than the sum of its isolated parts, thereby inferring that 
phenomena are better understood through holistic, or systems, perspectives than through 
the study of the systems’ isolated parts. Bergson further provided an illustration to 
support the importance of this perspective. 
A very small element of a curve is very near being a straight line. And the 
smaller it is, the nearer. In the limit, may be termed a part of the curve or a part 
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of a straight line, as you please, for in each of its points a curve coincides with 
its tangent. . . . In reality, life is no more made of . . . elements than a curve is 
composed of straight line. (p. 31) 
Beyond the holistic understanding tied to systems, Bergson (1907/1911) appears 
to provide the genesis for at least one other early tenant of systems theory: phenomena 
occur within creative, rather than deterministic, systems. In general, Bergson proposed a 
systems vision where phenomena may creatively interact with stimuli from the 
environment, which is considerably different than mechanical perspective. The former 
represents creative interaction with the environment while the latter is more 
deterministic. Basically, Bergson linked survival to creative action rather than 
deterministic reaction. In terms of application to this study, Bergson’s approach is 
considerably different than the perspective promoted by bureaucratic, collegial, and 
political models and seems to imply that the primary goal of organizations is survival 
rather than maximization of the production function. 
Nearly four decades after Bergson’s initial work, Ludwig von Bertalanffy also 
expressed his concerns with the reductionists’ perspective. As Bertalanffy (1956) noted, 
this fragmented perspective “led to a breakdown of science as an integrated realm. The 
physicist, the biologist, the psychologist, and the social scientist are, so to speak, 
encapsulated in a private universe, and it is difficult to get word from one cocoon to the 
other” (p. 1). In essence, Bertalanffy feared that isolation prevented sharing of research 
across disciplines and thus promoted an inaccurate context for their findings.    
However, Bertalanffy was most troubled by the lack of interaction required to 
explore fully the doom imposed on closed systems when applying Newton’s second law 
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of thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy continually 
increases toward a maximum resulting in a state of equilibrium (Katz & Kahn, 1966). 
Two primary principles govern this law: entropy and equilibrium. Entropy is “an 
inverse measure of a system’s capacity to change” (Wheatley, 1999, p. 76). Equilibrium 
is “A condition in which all acting influencers are canceled by others resulting in a 
stable, balanced, or unchanging system” (American Heritage Dictionary, p. 461). Based 
on these definitions and Newton’s second law, systems continually move toward an 
unchangeable state. In essence, “equilibrium is the end state in the evolution of closed 
systems, the point at which the system has exhausted all of it capacity to change, done 
its work, and dissipated its productive capacity into useless capacity” (Wheatley, 1999, 
p. 76). Bertalanffy realized that the second law painted an apocalyptic picture of 
organizations and the world; however, he also realized that the existing research paths 
with their divergent and specialized approaches were a barrier to resolving this issue.    
In the 1950s, Bertalanffy’s work contributed to the emergence of a new 
discipline called General Systems Theory. In 1954 the Society for General Systems 
Research was formed, and the basis of this emerging discipline was outlined in 1956 
when the first volume of the General Systems Yearbook was published. Through an 
article in this inaugural publication, Bertalanffy proposed a holistic approach toward 
understanding the concepts of “organization, wholeness, defectiveness, teleology, 
control, self-regulation, [and] differentiation . . . in the biological, behavioral, and social 
sciences” (p. 2). General Systems Theory, as proposed by Bertalanffy, called for the 
examination of phenomena at the systems, or macro, level (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972). 
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Bertalanffy’s proposal was a dramatic shift from the micro level and mechanical 
approaches that had been in place for nearly 200 years (Kast & Rosenzweig, 1972).  
Contributions from researchers in biology, chemistry, physics, and mathematics 
quickly advanced General Systems Theory, and by the late 1960s it became a 
philosophy of inquiry that transcended many disciplines (Fleener, 2002). As noted by 
Bertalanffy (1968), 
Physics is still the paragon of science, the basis of our idea of society and our 
image of man. In the meanwhile, however, new sciences have arisen – the life, 
behavioral and social sciences. They demand their place in a modern world 
view. . . . Now we are looking for another basic outlook on the world – the 
world as organization. Such a conception – if it can be substantiated – would 
indeed change the basic categories upon which scientific thought rests, and 
profoundly influence, practical attitudes. (p. 187) 
 By 1966 and 1967, the systems thinking surfaced as the “dominate 
organizational theory” (Shafritz & Ott, 1996, p. 254). William Scott (1961) was among 
the first theorists to hint at the applicability of systems thinking to organizational theory. 
As noted by Scott,  
The distinctive qualities of modern organization theory are its conceptual 
analytical base, its reliance on empirical research data, and above all, it 
integrating nature. These qualities are framed in a philosophy which accepts the 
premise that the only meaningful way to study organization is to study it as a 
system. (p. 264)  
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 Two additional works in the 1960s solidified the linkage of the general systems 
theory to organizational theory. The Social Psychology of Organizations written by 
Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1966) provided an initial bridge between systems theory 
and organization. Katz and Kahn proposed a theoretical model that merged the major 
tenants of structural, behavioral, and systems perspectives. These seemingly conflicting 
perspectives were balanced through what Katz and Kahn labeled an open systems 
approach. Katz and Kahn asserted systems theory focuses on interdependence of 
relationships and structures within and external to the organization.  
 Katz and Kahn identified at least two major shortcomings tied to closed systems 
thinking. First, Katz and Kahn noted that closed systems falsely assume organizations 
are “sufficiently independent to allow most of its problems to be analyzed with 
reference to its internal structure and without reference to its external environment” (p. 
284). Katz and Kahn noted such approaches limit analyses that attempt to understand 
organizational dynamics and change because they ignore, or at best minimize, the 
“mutual permeation of an organization and its environment” (p. 284). Second, Katz and 
Kahn noted organizational structures within closed systems end in entropic dissolution 
once their existing energy is expended. Basically, organizations as closed systems can 
only move toward disorganization or death as their existing energy is expended. 
However, Katz and Kahn noted structures within organizations tend to become more 
elaborate over time and do not appear consistent with the closed system perspective. 
Katz and Kahn proposed the open system perspective “ . . . by importing more energy 
from its environment than it expends, [open systems] can store energy and . . . will seek 
to improve their survival position and to acquire in their reserves a comfortable margin 
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of operation” (p. 279). Basically, open systems import energy from the external 
environment to counteract entropy.  
 James D. Thompson’s Organizations in Action (1967) was a second work that 
further solidified the transference of general systems theory to organizational theory. 
Thompson, like Katz and Kahn (1966), noted that efficiency approaches of rational 
organizational models like scientific management impose closed systems logic on 
organizations. As noted by Thompson,  
It seems that the rational-model approach uses a closed-system strategy. It also 
seems clear that the developers of the several schools using the rational model 
have been primarily students of performance or efficiency and only incidentally 
students of organizations. Having focus on control of the organization as a 
target, each employs a closed system of logic and conceptually closes the 
organization to coincide with that type of logic. The rational model of an 
organization results in everything being functional – making a positive, indeed 
an optimum, contribution to the organization. (p. 288) 
Thompson (1967) basically noted organizational theories rooted in the rational models 
were closed system approaches that did not accurately account for the complexity of 
functions within organizations. Thompson argued that organizations were complex 
systems consisting of “more variables than we can comprehend” and that “some of the 
variables are subject to influences we cannot control or predict” (p. 289). Because of 
complexity and unpredictability, Thompson called for a new logic from which to view 
organizations, a systems logic. 
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 Beyond many of the same systems applications made by Katz and Kahn (1966), 
Thompson (1967) noted three additional characteristics of open systems. First, 
Thompson established that survival of the organization, rather than efficiency, was the 
goal of organizations.  Thompson noted that a complex organization “is a set of 
independent parts which together make up a whole because each contributes something 
from the whole, which in turn is interdependent with some larger environment. Survival 
of the system is taken to be the goal” (p. 289). If survival is the goal, rather than 
efficiency, the function of subsystems within systems theory may certainly be more 
loosely coupled than tightly coupled, which is Thompson’s second contribution. Third, 
Thompson hinted at the possible coexistence of both closed- and open-systems 
characteristics in organizations. Thompson noted that even within complex 
organizations, technical functions might indeed retain closed-system functionality. 
Unfortunately, this characteristic appears to have been ignored by most organizational 
theorists as systems theory moved forward. However, this characteristic, as will be 
discussed later, is significant and perhaps explains further why management innovations 
continued to be adopted and subsequently rejected within higher education.  
Assumptions of systems theory. Systems theory is built on a set of core 
assumptions established by early theorists. In 1972, Kast and Rosenzweig identified 12 
key assumptions supported by general systems theory.  
1. Organizations are viewed holistically. Systems are best studied in their 
totality. Organizations are more than the sum of their parts.   
2. Organizational results may not necessarily be linked to initial conditions. 
Deterministic systems assume a direct cause and effect relationship between 
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initial conditions and final state. On the other hand, open systems may arrive 
at the same final state from “differing initial conditions and by a variety of 
paths” (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Equifinality is the term used to describe this 
multi-path process that leads to the same end result. If there does not exist a 
direct cause-effect relationship between initial conditions and final state, it 
would be difficult to predict the adoption or rejection of management 
innovations based on the existing state of an organization. And if equifinality 
exists, it may imply that regardless of the innovation that is introduced to a 
system, the system will arrive at the same final state.   
3. Organizations are viewed along a closed-open system continuum. 
Organizations may be viewed along a continuum of relatively open to 
relatively closed. Open systems exchange information, energy, or material 
with their environment to counter entropy necessary for the organization to 
survive. Closed systems do not exchange energy with their environment; 
hence, closed systems are continuously moving toward a state of equilibrium 
that is characterized by disorganization or death.  
4. Input-Transformation-Output modeling provides a process for understanding 
how energy is imported, transformed, and exported back into the 
organizational environment. Open systems import energy from the external 
environment to negate entropy. Open systems convert input into outputs via 
through-put, or transformational processes. Outputs are then exported back 
into the environment.  
   139 
 
5. Systems are made up of subsystems. By definition a system includes 
interrelated subsystems. The connectedness of the subsystem to the system 
or to other subsystems occurs along the open-closed continuum. Parsons 
(1960) and Thompson (1967) noted the relative openness and closedness of 
a subsystem is linked to the subsystem’s level of responsibility and control. 
Essentially, the more reliant the subsystem is upon energy, resources, or 
material from other subsystems, the more open the connectedness.  
6. Open systems require feedback from the environment. Feedback provides 
the information necessary for the system to maintain its steady state. Since 
the amount of information available to a system is often greater than the 
capacity of the system to process that information, systems develop coding 
processes to select, simplify, and process information that is relevant to the 
system. Feedback may be positive – affirming the direction of the 
organization – or negative – indicating corrective action is required.  
7. Organizations are bounded systems. Systems exist within boundaries that 
separate them from their environment. These boundaries are more permeable 
in systems that are more open than closed.  
8. Open systems are characterized by negative entropy. Entropy is the amount 
of energy expended by systems trying to reach equilibrium. As previously 
noted, entropy within closed systems continuously increases until the system 
reaches a maximum state of equilibrium, disorder, and death. Entropy in 
closed systems can only be positive. From an open systems perspective, 
organizations import resources from the external environment to not only 
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stop entropy, but even to reverse the process. In other words, organizations 
may import energy and generate negative entropy that results in the 
transforming of resources and the organization. 
9. Open systems are characterized by dynamic equilibrium. Equilibrium is the 
end result of entropic process and equates to organizational death. Open 
systems by continually importuning materials, information and energy can 
maintain equilibrium. The steady state is not motionless but rather is 
characterized by the continuous flow of input and outputs, or basically, open 
systems exist in states of dynamic equilibrium. 
10. Open systems move toward differentiation. Closed systems move 
entropically toward disorganization and death. Open systems move toward 
increased differentiation – elaboration of roles, increased specialization of 
function, and multiplication of processes. Organizations as open systems 
continually move toward a higher level. 
11. Open systems seek multiple goals. While the primary goal of an organization 
may be organizational survival, multiple goals often exist due primarily to 
the differing values and objectives of individuals and subsystems within the 
organization.  
12. There exists a hierarchy of systems. Within general system theory, there 
exists a hierarchical relationship between systems. Hence, there exist lower 
level subsystems and higher level suprasystems.  
 Essentially, systems theory assumes organizations may best be examined and 
understood in light of research associated with general systems theory – organizations 
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are dynamic systems that interact with their environment in order to attain energy 
necessary to avoid their entropic end. These assumptions appear to provide potential 
benefit in understanding the adoption of management innovations in higher education.  
First, the holistic perspective supported by systems theory appears to provide a 
sustained departure from the reductionist perspectives advocated by bureaucratic, 
collegial and political theories and their associated research approaches. Holistic views 
require holistic approaches to understanding why leaders are motivated to adopt 
management innovations from outside of higher education, and then, why the 
management innovations are subsequently rejected.   
 Second, the closed-open continuum assumption of systems theory provides 
potential insight into understanding why management innovations succeed in some 
organizations and fail in others. Management innovations that focus on optimal 
efficiency and effectiveness through increased control of the production function may 
experience more success in organizations that are more closed than opened. Success of 
the innovation may potentially be linked to the increased control of the production 
function associated with a more closed system as well as the reduced requirement to 
exchange energy with the closed system’s external environment. The closed-open 
continuum also applies to subsystems within organizations. Applying the same logic, 
management innovations within organizations may be adopted at differing levels within 
various subsystems of an organization. Differentiated adoption may be linked to the 
open-closed continuum of subsystems. Closed subsystems (1) may have increased 
control over their own production function; (2) may be more loosely coupled than 
tightly coupled to other subsystems and to the larger suprasystem; and (3) may be less 
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specialized. Conversely, open subsystems (1) may have less control over their 
production function; (2) may be more tightly coupled to other subsystems ; and (3) may 
have functions that are more elaborate and specialized. Therefore, one might 
hypothesize that subsystems that are more opened than closed may reject management 
innovations at higher rates than subsystems that are more closed than open.  
 Finally, management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) were imported to 
higher education via the business sector. If systems import energy from the external 
environment to avoid entropy, it may mean management innovations imported to higher 
education from the business sector provide energy needed by the institution to avoid 
entropy – or at least provide energy for the administrative subsystem of the organization 
to avoid entropy. The innovation is then transformed by the institution as a failed 
innovation including many lessons learned. This exported innovation may then be 
imported by the business sector as energy for its next management innovation. The 
innovation may provide renewable energy for both higher education and the business 
sector as it is transformed and passed from one environment to the next, thus supporting 
the cyclical nature of management innovations as observed by Birnbaum.  
 To summarize, it appears systems theory may provide a potential framework to 
examine the cyclical adoption and rejection of management innovations in higher 
education and thus warrants further consideration as a potential theoretical framework 
for this study. Specifically, two additional aspects of systems theory needed to be 
examined: (1) a specific application of systems theory to higher education; and (2) how 
that application accounts for decentralized power, ambiguity tied to the production 
function and loose coupling of organizational subsystems and the impact of these 
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characteristics on the adoption of management innovations within higher education. 
Therefore, the next section will focus on the specific application of systems theory to 
higher education.   
 Emergence of systems theory in higher education and the cybernetic model. 
Richard Birnbaum (1988) was among the first organizational theorists to develop a 
comprehensive systems model for higher education. In his book, How Colleges Work, 
Birnbaum (1988) specifically applied the major tenants of systems theory using a 
cybernetic perspective. Cybernetics is the title of a book written by Norbert Weiner in 
1948. Weiner, trying to capture the basic theoretical perspective of emerging systems 
theory, defined cybernetics as the “multidisciplinary study of the structure and functions 
of control and information processing systems” (Shafritz & Ott, p. 255). The primary 
characteristic of a cybernetic system, as noted by Weiner, is self-regulation through the 
use of biological, social, or technological subsystems. Subsystems identify problems, 
solve problems, and receive feedback necessary for perpetual self-regulation 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Scott, 1961; Shafritz & Ott, 1996; Weiner, 1948). The purpose of 
self-regulation is to maintain organizational equilibrium. As noted by Birnbaum (1988), 
equilibrium  
is accomplished through cybernetic controls – that is , through self-correcting 
mechanisms that monitor organizational functions and provide attention cues, or 
negative feedback, to participants when things are not going well. Systems of 
negative feedback detect and correct errors so that when something happens . . . 
that moves the college in an undesirable direction, something else automatically 
happens to bring it back on course (Morgan, 1986). Thus, coordination is 
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provided not by one omniscient and rational agent, but by the spontaneous 
corrective action of the college parts. (p. 179) 
In effect, cybernetic organizations maintain equilibrium through feedback and control 
systems (Birnbaum, 1988; Scott, 1961). Consequently, understanding the adoption and 
management innovations within Birnbaum’s cybernetic organization requires 
understanding the control and feedback systems within the organization. 
 Cybernetic controls “monitor organizational functions and provide attention 
cues, or negative feedback, to participants when things are not going well” (Birnbaum, 
1988, p. 179). Within higher education organizations, Birnbaum identified two types of 
controls: structural controls and social controls. Structural controls are “explicit controls 
manifested in organizational rules, regulations, and structures” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 
182). Examples of structural controls include purchasing policies, enrollment 
procedures, and admission standards. Social controls are “implicit controls developed 
through the interaction of individuals in groups that lead them toward shared attitudes 
and concern for group cohesion” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 182). Examples of social controls 
include organizational culture, mission, institutional symbols, committee meetings, staff 
interactions, and student perceptions. 
 Control systems within cybernetic organizations monitor inputs rather than 
outputs (Birnbaum, 1988). By focusing on inputs, organizations monitor those items 
that more directly impact institutional stability. As an input moves outside of an 
acceptable range, controls are triggered and corrective action occurs. For example, a 
decrease in the number of graduates (output) within the mathematics department at 
Downey College will likely not generate any response in the department, unless the 
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decrease in graduates is met by a decrease in the level of funding (input) being allocated 
to the department. To summarize, structural and social control systems within 
cybernetic organizations monitor organizational inputs for the purpose of maintaining 
organizational equilibrium. 
 With regard to feedback systems, Birnbaum (1988) identified two activities 
facilitated through structural and social controls. First, controls initiate minor 
adjustments to restore acceptable limits of those inputs being monitored. For example, a 
student at Downey College may not enroll in more than 18 hours. A student trying to 
enroll in more than 18 hours must secure overload approval from an advisor. Once the 
student secures overload approval, then the student may enroll. In essence, structural 
controls monitor the number of hours in which students enroll. When the number of 
hours exceeds a defined threshold, then the control provides negative feedback to the 
system and regulates the action through a self-correcting process – requiring the student 
to secure advisor approval. In this example, structural controls identified the deviation, 
provided feedback to the system, and directed the student to take corrective steps which 
restored the system’s equilibrium.  
 Second, controls initiate action to change organizational processes if minor 
adjustments are not effective. Returning to the Downey example, students seeking 
overload approval are having difficulty locating advisors to secure overload approval. 
This lack of advisor access is perceived negatively by students who complain publicly 
about the 18 hour policy. The Vice President for Academic Affairs becomes aware of 
the problem and casually mentions the concern at the monthly academic deans’ 
meeting. The deans respond in varying ways, but all responses remind faculty of their 
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important role in enrollment and advisement processes. Most faculty respond by 
increasing office hours during enrollment periods. As a result, access to faculty 
increases, and students become less agitated about the 18 hour limit. Why did this 
example follow this path? A student-centered culture is important at Downey. In fact, 
the university’s vision is to become one of the nation’s premier, student-centered 
universities. Because of this culture, deans and faculty inferred the importance of the 
Vice President’s comment and orchestrated a response to improve the situation. The 
social controls, and the cultural context in which these controls function, recognized 
disequilibrium was occurring, structural controls were not maintaining equilibrium, and 
therefore, processes were modified in order to restore equilibrium.  It is easy to envision 
a different responses if the organization culture had been different. A more teacher-
centered culture may have led to no response and a more consumer-centered culture 
might have contributed to a quicker and more dramatic response. In essence, the social 
control (university culture) detected a variation and reacted to restore equilibrium.  
 To summarize, structural controls, social controls, and their feedback systems 
support self-correcting, cybernetic organizations. As cybernetic organizations detect 
disequilibrium through control systems that monitor organizational inputs, feedback 
systems react through self-regulating processes. These reactions may result in minor 
structural changes or in major process changes. Maintaining and/or restoring 
equilibrium is the primary purpose of all control and feedback systems. In essence, the 
cybernetic perspective sees higher education institutions as “learning” organizations 
that have the capacity to evolve; capacity to learn from past experiences; capacity to 
solve problems; capacity to develop a shared vision; and the capacity to learn together 
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(Johnson, 1998; Senge, 1990, 2000). As noted by Wheatley (1999), viability and 
resiliency of a self-regulating organization comes from its “great capacity to adapt as 
needed, to create structures that fit the moment” (p. 82).  
 For the purpose of this study, it was important to understand the implication of 
control and feedback systems on the adoption or rejection of management innovations 
within the cybernetic framework. Initially, it appeared adoption or rejection might be 
linked to the perceived threat the innovation posed to the stability of the system. The 
likelihood of potential rejection may increase proportionally to the perceived threat, and 
conversely the likelihood of adoption increases when the perceived threat of the 
innovation decreases. Ultimately, the likelihood of adoption may increase if the 
required change is outside of the structural and social controls, if the required change 
maintains equilibrium, and/or if the required change is of minimal threat to the 
organization’s equilibrium. However, to broaden our understanding of the potential 
impact of the cybernetic model on the adoption or rejection of management innovations, 
it was important to use the cybernetic model as a framework from which to examine 
those factors that distinguished higher education institutions from business 
organizations: power that is more dispersed than centralized; organizational ambiguity 
associated with the production function; and subsystems that are more loosely coupled 
than tightly coupled. 
Power, ambiguity, and coupling within cybernetic organizations. Balance may 
be the most appropriate word to characteristic the function of centralized and dispersed 
power within cybernetic organizations. Balance is linked to three aspects of cybernetic 
organizations: (1) structural and social controls within the cybernetic organization; (2) 
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the organization of subunits within the cybernetic organization; and (3) the inclusion of 
bureaucratic, collegial, and political characteristics within the cybernetic organization.  
Two types of controls exist within cybernetic organizations: structural and 
social. Controls are used by leaders to monitor organizational functions and to provide 
feedback (Birnbaum, 1988). Structural controls (goals, policies, and procedures) are 
explicit controls and are established through centralized processes (Birnbaum, 1988). 
Conversely, social controls (organizational culture, mission, symbols, and perceptions) 
are more normative processes linked to dispersed power. In short, cybernetic controls 
result from processes that require a balance of centralized and dispersed power. 
The organization of subunits also contributes to power that is dispersed and 
centralized. Subunits are formed in reaction to the complexity of problems faced by the 
organization (Birnbaum, 1988). As problem complexity increases, the organization 
responds through the addition of subunits. Each subunit and its decision maker become 
responsible for different issues associated with the problem (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Steinbruner, 1974). Over time, the number of subunits and decision makers increase, 
thus, decreasing the ability of one individual, or a few individuals, to make decisions for 
the organization. If we were to stop here, power might appear to be more disperse than 
centralized; however, some centralized power exists in that subunits and their decision 
makers function within the organization’s boundaries as defined by its structural 
controls.  
Birnbaum (1988) also notes cybernetic organizations include bureaucratic, 
collegial, and political aspects. Bureaucratic processes govern much of the 
organization’s daily activities and structural controls. Political and collegial processes 
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influence interactions of groups and individuals in establishing and monitoring social 
controls, feedback from those controls, and any resulting action. The existence of 
bureaucratic, collegial, and political influences within a cybernetic organization further 
underscores that power has a centralized as well as dispersed characteristics.  
Thus far, the work of Birnbaum (1988) indicates power within a cybernetic 
organization is both centralized and dispersed.  Based on the previous discussion, the 
utilization of centralized or dispersed power is contingent upon context of the issue and 
is contingent upon that part of the organization responding to the issue. To understand 
the role of centralized and dispersed power on the adoption of management innovations 
within the cybernetic framework requires understanding the context in which the 
innovation occurs. This context may be understood by examining more closely the role 
of leaders within cybernetic organizations.  
Cybernetic institutions, as described by Birnbaum (1988), basically run 
themselves leaving the cybernetic leader with little influence over how subunits operate. 
The basic task of the cybernetic leader is one of maintaining operational boundaries 
within which each subunit functions. To understand this task, Birnbaum (1988) 
identified a taxonomy for effective cybernetic leaders that includes seven aspects. Four 
of these aspects provide increased insights into the role of power in the adoption of 
management innovations within cybernetic organizations:  
1. Cybernetic leaders realize the importance of both transactional and 
transformational leadership. 
2. Cybernetic leaders cultivate the emergence of leadership within the various 
subunits. 
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3. Cybernetic leaders remember that events are equivocal and that many 
opportunities to interpret organizational meaning afford them unusual 
influence without inducing the alienation that may arise from giving orders. 
4. Cybernetic leaders complicate themselves by learning to use multiple 
frameworks, including the bureaucratic, collegial, and political frameworks, 
to interpret events within the organization. 
Birnbaum (1988) advocates a balance of transactional and transformational 
leadership. Transaction and transformational leadership have not been identified as 
characteristics that distinguish higher education organizations from business 
organizations and thus are not a focus of this study. However, in light of Birnbaum’s 
assertion, it is important to understand the linkage of transaction and transformational 
leadership to centralized, dispersed, position, and individual power.  
Burns (1978) and Bass (1985, 1996) are perhaps the two individuals most 
identified with the development of transformational leadership theory (Yukl, 2002). 
Transactional and transformational are terms used to describe the behaviors used by 
leaders to influence followers and the subsequent effect of leaders’ behavior on 
followers.  
Transactional leadership involves exchange processes (Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985, 
1996). Through exchange processes, leaders capitalize on the self-interest of followers. 
While these exchange processes may lead to compliance of the follower, compliance 
will not generate commitment to the desired objective. Essentially, compliance to 
desired behavior is the result of a transaction between leader and follower whereby the 
leader appeals to the self-interest motives of the follower. To achieve the desired 
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behavior, the leader will use rewards as well as active and passive management of 
follower behaviors that are exceptions to the desired behavior. In essence, transactional 
leadership may rely more on centralized power than dispersed power and may rely more 
on power linked to position than on power tied to the individual. 
Transformational leadership relies on the capacity of leaders to motivate 
followers by appealing to the followers’ emotions and values. Leaders influence 
followers to change behavior and to exceed desired objectives by “(1) making them 
more aware of the importance of task outcomes, (2) inducing them to transcend their 
own self-interest for the sake of the organization or team, and (3) activating their 
higher-order needs” (Yukl, 2002, p. 253). Bass (1985) and Bass and Avolio (1990) 
identified four behaviors associated with transformational leadership: (1) idealized 
influence – emotional identification of the follower with the leader; (2) intellectual 
stimulation – leader influences follower to view problems from different perspectives; 
(3) individualized consideration – support, encouragement, and coaching provided to 
followers by the leader; and (4) inspirational motivation – leaders model desired 
behaviors for followers and inspire behavior through communication of vision. Overall, 
transformational leadership characteristics appear to be linked more closely to power 
associated with an individual’s personal characteristics than power linked to position – 
specifically referent and expert power; though it does appear transformational 
leadership might also include some linkage to power in the position category. There 
appears to be little reliance of transformational leadership upon either centralized power 
or decentralized power. 
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To summarize, Birnbaum’s advocacy for a leadership approach that incorporates 
both transactional and transformational leadership linked to centralized, dispersed, 
position, and individual power. Logically, the successful adoption of a management 
innovation requires leaders to use appropriately these four types of power within the 
context of the cybernetic organization. 
Second, Birnbaum (1988) encouraged cybernetic leaders to cultivate leadership 
within the various subunits of the organization. Increased leadership within an 
organization’s subunits clearly advocates power that is more dispersed than centralized. 
Dispersion of power is likely to increase as leadership increases within an 
organization’s subunits. To cultivate leadership, requires leaders who utilize individual 
influence over position influence, though there certainly is a potential role for power 
linked to position. In essence, the successful adoption of management innovations 
within a cybernetic organization is reliant upon the leadership capacity and power of the 
organization’s subunits. 
Third, Birnbaum (1988) encouraged leaders to interpret organizational events as 
they occur over giving orders as a means to gain influence. This assertion by Birnbaum 
contrasts proactive and reactive processes. Birnbaum warns that proactive processes 
linked to giving orders may indeed lead to less influence than reactive processes that 
interpret events. For events to occur, the leader must facilitate processes that allow 
power to be dispersed. Organizational events must be allowed to occur within the 
subsystems in order to allow interpretation to occur centrally. Hence, event 
interpretation seems to involve interplay between dispersed and centralized power. 
Similarly, power linked to position and individual characteristics are required in order 
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for successful leaders to interpret events. A leader must be legitimate as designated by 
position, and the leader must have expert power in order to influence the followers’ 
acceptance of the leader’s interpretation. In essence, Birnbaum’s assertion of reactive 
centralized leadership prohibits the proactive introduction of management innovations 
within cybernetic organizations.  
Fourth, Birnbaum (1988) encouraged cybernetic leaders to use multiple 
frameworks as a basis for their leadership and as a basis to interpret happenings within 
and external to the organization. As previously discussed, the use of multiple 
frameworks requires leaders to use centralized power, to cultivate power that is 
dispersed, to utilize power tied to the position, and to enhance personal attributes that 
lead to increased power. In short, the use of multiple sources of power is required by the 
cybernetic leader who desires to use bureaucratic, collegial, and political frameworks to 
influence the adoption of management innovations within cybernetic organizations.  
In light of the previous paragraphs and Birnbaum’s assertions about cybernetic 
leadership, what role might power play in the adoption of management innovations? 
The seven management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) were introduced to 
higher education via senior level administrators at the urging of boards of control, 
consultants, or other key persuaders external to the organization. Hence, the initial 
introduction and adoption of the management innovation appears to require power that 
is more centralized than decentralized. However, by following Birnbaum’s logic, 
innovations must arise from subsystems or be carefully orchestrated reactions to 
changes in the organizational inputs monitored by subsystems in order to be considered 
legitimately for adoption by the cybernetic organization.  In light of this scenario, power 
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needed to influence the adoption of management innovations is clearly more dispersed 
within the cybernetic organization’s technical subsystems than centralized power within 
its administrative subsystem. If this conclusion is true, one must question the role of 
follower perceptions in the adoption of management innovations. More specifically, 
how is the adoption of management innovations by followers influenced by the 
perceived use of power by leaders trying to influence the adoption?  Because of this 
question and in light of the previous paragraphs, the eventual adoption or rejection of 
management innovations within cybernetic organizations is more a function of 
dispersed power within the various technical subsystems than a function of centralized 
power associated with the administrative subsystem. Additionally, the adoption or 
rejection is more linked to power linked to an leader’s personal characteristics than to 
power derived from position. 
Second, ambiguity tied to the production function is a characteristic supported 
by the cybernetic model (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001). Two characteristics of the cybernetic 
organization support ambiguity tied to the production function: (1) cybernetic 
organizations focus on inputs instead of outputs; and (2) cybernetic organizations 
develop subsystems in tandem with the emergence of conflicting goals. The following 
paragraphs will provide elaboration tied to each characteristic. 
Cybernetic organizations monitor and respond to a limited number of inputs. By 
focusing on inputs instead of outputs, cybernetic organizations may accommodate 
multiple, conflicting goals and purposes and thereby lessen the need for elaborate, 
strategic processes “of rational calculation and decision making” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 
181). Cybernetic organizations “are not based on measuring or improving their output” 
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(p. 181). The improvement or understanding of technical processes that convert inputs 
to outputs are of little concern. As a result, cybernetic leaders are less likely to use 
rational processes to identify potential outcomes prior to the implementation of new 
activities or programs. Moreover, when new goals emerge or inputs move outside 
acceptable limits, the cybernetic leader is not concerned with developing effective 
technical processes to address the issue. Instead the leader looks to historical processes 
that have been successful. In higher education, the successful historical process is often 
the appointment of an ad hoc committee or blue ribbon task force. Why the input 
returned to the desired level or why the new goal is adequately addressed are of little 
importance. The committee was assembled and the desired change occurred. “No one 
knows exactly why this has happened, and so the cause and effect relationship can be 
thought of as occurring in a black box” (Birnbaum, 1988, p. 187). Essentially, the focus 
is on stability linked to the input and not on the technical process. To summarize, it 
appears the cybernetic model by focusing on inputs does not require the standardization 
of the production function and thus aligns with ambiguity tied to the production 
function within higher education. 
Cybernetic organizations develop subsystems in tandem with the emergence of 
conflicting goals. When a cybernetic organization introduces a new goal or is required 
to adopt a new goal, the organization will develop a new subsystem(s) in response to the 
new goal (Birnbaum, 1988). Over time, a hierarchical structure of subsystems will 
evolve that corresponds to the complexity of the organization’s goals. Because of this 
fragmented subsystem, cybernetic organizations have the capacity and ability to 
respond to “ill-defined and often conflicting purposes” (Birnbaum,1988, p. 190).  
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A return to Downey College to illustrate how subsystems evolve might be 
helpful. The historic mission and goals of Downey College had primarily focused on 
access, academic excellence, and outreach. Subsequently, the university had evolved to 
include three primary subsystems: student services, academic affairs, and continuing 
education. The student services subsystem included two sub-subsystems that aligned 
with its primary functions: recruitment and disability services. Other functions within 
the student services were primarily coordinated through the office of the vice president 
for student services. With the arrival of a new President and a new vision to become a 
premier student-centered university, the mission and goals of Downey were expanded. 
Obvious goal conflicts quickly emerged. How does a university achieve academic 
excellence while being a premier student-centered university? How does a community 
outreach program respond to these expanded mission and goals? To resolve these 
growing conflicts, the student services unit was renamed student development and 
several new sub-subsystems were created within student development to accommodate 
the unit’s new student-centered goals, including campus life, housing and residence life, 
career development, and freshmen experience. The reorganized student development 
subsystem and its new sub-subsystems became primarily responsible for the student-
centered aspects of Downey’s expanded mission and goals, thus relieving the other 
subsystems of the need to manage conflicts between the expanded mission and goals 
and the historic mission and goals.  
In summary, it appears cybernetic organizations focus more on inputs than on 
outputs and technical processes used to convert inputs to outputs. This characteristic 
when coupled with fragmented subsystems that allow cybernetic organizations to 
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respond to conflicting goals appears to indicate that Birnbaum’s cybernetic perspective 
of organizations does not require the standardization of the production function and thus 
becomes a potential framework from which to understand the rejection of management 
innovations within higher education.  
 Third, and as discussed in the previous section, cybernetic organizations are 
complex systems of hierarchal subsystems. These subsystems are more loosely coupled 
than tightly coupled. For example, changes in the student life unit will have little if any 
consequence on the English department. Loose coupling across subunits allows for the 
development of structures and processes that differ considerably. The fact that 
structures and processes are different across subunits is of little consequence to the 
institution.  Loosely coupled subsystems may be added, subtracted, or collapsed with 
little effect on the cybernetic organization (Kerr, 2001; Simon, 1957). Coupling across 
subunits becomes more tightly coupled with issues directly related to social and 
structural controls of the organization including organizational rules, regulations, and 
culture (Birnbaum, 1988).  Additionally, subunits may become more tightly coupled 
through political processes that may align formal subunits and informal groups across 
the organization in vying for power and resources in support of common self-interests 
(Birnbaum, 1988). 
Linkages within each subsystem are more tightly coupled than linkages across 
subsystems (Birnbaum, 1988). While subsystems function within the organization’s 
social and structural boundaries, each subsystem may develop its own bureaucratic and 
collegial control (Cyert & March, 1963).  These controls govern behavior and 
operations of the unit while optimizing effort toward achieving its assigned 
   158 
 
organizational goal(s). Hence, the application of rational decision making within 
subunits is simplified due to the limited focus of the subsystem and due to linkages 
within the subsystem that are more tightly coupled than loosely coupled. 
To summarize, the literature indicates cybernetic theory generally supports the 
three characteristics that distinguish higher education organizations from businesses. 
Specifically, cybernetic theory recognizes (1) power that is more dispersed than 
centralized; (2) ambiguity tied to the production function; and (3) subsystems that are 
viewed as more loosely coupled than tightly coupled. Additionally, the cybernetic 
model provides multiple perspectives from which to analyze and understand 
organizational process. The cybernetic model contains elements of the bureaucratic, 
collegial, and political model as well as normative and deterministic elements. 
Therefore, the cybernetic model appeared to accommodate the complexity of higher 
education organizations and served as the guiding organizational framework for this 
proposed study. 
The question then became, “What factors might contribute to the adoption of a 
management innovation in higher education in light of the cybernetic model?” It 
appeared that the adoption of a management innovation in a cybernetic organization 
was perhaps contingent upon decentralized and centralized elements of the 
organization. From a decentralized perspective, successful adoption appeared to be 
contingent upon the leadership of various subsystems and the congruency of the 
innovation with the values, beliefs, and goals of the subsystem. From a centralized 
perspective, adoption was contingent upon the capacity of the leadership to introduce 
the innovation as a response: as a response to a crisis; as a response to a problem that 
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has been identified through data collection procedures; as a response to a successfully 
adopted innovation in another subsystem that can be shared with another subsystem 
encountering similar issues with similar values, beliefs, and goals; or as a subtle 
response to improve selected activities within a specific subsystem.  
Summary of Organizational Theory 
Increased organizational complexity during the twentieth century was 
accompanied by organizational models that attempted to explain that complexity. Each 
model provided differing and increasingly complex views of power, coupling, and goal 
ambiguity. It is evident that organizational perspectives outgrew the structuralist 
interpretations that viewed higher education organizations as similar to deterministic 
business models. Instead the literature supported a view where academic institutions are 
seen as complex organizations that are perhaps more normative than deterministic with 
subsystems that are more loosely coupled, thus allowing them to handle ambiguity of 
goals and ambiguity tied to the production function. 
If academic organizations are more normative than deterministic, why then do 
these normative organizations continue to look to the rational paradigm for management 
innovations? The seven rejected management innovations studied by Birnbaum (2001) 
were rooted in the rational paradigm – that is, the innovations sought to maximize 
effectiveness and efficiency through standardization of the production function. Even in 
light of complex organizational models and understanding that account better for the 
unique organizational characteristics and dynamics of higher education, management 
innovations rooted in the rational paradigm continue to circulate through higher 
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education (Best, 2006; Birnbaum, 2001). Why?  Is it possible that rejected management 
innovations serve some other purpose than increased effectiveness and efficiency?  
Benefits of Management Innovations 
Indeed, Birnbaum (2001) cited a number of benefits linked to rejected 
management innovations. First, the management innovations studied by Birnbaum 
appeared to provide a window through which academic institutions could view the 
environment in which they exist and thus provide a catalyst to examine, to reexamine, 
and to consider the potentiality of change (Birnbaum, 2001). As noted by Bohl and 
Luthans (1996), “Pity those organizations that have not gravitated toward the new and 
innovative, tested the latest fad, tempered it against economic realities, and emerged as 
stronger and more resilient” (p. 3). The implementation of a management innovation is 
an exhilarating and sometimes painful process that provides an opportunity for an 
organization to examine itself from a different perspective and to affirm existing 
practice or to change practice in light of the examination. In either case, the examination 
leads to organizational renewal (Birnbaum, 2001).  
Second, management innovations appeared to elevate the importance of data 
(Birnbaum, 2001). Prior to the management innovations, academic organizations tended 
to undervalue the quantitative (i.e., enrollment, program costs, service area 
demographics, etc.) and overvalue the qualitative (i.e., culture, history, relationships, 
values, etc.). The importance of the quantitative has certainly been elevated through the 
adoption of management innovations; however, the danger comes when the pendulum 
swings to the other extreme (Birnbaum, 2001). Birnbaum warned that the problem with 
management innovations is “not created by giving managers access to more data, but by 
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the adoption of rational systems in which hard data, rather than soft data are given 
primacy” (p. 207). Effective management requires a balance of both, and it is through 
the adoption of management innovations that the use of quantitative data were elevated. 
A third benefit of management innovations as noted by Birnbaum (2001) was 
the emphasizing of alternative goals and values. As noted previously, higher education 
organizations often have multiple and at times conflicting goals and values. It is nearly 
impossible to optimize every goal and to validate every value. Therefore, management 
innovations provide a means for alternative goals and values to surface (Birnbaum, 
2001). For example, suppose that an institution had worked for several years on 
elevating the status of the organization in the area of scholastic research. Indeed the 
institution had become successful at increasing levels of external funding, establishing 
new research laboratories, and securing high quality research faculty. However, little 
attention was given to student retention and graduation during the same period. Then 
suppose that the governing board of the institution decides to introduce a management 
innovation titled performance-based funding that links institutional funding to retention 
and graduation rates. As the innovation is implemented within the institution, the 
importance of retention and graduation is elevated. Thus, the academic innovation 
provided a means to emphasize a goal and value of the institution that had previously 
been neglected.  
Fourth, management innovations appeared to diversify interactions and 
communication within organizations (Birnbaum, 2001). Activity and processes spawned 
by the introduction of a management innovation often require that the organization 
interact and communicate in new ways both internally and externally (Birnbaum, 2001). 
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This diversified communication and interaction provide a means by which to increase 
organizational and individual knowledge (Birnbaum, 1988; Mintzberg, 1979; Senge, 
1990; Wheatley, 1999).  
Finally, Birnbaum (2001) concluded that the adoption of management 
innovations reinforced management myths within higher education. Birnbaum notes: 
People in general must believe their institutions have some control over 
their own destiny, and managers in particular must believe in their own 
efficacy. Institutions live through the myths they create about how things 
happen, and part of that myth is that rationality is important and what 
managers do have influence. The adoption of a fad [innovation] and the 
activities of managers in implementing the fad [innovation] reinforce 
these myths. . . . Myths provide additional leverage and confirm the 
authority of a manager. (p. 210) 
 If indeed this last benefit is true, it would mean that management innovations 
reinforce myths tied to organizational management and to an organization’s leaders. 
Specifically, the adoption appears to support the myth that managers, and thus 
management, can influence the behavior of the organization. Therefore, if managers and 
management are perceived as influencing change through the adoption of management 
innovations, they are fulfilling the myth and thus are perceived as being legitimate.  
 This conclusion leads to several questions. Is it possible that while 
organizational models have evolved in complexity to accompany the increasing 
complexity of higher education organization, that there remains in place structures, 
processes, and expectations tied to structural theory and that these remnants are 
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manifested in the term “legitimacy”?  If so, how then does the adoption of innovations 
impact the legitimacy of an organization and its leaders, or conversely, how does the 
legitimacy of a leader, the legitimacy of an organization, or the legitimacy of innovation 
impact the adoption of the innovation? Additionally, what factors influence the 
legitimacy of an innovation and the subsequent adoption of the innovation?  
The Role of Legitimacy in the Adoption of Management Innovations 
 Before considering these questions, it was important to define legitimacy. In 
general, legitimacy appeared to be constructed both individually and socially (French & 
Raven, 1959; Linton, 1945; Pfeffer, 1981; Yukl, 2002). Linton was among the first to 
investigate behavior linked to group norms. Through his work, he distinguished group 
norms by three categories: universal (behavior is universal within the context of the 
culture); alternative (behavior is an individual’s choice); and specialties (behavior is 
linked to the position organization). French and Raven (1959) used the work of Linton 
to examine further the influence of group norms on behavior, attitudes, and beliefs. 
French and Raven found that individuals often speak of changing behavior, attitudes, 
and beliefs with terms like “should, ought to, or has a right to” (p. 379).  In other words, 
individuals evaluate behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs in terms of a positive-neutral-
negative trichotomy and base that evaluation on internalized norms and values. French 
and Raven defined this evaluation process as legitimacy. Given that management 
innovations often require organizations and individuals to change behaviors, attitudes, 
and beliefs (Birnbaum, 2002; Rogers, 1995), it is logical to conclude that legitimacy 
plays a significant role in determining the adoption or rejection of a management 
innovation. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, legitimacy will be defined as a 
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label assigned by individuals to identify the validity of a management innovation. 
Legitimacy emerges as the result of an evaluative process used by individuals to 
determine the alignment of the management innovation with the internalized norms and 
values of individuals (French & Raven, 1959). The results of this evaluation process are 
reflected as a positive-neutral-negative perception of the management innovation. 
With legitimacy defined, it was now possible to consider the role of legitimacy 
in the adoption or rejection of innovations. If legitimacy was one of the evaluation tools 
by which leaders and followers evaluate whether to adopt or reject a management 
innovation, what are the factors that contribute to the evaluation process? French and 
Raven (1959) found that internalized norms and values contributed to the evaluation 
process. In essence, an innovation that is more closely aligned with the internalized 
norms of an individual may be perceived as being more legitimate and thus will likely 
be adopted. Conversely, an innovation that counters the internalized norms of an 
individual would be considered less legitimate and most likely would be rejected. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the legitimacy of a management innovation in 
tandem with the legitimacy of leaders might partially explain why management 
innovations are successfully adopted in the business sector where the internalized norms 
of individuals within the organization are congruent with the expected outcomes of 
effectiveness and efficiency tied to the management innovation. It is also within the 
realm of possibility to envision that a board member with a business background could 
view the same innovation as legitimate within the context of higher education. 
Subsequently, because the board member views the innovation as legitimate and 
because the board member is viewed as legitimate by the president, it is conceivable to 
   165 
 
see how the president would view the innovation as legitimate and would target the 
innovation for adoption at his/her institution. As the innovation trickles through the 
institution, most certainly the potential for decreased legitimacy is possible especially if 
the innovation is not supportive of the expectations of autonomy within the academic 
unit. Indeed, Birnbaum (1988) noted, 
Beliefs and decisions that are seen as logical and self-evident by one group may 
be considered mindless or devious by another. Different versions of reality may 
lead groups to become committed to certain courses of action and to lose the 
ability to recognize or understand alternatives. Some of what happens on 
campus can be explained only by realizing that people respond to a reality that 
they themselves create. (p. 178) 
From the literature and the above illustration, it was possible to hypothesize that 
internalized norms of individuals impacted the evaluation of a management innovation 
and subsequently determined the innovation’s legitimacy. 
If legitimacy is linked to internalized norms, one must then consider the factors 
that shaped those norms. As previously noted, organizational norms within higher 
education vary greatly from those of the business sector in terms of power, coupling, 
and ambiguity. This variation of norms is even more pronounced within the academic 
unit where plurality of power, loose coupling, and ambiguity are perhaps more revered 
and expected than in the nonacademic unit and in most business organizations. 
Therefore, is it possible that power, coupling, and goal ambiguity somehow interact in a 
cybernetical organization to influence the perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation, which in turn influences the adoption or rejection of that innovation? The 
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literature did not reveal any studies that examined how power, coupling, and ambiguity 
interact within a cybernetical organization to influence perceived legitimacy of a 
management innovation and the subsequent adoption or rejection of that innovation. 
While Birnbaum (2001) hinted that legitimacy played a role in the adoption and 
rejection of management innovations, the literature did not yield any studies that 
empirically tested this hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
Organization 
 
 Chapter III articulates the methodology used to answer the research questions 
consistent with the purpose of this study. The chapter (1) identifies the study’s research 
design and provides a supporting rationale for that design; (2) articulates the population 
and selected site; (3) discusses sampling techniques; (4) restates the variables of 
interest; (5) establishes procedures and instruments used in data collection; (6) 
establishes data analyses performed on the collected data; and (7) provides a discussion 
of potential limitations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to broaden our understanding of how power, 
coupling, ambiguity, and subsystems influenced the perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption or rejection of a management innovation within the context of a 
higher education organization.  
Research Questions 
Research questions explored by this study included the following:  
 
1. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation influence individuals 
(administrators, faculty, and staff) to adopt or reject a management innovation within 
higher education? 
2. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation vary based on the 
organizational subsystem (technical and administrative) in which individuals worked?  
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3. Did perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate the adoption of a 
management innovation influence how individuals perceived legitimacy of a 
management innovation?  
4. Did the perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a proposed 
management innovation influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a 
management innovation?  
5. Did the perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and outputs influence how 
individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management innovation?  
6. Did the factors of power, coupling, and ambiguity interact to influence how 
individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management innovation?  
Research Design 
This study used a two-phase, sequential, mixed method research design 
(Creswell, 1999, 2003; Morse, 2003). The following paragraphs highlight two 
prominent features of this design and provide a rationale for their inclusion.  
First, the study included a mixed method design. In general, a mixed method 
design is defined as a study that uses both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, 
data collection techniques, data analyses, and reporting techniques (Creswell, 1999, 
2003; Morse, 2003). The richness of data, analysis, and findings associated with the 
mixed method design has led to the increased usage of the methodology (Creswell, 
2003). This study required the collection of quantitative and qualitative data in order to 
gain a more holistic and integrated understanding tied to the purpose and research 
questions. Hence, a mixed method design was used to expand understanding related to 
the purpose of the study and the study’s research questions (Creswell, 2003). Such an 
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approach increased the scope and comprehensiveness of the study as well as provided 
additional information, insights and perspectives (Morse, 2003).  
Second, the study occurred in two, sequential phases. Creswell (1999, 2003) 
referred to this approach as a “two-phase, sequential, explanatory design.” This design 
is most appropriate when a deductive approach is used to test theory in the first phase 
and the second phase can be used to provide confirmation and elaboration of anticipated 
findings and/or explanation of any unanticipated results (Creswell, 1999, 2003; Morse, 
2003). For this study, Phase I focused on answering the identified research questions 
utilizing an ex post facto design. The ex post facto design utilized quantitative 
sampling, data collection (a survey), and analysis to yield theoretical statements related 
to the adoption or rejection of a specific management innovation within a higher 
education setting. Phase II used qualitative sampling, data collection (semi-structured 
interviews), and analysis to further interpret, explain, and add details to the theoretical 
model from Phase I.  
Figure 2 provides an overview of the two-phase, sequential, mixed method 
design used in this study. The model illustrates the two methods associated with each 
phase: “QUAN” (quantitative) and “qual” (qualitative). QUAN is in all capital letters to 
signify that the study was more theoretically driven by the quantitative method than by 
the qualitative method (Creswell, 1999, 2003; Creswell et al., 2003; Greene et al., 1989; 
Morse, 2003). As illustrated in the model, Phase I quantitative data was collected and 
analyzed before proceeding to Phase II, which included qualitative data collection and 
analysis. At the conclusion of both phases, interpretation of Phase I and Phase II results 
occurred.  
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Figure 2. Two-phase, sequential, mixed method design. 
 
Three additional rationales supported the use of the two-phase, sequential, 
mixed method design and are highlighted in the balance of this section. First, the 
adoption of management innovation occurred within the complexity of a higher 
education organization. To explore the research questions within this bounded 
complexity, there was a need to conduct an in-depth, just-in-time examination linked to 
the adoption of a management innovation by individuals and subsystems within a 
specific university. A two-phase, sequential, mixed method design was an appropriate 
methodology to examine a contemporary phenomenon as it occurred within an 
authentic setting (Creswell, 1999, 2003). Second, as established in Chapter II, this study 
relied on Birnbaum’s (2001) theoretical framework to set up its methodology and to 
guide data collection and analyses in an attempt to answer the researcher’s questions. 
The two-phase, sequential, mixed method design accommodated the use of a prior 
theoretical proposition (Creswell, 1999, 2003; Creswell et al., 2003; Greene et al., 1989; 
Morse, 2003). Finally, the design allowed the researcher, as a participant observer, to 
conduct a more in-depth investigation of the phenomenon within the specific bounded 
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context in which the phenomenon occurred. Such an approach provided access to 
individuals, groups, and events that might otherwise had been inaccessible and allowed 
an opportunity for the researcher to perceive data and to explore the purpose and 
research questions from an insider’s perspective (Ball, 1997; Yin, 2003). Given these 
three reasons plus the two mentioned at the beginning of this section, the two-phase, 
sequential, mixed method design was well suited to answer the proposed research 
questions.  
Population and Site Selection 
Two types of populations are distinguished in the development of research 
designs: targeted population and accessible population (Ary, Jacobs & Razavieh, 2002; 
Wallen & Fraenkel, 2001). The targeted population is often defined as that population 
to which the researcher would like to generalize the findings from the study (Ary et al., 
2002; Wallen & Fraenkel, 2001). Given that it may be difficult to have access to the 
entire targeted population, a researcher may refine the population to reflect those who 
are accessible (Ary et al., 2002; Wallen & Fraenkel, 2001). As summarized by Ary et 
al., (2002), “The former is an ideal choice and the later, a realistic choice” (p. 130). This 
study occurred within a single higher education institution. For the purpose of this 
study, the institution will be known as Compass Point University. Compass Point 
University (CPU) is a pseudonym for a public, four-year regional institution that is 
currently implementing a management innovation. Hence, the targeted population was 
defined as all full-time employees at CPU, and the accessible population was defined as 
those individuals at CPU who completed the survey instrument and/or participated in 
the interviews.  
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Site background. With the population defined, the balance of this section will 
provide some general and historical information about Compass Point University 
(CPU). Compass Point University is a regional institution located in the Midwestern 
part of the United States. CPU was established in the early 1900s by the state legislature 
as Compass Point Normal School and was given a mission to train public school 
teachers. Academic programming at the normal school consisted of a four-year 
secondary program and a two-year college post-secondary program. Upon completing 
this curriculum, a graduate of the normal school was awarded a lifetime teaching 
license.  
In the 1920s, Compass Point Normal School became Compass Point Teachers’ 
College and was authorized to increase academic programming to four years of teacher 
education and to confer bachelor’s degrees. In the decade of the 1940s, Compass Point 
expanded its academic programs to include degree programs in Arts and Sciences as 
well as Education. Accompanying these new degrees was a third name change, 
Compass Point State College.  
By the 1950s, Compass Point State College was authorized to offer a fifth-year 
program for teachers leading to the Master of Teaching degree, and in 1960s, Compass 
Point was authorized to offer other advanced degrees.  In the 1970s, the state legislature 
officially changed the name of Compass Point State University, and in the mid 1980s, 
the official title became Compass Point University. 
At the time of this study CPU offered about 40 undergraduate degree programs 
and about ten graduate programs. CPU employed approximately 430 full-time 
employees, including 150 full-time faculty. The University was accredited by the North 
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Central Association and nine academic programs were accredited by various 
professional organizations. Nearly 4,500 students attended Compass Point University. 
Non-traditional students over age 22 comprised 59% of the student body. Sixty-three 
percent of the student body were female and 27% were minority. With regard to 
classification, 25% were freshmen, 15% sophomores, 20% juniors, 20% seniors, 20% 
graduates. Nearly 72% of CPU’s full-time faculty had terminal degrees.  
Dr. I. M. Normal was named the president of Compass Point University nearly 
three years prior to this study. Dr. Normal began many new initiatives at CPU during 
his first year as president, including a merit pay program. The merit pay program was 
slated for implementation during the spring semester nearing the end of the Dr. 
Normal’s first year. The spring semester was the time of year when employee 
evaluations occurred and salary increases determined for the following year. Merit pay 
evaluations occurred, but in the end, salary increases were more reflective of cost-of-
living increases than merit pay increases. Basically, most employees received the same 
salary increases. In the second year, considerable effort was put into defining evaluative 
criteria and processes to support more thoroughly the merit pay program. The merit pay 
program was used for a second time to evaluate employee performance in the spring 
semester of Dr. Normal’s second year, and merit stipends were awarded during the fall 
semester. Dr. Normal left the institution midway through his third year, after the merit 
stipends were awarded. This study occurred in the spring semester following Dr. 
Normal’s departure.  
Compass Point University is a representative setting in which to conduct the 
study. First, CPU is one of 430 institutions affiliated with the American Association of 
   174 
 
State Colleges and Universities (AASCU). These 430 institutions enrolled more than 3 
million students and accounted for 56% of enrollment at all public four-year institutions 
in America in 2008. AASCU colleges are regionally accredited institutions of higher 
education, and since AASCU grew out of the Association of Teacher Education 
Institutions, many of these colleges and universities share common beginnings as 
normal schools (American Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2008).   
The Carnegie Classification system also supports that CPU shares 
commonalities with a large number of institutions based on control and level, 
undergraduate instructional programs, graduate instructional programs, enrollment 
profile, undergraduate profile, size and setting, and basic classification (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2008). As demonstrated in Table 1, the 
number of institutions with which CPU shares commonalities ranges from 132 
institutions with which CPU shares a common graduate student population and mission 
to 656 institutions with which CPU shares common control and level (public: 4-year 
institution). Basically, information from the American Association of State Colleges 
and Universities as well as information from the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching (2008) indicated that CPU shared similar missions, purposes, 
and characteristics with a large number of other public, four-year, regional institutions 
of higher education throughout the United States and thus was a representative or 
typical site for this study. This representativeness when coupled with other aspects of 
the research design contributed to generalization of findings (Merriam, 1998; Stake, 
1995). 
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Table 1 
 
 Similar Institutions by Carnegie Classification 
 
Classification Category 
Number of 
Similar 
Institutions 
Control & Level Public: 4-year or above 656 
Undergraduate Program Prof+A&S/SGC: Professions plus arts & sciences, some graduate 305 
Graduate Program Postbac-A&S/Ed: with arts & sciences (education dominant) 132 
Enrollment Profile HU: High undergraduate 523 
Undergraduate Profile FT4/S/HTI: Full-time four-year, selective, higher transfer-in 306 
Size & Setting M4/NR: Medium four-year, primarily nonresidential 165 
Basic Master's L: Master's Colleges and Universities (larger programs) 347 
 
Variables of Interest 
 The variables of interest for this study included five independent variables and 
two dependent variables. One variable, legitimacy, was both a dependent and an 
independent variable. As a dependent variable, this study sought to understand how the 
factors of power, coupling, ambiguity, and organizational subsystems influenced 
perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. In turn, legitimacy, as an independent 
variable, was examined to determine its influence on the adoption or rejection of an 
innovation.  
 The remainder of this section will further define the variables of interest.  
Independent Variables 
The study focused on five independent variables. The independent variables 
were legitimacy, organizational subsystems, power, coupling, and ambiguity. A 
   176 
 
discussion of each variable and its components is included in the remainder of this 
section.  
 Legitimacy. Legitimacy was defined as a label assigned by staff, faculty, and 
administrators to identify the validity of the merit pay system. Legitimacy emerges as 
the result of an evaluative process used by individuals to determine the alignment of the 
merit pay system with the internalized norms and values of individuals (French & 
Raven, 1959). The results of this evaluation process are reflected as a positive-neutral-
negative perception of the merit pay system. 
Organizational subsystems. Two organizational subsystems were of interest to 
this study: the technical subsystem and the administrative subsystem (Birnbaum, 1988). 
The technical subsystem was defined as that part of the higher education organization 
primarily responsible for implementing processes that convert inputs into outputs and 
included all full-time faculty at Compass Point University (Birnbaum, 1988). The 
administrative subsystem was defined as that part of the organization that coordinated 
and directed the organization and included all full-time staff and administrators who 
worked at Compass Point University within four structural units: the strategic apex, 
middle line administrators, techno-structure and support staff (Birnbaum, 1988; 
Mintzberg, 1979).  
Power. Power was defined as the capacity of an administrator to influence the 
behavior or activities of other individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) related to 
the adoption of the merit pay system. For this study, three types of position power were 
of interest: legitimate, reward, and coercive; and two types of personal power were of 
interest: expert and referent (French & Raven, 1959; Warren, 1968).  
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Coupling. Coupling, as a variable of interest, was defined as the degree to which 
individuals within a subsystem perceived that changes in their behaviors or activities 
directly influenced the merit pay system and thereby achieved the purposes of the merit 
pay system.  Coupling was measured along a continuum between tightly coupled on the 
one end to loosely coupled on the other.  
Ambiguity. Ambiguity was defined as the degree to which individuals within a 
subsystem could clearly identify the inputs, processes, and outputs of the subsystem, 
those parts of the production function. Individuals perceive inputs, processes, and 
outputs along a continuum. On one end of the continuum, individuals could clearly 
define inputs, processes, and outputs associated with their work as it occurred within the 
context of their associated subsystem. Also, inputs and outputs could be measured 
clearly. On the other end of the continuum, individuals perceived inputs, processes, and 
outputs as ambiguous, or perhaps indefinable, and inputs and outputs could not be 
measured clearly. 
Dependent Variables 
The study focused on two dependent variables. The dependent variables were 
legitimacy and adoption or rejection of a management innovation. A discussion of each 
variable and its components is included in the remainder of this section.  
Legitimacy. Legitimacy was defined as a label assigned by staff, faculty, and 
administrators to identify the validity of the merit pay system. Legitimacy emerges as 
the result of an evaluative process used by individuals to determine the alignment of the 
merit pay system with the internalized norms and values of individuals (French & 
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Raven, 1959). The results of this evaluation process are reflected as a positive-neutral-
negative perception of the merit pay system. 
Adoption or rejection of the management innovation. Adoption was defined as 
the degree to which individuals within the organization changed behaviors and activities 
to align with the merit pay system (Rogers, 1995). Rejection was defined as a decision 
made by individuals not to adopt the merit pay system. Adoption or rejection of an 
innovation is associated with an innovation-decision process (Rogers, 1995). The 
innovation-decision process includes four stages that lead to adoption or rejection: (1) 
knowledge; (2) persuasion; (3) decision; and (4) implementation (Rogers, 1995). During 
the knowledge stage, individuals have a basic knowledge about how the merit pay 
system works. They understand the purposes of the merit pay system and its processes. 
Individuals in the persuasion stage develop either a favorable or unfavorable attitude 
toward the merit pay system. This stage is followed by a decision to adopt or reject the 
innovation. Finally, implementation occurs when individuals have changed activities or 
behaviors to align with the criteria of the merit pay system. Therefore, adoption or 
rejection of the merit pay system was measured by progression through innovation-
decision process and the ultimate rejection or adoption of the merit pay system. 
Sampling 
Phase I 
Quantitative design, sampling, data collection, and analysis were used in Phase I 
of this study. A survey was the only means of data collection in Phase I. The population 
for this study included all 430 full-time employees at Compass Point University. Full-
time employees were defined as those employees who worked more than 30 hours each 
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week at Compass Point University and were specifically designated as full-time 
employees by the human resources office at Compass Point University.  
To ensure that the sample was representative of the population and to decrease 
visibility of the study, a proportional stratified random sampling technique was used to 
select 250 potential participants from the population.  Individuals involved in the field 
test were not included in the sample. Stratified random sampling involved the sorting of 
individual subjects based on specific strata and then random selection of subjects within 
each strata (Ary et al., 2002). The technique was proportional in that the number 
selected from each stratum was proportional to the number within each stratum for the 
population (Ary et al., 2002). One stratum was used for random sampling in Phase I: 
subsystems. Subjects were sorted into two subsystem categories: (1) participants from 
the technical subsystem (all full-time faculty); and (2) participants from the 
administrative subsystem (all full-time staff and administrators). These two categories 
were selected because they aligned with the units of analyses for this study as proposed 
in the research questions. At Compass Point University, 146 individuals were employed 
within the technical subsystem and 284 employed within the administrative subsystem. 
Proportionally, 85 individuals were selected randomly from the technical subsystem, 
and 165 individuals were selected randomly from the administrative subsystem.  
Phase II 
Qualitative design, sampling, data collection, and analysis were used in Phase II. 
The purpose of Phase II was to interpret, explain, and provide additional details related 
to Phase I findings. Fifteen face-to-face personal interviews provided the means of data 
collection. Two sampling techniques were used to select Phase II participants. First, a 
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stratified random sampling technique was used. One stratum was used for random 
sampling in Phase II: subsystems. At the conclusion of the Phase I survey, participants 
were provided an opportunity to identify their willingness to be interviewed as part of 
the study. Those that affirmed their willingness to be interviewed were placed into two 
subsystem categories: (1) participants from the technical subsystem (all full-time 
faculty); and (2) participants from the administrative subsystem (all full-time staff and 
administrators). Phase II participants were then selected randomly from each category. 
Two full-time faculty and three full-time staff were selected using stratified random 
sampling. It was anticipated that this randomized approach would yield a sample 
representative of the commonalities and differences that exist across the sample (Ary et 
al., 2002). A randomized approach was used to select participants for interviews until 
the range of ideas expressed by the subjects had been exhausted and no new information 
was being acquired, or basically, interviews continued until saturation occurred (Glasser 
& Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Teddlie & Yu, 2007). 
In addition, a purposive sampling approach was used to select ten additional 
participants for interviews. Purposive sampling allowed for the selection of a sample 
based on specific criteria and was not random (Kemper et al., 2003; Teddlie & Yu, 
2007). For this study, interviews were conducted with subjects who were important 
players in the implementation of the merit pay system. These key informers included 
the president, the institution’s three vice-presidents, the academic deans, the faculty 
senate president, and the staff council president. These individuals, because of their 
leadership roles, had additional insights and perspectives related to the implementation 
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and adoption of the merit pay system (Yin, 2003). These insights contributed to richer 
description and understanding related to the adoption of the merit pay system. 
To summarize, quantitative data were collected in Phase I of this study from 
individuals selected using a stratified random sampling technique. Qualitative data were 
collected in Phase II using stratified sampling and purposive sampling techniques. 
Data Collection 
 This mixed method study included both quantitative and qualitative elements to 
increase the validity and rigor of the study. Phase I data collection focused on 
quantitative data collection. Phase II focused on qualitative data collection. 
Phase I: Quantitative Data Collection 
Quantitative research is defined as “confirmatory, deductive, structured, closed-
ended, controlled, and linear research that results in quantitative data” (Johnson & 
Turner, 2003, p. 297).  In effect, quantitative research utilizes systematic approaches (1) 
to identify independent and dependent variables related to a phenomenon; (2) to define 
those variables; (3) to measure quantitatively those variables; and (4) to determine the 
relationship between those variables using statistical analyses (Ary et al., 2002; Gay, 
1987; Patton, 2002). Since the quantitative phase of this study did not manipulate any of 
the variables of interest, a nonexperimental, ex post facto approach was used to answer 
the identified research questions.  
With regard to data collection instruments, a survey was distributed to 250 full-
time employees at Compass Point University. Surveys are a common approach to data 
collection in quantitative methodology (Ary et al., 2002). The researcher examined the 
literature and found no survey instruments that singularly measured all the variables of 
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interest for this study. Survey questions were developed by the researcher and field-
tested. Based on the field-test, the survey was modified and was then used to broaden 
our understanding of how power, coupling, and ambiguity interacted to influence 
perceived legitimacy of the merit base system and how perceived legitimacy influenced 
the adoption or rejection of a management innovation. Additional information about the 
field test is provided later in this chapter. 
Survey instrument. An Innovation Adoption Survey was developed (see 
Appendix A). The survey consisted of three sections. The first section collected 
demographic data regarding gender, age, highest degree earned, years of employment, 
and subsystem in which individuals were employed (or job classification). The second 
section, Merit Pay Perceptions, measured the following variables: legitimacy, 
organizational subsystems, power, coupling, and adoption or rejection of the 
management innovation. The third section, Administrator Role, primarily measured the 
perceived use of power by administrators. All survey questions were developed by the 
researcher. 
This anonymous survey was administered to 250 full-time employees at 
Compass Point University. The survey was developed using SurveyMonkey and 
distributed in an electronic, web-based format via the email system at Compass Point 
University. The administration of the survey included three contacts with the study’s 
participants. A paper version of the survey was distributed to 30 individuals who did not 
have access to email. Table 2 provides a summary of the distribution method. 
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Table 2 
 
Summary of Survey Distribution Method 
 
Contact Day Method Mode 
1 1 Pre-notice letter Email 
2 4 Survey packet Email/Web 
3 7 Thank-you/reminder Email 
 
Table 3 outlines the features that were included in the development and 
administration of the survey to further enhance completion and return rates (Couper, 
Traugott, & Lamias, 2001; Dillman, 2007; Fox, Crask, & Kim, 1988).  
Table 3 
 
Survey Development and Administration Features to Increase Return Rates 
 
Phase Feature 
Survey Development 
 
Short entry boxes 
 
Multiple-item screens that group questions tied to the same variable 
 
A graphic indicator on each page demonstrating progress toward completing 
the survey 
 
Survey Administration 
 
Pre-notice letter and email 
 
One thank you/reminder emails 
 
$2 cash incentive distributed with pre-notice letter  
 
A $300 gift certificate awarded to two randomly selected individuals who 
completed the survey 
 
The remainder of this section identifies each survey question linked to each 
research question.  
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Research Question 1. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
influence individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) to adopt or reject a 
management innovation within higher education?  
Perceived legitimacy was the independent variable for Question 1. Legitimacy 
was defined as a label assigned by individuals to identify the validity of the merit pay 
system. Legitimacy is the result of an evaluative process used by individuals to 
determine the alignment of the merit pay system with the internalized norms and values 
of individuals (French & Raven, 1959).  
The following four questions were used to measure legitimacy. 
Survey Question 7. On my most recent evaluation, I feel my performance was 
accurately measured and reflected my actual performance. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 9.  The merit pay system is a fair and objective method to 
evaluate my employee job performance at this university.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
 
Survey Question 12.  On my most recent evaluation, the merit pay system 
proved to be a valid approach for evaluating my 
performance as an employee.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
 
Survey Question 18.   The merit pay system is a good fit for me and for the 
university or the merit pay system makes sense 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant Influence 
  
For questions 7, 9, and 12, the legitimacy variable was continuously measured 
by requesting participants to numerically respond on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – 5 
to a given prompt with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 
5=strongly agree. For data analysis, responses to questions 7, 9, and 12 were recoded as 
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follows: 1 = -2; 2 = -1; 3 = 0, 4 = +1, 5 = +2. For question 18, the legitimacy variable 
was continuously measured using a Likert scale ranging from 1-5 with 1=no influence 
and 5=significant influence.  
 The adoption or rejection of the merit pay system was the dependent variable for 
Question 1. Adoption was defined as the degree to which individuals within the 
organization changed behaviors and activities to align with the merit pay system 
(Rogers, 1995). Rejection was defined as the decision not to adopt an innovation 
(Rogers, 1995). Adoption or rejection of innovation is the result of an innovation-
decision process that includes four stages: (1) knowledge; (2) persuasion; (3) decision; 
and (4) implementation (Rogers, 1995). Accordingly, the survey included four 
questions that measured the degree to which individuals completed each stage of the 
innovation-decision process.   
Survey Question 13.  I know and understand how the merit pay system works. 
1 2 3 4 5 
SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 15.  I have formed a clear opinion (positive or negative) about 
the potential benefits of the merit pay system to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 16. I plan to change behaviors or activities as an employee to 
align my job performance with the evaluation criteria of 
the merit pay system.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 17. What would you say has been your percent of actual 
change (from 0% to 100%) in your behavior or activities 
related to the criteria of the merit pay system.  
 _____ % of change in actual behavior or activities 
 
For questions 13, 15, and 16, the innovation-decision process variable was 
continuously measured by requesting participants to respond numerically on a Likert 
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scale ranging from 1 – 5 to a given prompt with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=neutral, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree. For data analysis, responses to questions 13, 
15, and 16 were recoded as follows: 1 = -2; 2 = -1; 3 = 0, 4 = +1, 5 = +2. For question 
17, the innovation-decision process variable was continuously measured by requesting 
participant to provide an overall percentage of change. In essence, the innovation-
decision process questions identified the degree to which individuals had moved 
through the innovation-decision process and the degree to which adoption of the merit 
pay system occurred. 
Research Question 2. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
vary based on the organizational subsystem (technical and administrative) in 
which individuals worked?  
 The independent variable for Research Question 2 was organizational 
subsystem. This categorical variable was measured using two organizational 
subsystems: the technical subsystem and the administrative subsystem. The technical 
subsystem included all full-time faculty. The administrative subsystem included all 
other full-time employees (staff and administrators) at Compass Point University. The 
technical subsystem was defined as that unit of the organization that converts inputs 
into outputs. The administrative subsystem was defined as the unit that coordinates and 
directs the organization. Responses to survey question 5 were binary coded (0=technical 
subsytem, 1=administrative subsystem). 
Survey Question 5. Please identify your position and the campus unit with 
which you are most closely affiliated.  
 Teaching Faculty (not including deans or department chairs).  
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 College of Education and Psychology 
 College of Health and Sciences 
 College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
 School of Business 
 Library 
 Non-Faculty 
 President’s Office 
 Academic Affairs 
 Student Development 
 Administration and Finance 
 Advancement and Development 
 Athletics 
 Communications and Marketing 
If non-faculty, please select one of the following job classifications. 
 Senior-level administrator (president, vice presidents, 
associate and assistant vice presidents, dean of students, 
athletic director, communications and marketing director) 
 Mid-level administrator (all other administrators who 
directly supervise full-time employees including academic 
deans, academic department chairs, unit directors, program 
directors, etc.) 
 Professional staff 
 Support staff 
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Perceived legitimacy was the dependent variable for Research Question 2 and as 
a variable has been discussed previously in Research Question 1. Data from the survey 
questions related to this variable in Research Question 1 were used to answer this 
question.  
Research Question 3: Did perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate 
the adoption of a management innovation influence how individuals perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation?  
Perceived legitimacy was the dependent variable and survey questions to 
measure legitimacy have been identified previously. Power was the independent 
variable for Question 3. Power was defined as the capacity of a leader to influence the 
behavior or activities of a follower. Three types of position power were considered 
(legitimate, reward, and coercive) and two types of personal power (expert and 
referent).  
The survey included 15 questions to measure power as a continuous variable. 
Three questions measured the overall use of power, and each power type was measured 
by at least two questions. For questions 33-42, the power variable was continuously 
measured by requesting participants to respond numerically on a Likert scale ranging 
from 1 – 5 to a given prompt with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 
and 5=strongly agree. For data analysis, responses to these questions were recoded as 
follows: 1 = -2; 2 = -1; 3 = 0, 4 = +1, 5 = +2. For questions 19, 20, 23, 26, and 32, 
power was continuously measured by requesting participants to respond numerically on 
a Likert scale ranging from 1 – 5 where 1=no influence and 5=significant influence. 
   189 
 
The balance of this section will restate the definition for each type of power and 
will be followed by the corresponding survey questions that were used to measure that 
type of power. 
General power question 
Survey Question 19.   The influence of the president. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 20.   The influence of the senior administration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 32. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the extent to which the 
administrator(s) in your area have influenced your 
attitudes and behaviors of the merit pay system.  
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Legitimate power was defined as the capacity of a leader to influence the behavior or 
activities of a follower based on the leader’s formal authority or position influence over 
the follower.  
Survey Question 33.   I appreciated the leadership authority of my 
administrator(s) and followed their leadership. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 39.   My administrator’s position within the organization 
influenced my attitudes and behavior with regard to the 
merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
SD D N A  SA 
 
Reward power was defined as the capacity of a leader to influence the behavior or 
activities of a follower based on the leader’s capacity and willingness to provide 
resources and/or awards to the follower. 
Survey Question 34.   I knew the administrator(s) would reward a change in my 
attitude or behavior as related to the merit pay system. 
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1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 40.   I anticipated that incentives would be provided by the 
administrator(s) if I conformed to their expectation related 
to the merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Coercive power was defined as the capacity of a leader to influence the behavior or 
activities of a follower based on the leader’s authority and willingness to impose 
sanctions or punishments on the follower. 
Survey Question 23.   Negative consequences for not changing (i.e., no salary 
increase, negative comments by peers, negative 
evaluation by supervisor). 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 35.   I wanted to avoid any negative consequences that might 
result from my unwillingness to align my attitudes and 
behaviors with the expectations of my administrator(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
  
Survey Question 42.   I thought I might be penalized by my administrator(s) for 
not following their leadership related to the merit pay 
system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Referent power – The capacity of a leader to influence the behavior or activities of a 
follower based on the follower’s personal identification and trust with the leader and the 
fact that the leader will do good deeds for the follower even in the absence of extensive 
collaboration with the follower. 
Survey Question 36.   I trusted my administrator(s) and knew that they would do 
good things for me if I followed their leadership related to 
the merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
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Survey Question 38.   I did not want to risk the relationship with my 
administrator(s) and therefore conformed to their 
expectations with regard to the merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Expert power – The capacity of a leader to influence the behavior or activities of a 
follower based on the knowledge and/or skills of the leader as perceived by the 
follower. 
Survey Question 26.   Lack of my supervisor(s)’ understanding and knowledge 
of the merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 37.   I knew the administrator(s) had knowledge and expertise 
with regard to the merit pay system, and I chose to follow 
their leadership on this issue. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 41.   When I have followed the administrator(s)’ judgment and 
experience in the past, I have been pleased with the 
outcome. Therefore, I followed the administrator(s)’ lead 
on the merit pay system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Research Question 4. Did the perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a 
proposed management innovation influence how individuals perceived the 
legitimacy of a management innovation?   
Perceived legitimacy was the dependent variable and survey questions to 
measure legitimacy have been identified previously. Perceived degree of coupling was 
the independent variable and was defined as the degree to which individuals within a 
subsystem perceived that changes in behavior or activities directly influenced the merit 
pay system and thereby achieved the purposes of the merit pay system. For questions 10 
and 11, the perceived coupling variable was continuously measured by requesting 
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participants to respond numerically on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – 5 to a given 
prompt with 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, and 5=strongly agree. 
For data analysis, responses to these questions were recoded as follows: 1 = -2; 2 = -1; 3 
= 0, 4 = +1, 5 = +2. For questions 21 and 22, perceived coupling was continuously 
measured by requesting the participants to respond numerically on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 – 5 where 1=no influence and 5=significant influence. 
Perceived coupling was measured using the following four questions. 
Survey Question 10.  The University’s merit pay system provides an incentive 
for me to increase my work productivity. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 11.  I feel that if I improve my work performance, I will 
receive a corresponding salary increase according to the 
way the merit pay systems is supposed to work.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 21. The opportunity to increase my salary. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 22.   The opportunity for increased recognition as an employee. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Research Question 5. Did the perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and 
outputs influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Perceived legitimacy was the dependent variable and survey questions to 
measure legitimacy have been identified previously. Ambiguity was the independent 
variable and was defined as the degree to which individuals within a subsystem can 
clearly identify the inputs, processes, and outputs of the subsystem. For questions 28-
31, the ambiguity variable was continuously measured by requesting participants to 
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respond numerically on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – 5 to a given prompt with 
1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree and 5=strongly agree. For data 
analysis, responses to these questions were recoded as follows: 1 = -2; 2 = -1; 3 = 0, 4 = 
+1, 5 = +2. For questions 24, ambiguity was continuously measured by requesting 
participant to respond numerically on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – 5 where 1=no 
influence and 5=significant influences. Question 24 was a negative prompt; hence the 
rating was transformed by subtracting the response by 6. 
The following five questions were used to measure ambiguity.  
Survey Question 24. Lack of employee production benchmarks, or production 
benchmarks that are difficult to measure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 No influence Significant influence 
 
Survey Question 28.  I can identify the inputs and outputs for my work unit. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 29. I can measure the inputs and outputs for my work unit. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 30. I can identify my work outputs related to the merit pay 
system.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Survey Question 31. I can measure my outputs related to the merit pay system. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 SD D N A  SA 
 
Research Question 6. Did the factors of power, coupling and ambiguity interact 
to influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Data gained from survey items linked to the previous research questions were 
used to answer question 6. 
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Phase II: Qualitative Data Collection 
 Pure qualitative research is defined as “exploratory, inductive, unstructured, 
open-ended, naturalistic, and free-flowing research that results in qualitative data” 
(Johnson & Turner, 2002, p. 297). In essence, qualitative research seeks to understand 
holistically the phenomenon, to understand the context in which the phenomenon 
occurs, and thus to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon using descriptive 
data (Ary et al., 2002; Schwandt, 2001; Wallen & Fraenkel, 2001). Within the context 
of the mixed method study, a second phase qualitative approach provided confirmation 
and elaboration of Phase I findings (Creswell, 1999, 2003; Morse, 2003).  
 One data collection technique was used in Phase II: face-to-face interviews. The 
remainder of this section provides a rationale for the use of interviews for data 
collection and identifies associated approaches used to conduct the interviews. 
Interviews.  Interviews are valuable sources of data in qualitative research 
(Johnson & Turner, 2003; Schwandt, 2001; Yin, 2003). For this study, interviews 
served the confirmation and exploration purposes of Phase II, provided additional in-
depth information related to the adoption of the management innovation, and increased 
validity of the study (Johnson & Turner, 2003).  
The researcher utilized a semi-structured interview protocol that contained 
formal elements. A formal approach ensured the consistent wording and sequencing of 
questions in alignment with the theoretical framework (Johnson & Turner, 2003; Patton, 
2002; Yin, 2003). The open-ended questions within the interview protocol (see 
Appendix B) allowed subjects to communicate their own opinions and insights about 
the adoption and rejection of the merit pay system, about the variables of interest and 
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about findings from Phase I (Yin, 2003). As noted by Patton (2002), “The truly open-
ended question allows the person being interviewed to select from among that person’s 
full repertoire of possible responses those that are more salient” (p. 354). In addition, a 
set of probing questions were developed to confirm findings linked to the Phase I 
survey. 
Field-Test 
 The survey, interview guide, and data collection procedures were field-tested. 
The purpose of the field test was (1) to establish content validity of questions contained 
in the instruments; (2) to improve the clarity of the questions contained in the 
instrument; (3) to assess the appropriateness and practicality of the study; and (4) to 
anticipate and resolve any potential problems related to data collection (Ary et al., 2002; 
Yin, 2001).   
Initially, five previous employees at Compass Point University were invited to 
participate in the field test. These individuals included two faculty and three staff. Each 
individual received a packet that included an introductory letter and instructions. The 
packet also included the survey and interview questions. An additional sheet that 
defined the variables of interest was also included. Each participant was asked to 
complete the survey and to review the interview questions.  
Following the completion of the survey and review of interview questions, the 
researcher contacted each participant for a debriefing session. In this session, 
participants were asked to identify survey or interview questions that were confusing or 
that appeared irrelevant based on their experiences and also to identify additional 
questions not asked of them. Participants offered no suggested changes to the questions 
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contained in the interview guide. Responses from the field test participants and 
discussions with the researcher’s dissertation chair led to some minor modifications to 
the research questions (see Appendix C for complete field test results). 
Following these revisions, the survey was distributed to 25 full-time employees 
at CPU. Of those individuals, 19 completed the survey. A review of responses indicated 
that these 19 individuals answered 100% of the questions. The high response rate and 
the absence of any unanswered items led the researcher to conclude that no additional 
survey modifications were warranted (see Appendix C for complete field test results).  
Data Analysis 
 The two-phase, sequential design required that data analysis occur within each 
phase (Creswell, 1999, 2003). Quantitative data analysis occurred at the end of Phase I. 
Qualitative data analysis occurred throughout Phase II. Data correlation that integrated 
analyses from both phases was incorporated throughout Phase II data analysis 
(Creswell, 1999, 2003; Creswell et al., 2003; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003).  This 
section of Chapter III discusses procedures that were used for Phase I and Phase II data 
analyses. 
Phase I Analysis 
 Phase I utilized quantitative data analysis and was guided by the study’s six 
research questions. For each research question, specific statistical procedures were 
identified.  
Research Question 1.  The first research question examined if perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation influenced individuals to adopt or reject a 
management innovation within higher education. Four survey questions (7, 9, 12, and 
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18) measured the independent variable, perceived legitimacy, and four survey questions 
(13, 15, 16, and 17) measured the dependent variable, adoption or rejection of the 
management innovation. Each survey question required a numerical response to a 
provided prompt. Responses were coded as previously noted in the instrument section. 
Each survey question was treated as a single independent variable (L1, L2, L3, and L4), 
and a single dependent variable (IA1, IA2, IA3, and IA4). Surveys with missing data 
related to these two variables were not included in the analysis. 
Responses to each survey question were used to perform two data analyses. 
First, a Pearson r analysis was used to analyze the degree to which relationships existed 
between the innovation-decision variables (IA1, IA2, IA3, IA4) as a means to examine 
the innovation-decision process. Second, a series of multiple regression analyses was 
used to examine the collective and separate effect of the Research Question’s 
independent variables  (L1, L2, L3, L4) on the innovation-decision responses (IA1, IA2, 
IA3, IA4) while controlling for gender, age, highest degree earned, years of 
employment, and subsystem (Lomax 2001, Pedhazur, 1997). 
Research Question 2. The second research question examined if perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation varied based on the subsystem in which an 
individual functioned.  Survey Question 5 placed individuals into two groups related to 
the independent variable, organizational subsystem. Responses were binary coded 
(0=faculty, 1=administrative).  
Based on the analysis tied to Research Question 1, two survey questions (9 and 
18) measured the dependent variable, perceived legitimacy. Each survey question 
required a numerical response (1 – 5) to a provided prompt. Responses were coded as 
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previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was treated as a dependent 
variable (L2 and L4). Surveys with missing data related to this variable were not 
included in the analysis. 
Simple regression analysis was used to determine if the organizational 
subsystem in which an individual worked was a significant predictor of how an 
individual perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system. Lomax (2001) and 
Pedhauzur (1997) indicated that simple regression analysis is an appropriate statistical 
method for understanding the predictive effect of a single independent variable on a 
dependent variable. 
Research Question 3. The third research question sought to understand if 
perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate the adoption of a management 
innovation influenced how individuals perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation. The independent variable was power. Five types of power were measured 
by ten survey questions: legitimate power (questions 33 and 39), reward power 
(questions 34 and 40), coercive power (questions 23, 35, and 42), expert power 
(questions 26, 37, and 41), and referent power (questions 36 and 38). Each survey 
statement required a numerical response (1 – 5) to the provided prompt. Responses were 
coded as previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was treated as a 
single independent variable (LP1, LP2, RWP1, RWP2, CP1, CP2, CP3, EXP1, EXP2, 
EXP3, RFP1 and RP2). Surveys with missing data related to this variable were not 
included in the analysis. 
 Based on the analysis tied to Research Question 1, two survey questions (9 and 
18) measured the dependent variable, perceived legitimacy. Each survey question 
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required a numerical response (1 – 5) to a provided prompt. Responses were coded as 
previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was treated as a dependent 
variable (L2 and L4). Surveys with missing data related to this variable were not 
included in the analysis. 
With regard to data analysis, a series of multiple regression analyses was used to 
analyze the collective and separate effect of the question’s independent variables (LP1, 
LP2, RWP1, RWP2, CP1, CP2, CP3, EXP1, EXP2, EXP3, RFP1 and RP2) on 
perceived legitimacy (L2 and L4) while controlling for gender, age, highest degree 
earned, years of employment, and subsystem (Lomax 2001, Pedhazur, 1997). 
Research Question 4. The fourth research question sought to know if the 
perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a proposed management innovation 
influenced how individuals perceived legitimacy of the management innovation.  Four 
survey questions measured the independent variable, perceived coupling (10, 11, 21, 
and 22). Each survey statement required a numerical response (1 – 5) to the provided 
prompt. Responses were coded as previously noted in the instrument section. Each 
response was treated as a single independent variable (C1, C2, C3, and C4). Surveys 
with missing data related to this variable were not included in the analysis. 
Based on the analysis tied to Research Question 1, two survey questions (9 and 
18) measured the dependent variable, perceived legitimacy. Each survey question 
required a numerical response (1 – 5) to a provided prompt. Responses were coded as 
previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was treated as a dependent 
variable (L2 and L4). Surveys with missing data related to this variable were not 
included in the analysis. 
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With regard to data analysis, a series of multiple regression analyses was used to 
analyze the collective and separate effect of the question’s independent variables C1, 
C2, C3, C4) on perceived legitimacy (L2, L4) while controlling for gender, age, highest 
degree earned, years of employment, and subsystem (Lomax 2001; Pedhazur, 1997). 
Research Question 5. The fifth research question sought to know if the 
perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and outputs for a subsystem influenced how 
individuals perceived legitimacy of a management innovation. Five survey questions 
measured the independent variable, perceived ambiguity (24, 28, 29, 30, and 31). Each 
survey statement required a numerical response (1 – 5) to the provided prompt. 
Responses were coded as previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was 
treated as a single independent variable (A1, A2, A3, A4, and A5). Surveys with 
missing data related to this variable were not included in the analysis. 
Based on the analysis tied to Research Question 1, two survey questions (9 and 
18) measured the dependent variable, perceived legitimacy. Each survey question 
required a numerical response (1 – 5) to a provided prompt. Responses were coded as 
previously noted in the instrument section. Each response was treated as a dependent 
variable (L2 and L4). Surveys with missing data related to this variable were not 
included in the analysis. 
With regard to data analysis, a series of multiple regression analyses was used to 
analyze the collective and separate effect of the question’s independent variables (A1, 
A2, A3, A4, A5) on perceived legitimacy (L2, L4) while controlling for gender, age, 
highest degree earned, years of employment, and subsystem (Lomax 2001, Pedhazur, 
1997). 
   201 
 
Research Question 6. The sixth research question sought to understand if the 
factors of power, coupling, and ambiguity interacted to influence how individuals 
perceived legitimacy of a management innovation. A path analysis was conducted to 
test the magnitude of intercorrelations among the sets of variables within a hypothesized 
causal model (Coughlin, 2005; Mertler & Vanatta, 2005; Pedhazur, 1997, Schumacker 
& Lomax, 2004). The hypothesized causal model emerged from the researcher’s critical 
analysis of the research related to the adoption of management innovations in higher 
education and from testing the background variables using a series of multiple 
regression analyses, correlation analyses, and partial correlation analysis (Mertler & 
Vanatta, 2005; Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
The path analysis required a change in terminology tied to the model’s variables. 
Independent variables were changed to exogenous variables, and dependent variables 
were changed to endogenous variables (Coughlin, 2005; Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; 
Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Within a causal model, exogenous 
variables are connected to endogenous variables with lines ending in arrows, thus 
identifying paths of causation. Basically, the path analysis used exogenous variables to 
explain variance of endogenous variables (Coughlin, 2005; Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; 
Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). 
The causal model that emerged from the literature was tested using a series of 
multiple regression analyses. Multiple regression was used to analyze the collective and 
separate effects of the question’s exogenous variables (power, coupling, ambiguity, 
gender, age, highest degree earned, years of employment, and subsystem) on perceived 
legitimacy (L2 and L4). A second series of regression analyses was used to analyze the 
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collective and separate effects of the question’s exogenous variables (power, coupling, 
ambiguity, gender, age, highest degree earned, years of employment, and subsystem) on 
the innovation adoption process (IA1, IA2, IA3, IA4). The results of these regression 
analyses were combined with results associated with Research Questions 1-5 to form a 
hypothesized causal model. 
Second, error terms were added to the endogenous variables. Error is an 
important concept linked to path analysis. Error is used to represent any unexplained 
variance, or residuals, found in an endogenous variable that may be linked to any 
exogenous variables not included in the model (Coughlin, 2005; Mertler & Vannatta, 
2005; Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Errors are depicted on the causal 
model as an “e” linked to the endogenous variable. 
Third, each path was evaluated using correlation and partial correlation analysis 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). A Pearson 
r correlation analysis was used to analyze the degree to which relationships existed 
between the various variables within the hypothesized model. Relationships found to be 
significant (p<.05) were retained in the model. Relationships that were not significant 
(p≥.05) were eliminated from the model. Second, partial correlation analyses were then 
conducted to determine the strength of each relationship within the model while 
controlling for all other variables within the model.  Relationships that were significant 
(p<.05) while controlling for all other variables were retained in the model. 
Relationships that were not significant (p≥.05) were eliminated from the model. 
Next, the goodness-of-fit for the hypothesized model with the observed data was 
tested. Models with good fit are supported by the variance found within the sample data 
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while models of poor fit lack this quality. Goodness-of-fit was evaluated using a chi-
square statistic, chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio, Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation, Normed Fit Index, and Comparative Fit Index (Cohen et al., 2003; 
Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Wuensch, 
2006).  
The 2 statistic “compares the model implied by the relationships among the 
empirical variables with the model specified by the investigator” (Cohen et al., 2003, p. 
472). In most statistical analysis, high 2 values lead to rejection of the null hypothesis. 
However, in path analysis, a lower 2 indicates the model more closely reflects the 
variance among variables within the observed data (Coughlin, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003; 
Pedhazur, 1997). Hence, significance of the 2 statistic occurs when p≥.05 indicating a 
good fit between the model and the data. 
The determination of goodness-of-fit should not be based solely on the 
significance of 2 given its sensitivity to sample size (Coughlin, 2005; Cohen et al., 
2003; Pedhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004; Wuensch, 2006). As noted by 
Schumacker & Lomax (2004), “as sample size increases (generally above 200), the χ2 
statistic has a tendency to indicate a significant probability level . . . as sample size 
decreases (generally below 100), the χ2 statistic indicates nonsignificant probability 
levels” (p. 100). Accordingly, goodness-of-fit was also determined by examining the 
ratio between the 2 statistic and the degrees of freedom. A general rule of thumb is that 
a  2:df ratio lower than 3:1 or 2:1 supports a good fit (Pedhazur, 1997, Wuensch, 
2006). Goodness-of-fit was also evaluated by evaluating the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RME), which ranges from 0 (perfect fit) to 1 (no fit at all) (Pedhazur, 
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1997). A RME<.05 may be considered a good fit (Pedhazur, 1997; Schumacker & 
Lomax 2004; Wuensch, 2006), and a RME of ≤.08 but >.05 may be considered an 
adequate fit (Coughlin, 2005; Wuensch, 2006). Lastly, goodness-of-fit was evaluated 
using the Normed Fit Index (NFI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI), which yield indices 
ranging between 0 (no fit at all) to 1 (perfect fit). Values greater than .9 on NFI or CFI 
indicate a satisfactory or good fit (Coughlin, 2005; Pedhazur, 1997; Wuensch, 2006).  
Finally, decomposition of effects was conducted to determine direct, indirect, 
and total effects of variables within the model. Direct effect is captured when a variable 
in the model has a direct influence upon another variable (Coughlin, 2005; Cohen et al., 
2003; Pedhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004: Wuensch, 2006). Indirect effects 
occur when the effects of one variable in the model upon another variable are mediated 
through third variable (Coughlin, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003; Pedhazur, 1997; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004: Wuensch, 2006). Total effects are the summation of 
direct and indirect effects (Coughlin, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003; Pedhazur, 1997; 
Schumacker & Lomax, 2004: Wuensch, 2006). Direct effects are the only paths 
represented in the causal model. 
Phase II Analysis 
The purpose of Phase II analysis was to confirm, elaborate, and/or explain Phase 
I findings qualitatively (Creswell, 1999, 2003; Morse, 2003). To accomplish this 
purpose, Phase II applied qualitative data analysis to 15 transcribed interviews. 
Specifically, a typology development analysis, or confirmatory thematic analysis, was 
used (Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). As noted by Caracelli 
& Green (1993), 
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In the typology development mixed-method analysis strategy, the analysis of 
one data type considers the homogeneity within and heterogeneity between 
subgroupings of data on some dimension of interest, yielding a set of substantive 
categories or typology. This typology is then incorporated in the analysis of the 
contrasting data type. (p. 198) 
Essentially, Phase I quantitative data analysis yielded a typology related to the adoption 
or rejection of the merit pay system at Compass Point University. This Phase I typology 
provided the theoretical framework for the Phase II qualitative analysis. Beyond the 
work of Caracelli and Green (1993), the use of an a priori framework in qualitative 
analysis is also supported by others (Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Creswell, 1999, 2003; 
Merriam, 1998; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Schwandt, 2001; Yin, 2003). 
The confirmatory analysis included three processes. The first process converted 
audio recordings to verbatim transcripts. A researcher-transcriptionist approach that 
utilized voice recognition software, and a listen and repeat method was used to create 
verbatim transcripts (Matheson, 2007; Park & Zeanah, 2005). Two approaches were 
used to minimize transcript errors and increase trustworthiness: (1) the researcher 
checked completed transcripts against the original recordings, which also increased the 
researcher’s familiarity with the data; and (2) three participants were asked to review 
transcripts of their interviews and check for accuracy (Matheson, 2007; Park & Zeanah, 
2005).  
The second process reduced the data collected from the transcribed interviews 
(Keeves & Snowden, 1997; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003). Data reduction primarily 
focused on coding the data. Coding is a procedure that “disaggregates data, breaks it 
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down into manageable segments, and identifies or names those segments” (Schwandt, 
2001, p. 26). Data was coded based on first-order and second-order concepts 
(Huberman & Miles, 2002) using NVivo software. First-order concepts were identified 
as those concepts within the data that were linked to the Phase I typology and 
theoretical statements including confirming and disconfirming statements. The data was 
then coded based on second-order concepts. Second-order concepts were identified as 
those characteristics, processes, or themes that further explained first-order concepts. 
Second-order concepts provided a broader understanding related to the adoption or 
rejection of the management innovation. Coding occurred following each interview and 
prior to the subsequent interview.  
Third, the coded data was analyzed using an iterative process of explanation 
building (Keeves & Snowden, 1997; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; Yin, 2003). The 
purpose of the explanation building process was to “explain the phenomenon” (Yin, 
2003, p. 120), or in this study to explain the causal model identified in Phase I. After the 
initial interview was coded, the model was revised based on the analysis of the initial 
interview. Following subsequent interviews, data from previous interviews were 
reviewed and coded in light of any new characteristics, processes, or themes that 
emerged. This process was repeated and concluded with a more refined and elaborate 
typology. The iterative process of explanation building (coding, analysis, and revision 
of the typology) also ensured that Phase I and Phase II analysis were integrated 
(Caracelli & Green, 1993; Keeves & Snowden, 1997; Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003).  
In essence, Phase II culminated with a holistic integration of multiple data sources 
associated with the mixed-method design.  
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Validity, Trustworthiness, and Inference 
 Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006) recommended that validity, trustworthiness, 
and inference as related to mixed method research “be seen as a continuous process 
rather than as a fixed attribute of a specific research study” (p.56). Creswell (2003) and 
Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) advocated that processes to ensure validity be 
incorporated into both quantitative and qualitative phases of a mixed method study. 
Accordingly, the study incorporated procedures within each phase of the study to 
increase validity, trustworthiness, and inference. 
 Quantitative validity. As many as 50 different threats to validity of quantitative 
studies have been identified (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006). Shadish, Cook, and 
Campbell (2002) and Creswell (2003) synthesized these threats into four types: internal 
validity, external validity, statistical conclusion validity, and construct validity. 
 Threats to internal validity were not of significant concern to this study given 
the nonexperimental, ex post facto design used in Phase I. 
 Threats to external validity refer to generalization of findings “beyond the 
groups in the experiment to other racial or social groups” (Creswell, 2003, p. 171). To 
minimize this threat, the study included (1) a limitations section that warned against 
generalization beyond the context of the study; and (2) a detailed description of the 
study’s setting so that readers would broader understanding related to the context of the 
study.  
 As noted by Creswell (2003) “threats to statistical conclusion validity arise 
when experimenters draw inaccurate inferences from the data because of inadequate 
statistical power or violation of statistical assumptions” (p. 171). For this study, the 
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following procedures were incorporated to increase statistical conclusion validity: (1) 
sampling procedures were used to increase power; (2) power statistics were analyzed 
and discussed; (3) statistical assumptions were tested and discussed, and where 
violations occurred, additional discussions of the violation were included.  
 Construct validity focuses on the accuracy of definitions and measures 
associated with the study’s identified variables (Ary et al., 2002; Creswell, 2003). 
Threats to construct validity were minimized by (1) sound logic rooted in literature to 
define variables; (2) survey items linked to published literature, to the extent possible 
and where appropriate; (3) an external review of the survey instrument.  
 Qualitative trustworthiness. Qualitative researchers often prefer to use the term 
trustworthiness over the term validity (Creswell, 2003; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 1990; 
Schwandt, 2001) to “capture authentically the lived experiences of people” 
(Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006, p. 49). In Naturalistic Inquiry, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) identified four criteria associated with trustworthiness: credibility (the degree to 
which researchers’ representations reflect subjects’ views); transferability 
(generalization); dependability (the degree to which researchers’ processes are 
substantiated); and confirmability (linkages of findings to data). 
  Overall, the greatest threat to trustworthiness was credibility and dependability. 
The threat was specifically linked to the participant observer role assumed by the 
researcher. The role of a qualitative researcher exists on a continuum between 
participant and observer. It is never possible for a researcher to only be a participant or 
an observer (Coffey, 1999; Mason, 2002). The qualitative researcher is always a 
participant observer, and in the participant role, it is nearly impossible to control how 
   209 
 
individuals in the study will react to the researcher as participant (Mason, 2002). 
Therefore, this study identified specific strategies to minimize threats linked to the 
participant observer role (Coffey, 1999; Mason, 2002; Sanchez-Jankowski, 2002; 
Huberman & Miles, 2002).  
 First, the researcher’s role, experiences, and biases were identified (Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985, 1990; Schwartz & Schwartz, 1955). The researcher’s participant role, at 
the time of the study, was one of administrator within the sponsored programs and 
research office at CPU. The researcher had served in this capacity for ten years and had 
also earned two degrees from CPU. The researcher did not supervise, directly or 
indirectly, any individuals interviewed as part of this study, and the researcher did not 
play a significant role in the implementation of the management innovation. Hence, the 
researcher had no vested interest in the outcome of this study. With regard to 
experiences, the researcher had coordinated the implementation of several management, 
technology, and instructional innovations prior to this study. These innovations 
occurred within a variety of university and public school settings. Finally, the researcher 
identified the following personal biases related to this study: (1) the researcher tends to 
view the world through from the lens of a white, middle-class, middle-aged male who 
was a first-generation high school and college graduate that grew up in very humble 
conditions; (2) because of the researcher’s long relationship with the institution and 
with individuals at the institution, the researcher entered the study with the belief that he 
would not be seen as an outsider and that individuals would demonstrate trust in the 
social contract between the researcher and respondents to the point that answers 
provided in the interviews would reflect who they were as individuals within the 
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context of the phenomena being studied and that answers would accurately represent 
events discussed by the individuals; and (3) the researcher entered Phase II of the study 
with the belief that the results of the quantitative section were valid and provided a 
potential framework to understand the perceived legitimacy of management innovations 
and the subsequent adoption of those innovations within higher education. In summary, 
the researcher continually reminded himself of these articulated roles, experiences, and 
biases throughout the qualitative data collection and analysis portions of this study as a 
means to ensure that conclusions accurately reflected the individuals and events 
contained within the data and to ensure that conclusions were minimally influenced by 
the roles, experiences, and biases of the researcher.  
 Additionally, the researcher developed strategies to address three additional 
threats to credibility and dependability posed by the participant observer role as 
identified by Sanchez-Jankowski (2002). First, Sanchez-Jankowski noted that the 
participant observer may have difficulty understanding the authentic representation of 
individuals and events. Specifically for this study, the participant observer role had the 
potential to affect how interviewees responded to interview questions to the point that 
responses to questions might not accurately represent the individual’s true person or the 
individual’s true perceptions of events. This threat was minimized by (1) providing 
participants with an opportunity to not participate in the study; (2) ensuring that 
participants were familiar with the interviewer in order to establish the trust needed to 
reinforce the social contract of anonymity agreed to by the researcher and the 
interviewee; (3) selecting participants who were not supervised, directly or indirectly, 
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by the researcher; and (4) collecting only interview data so as to minimize interaction 
between the researcher and participant. 
 Second, Sanchez-Jankowski (2002) suggested that the role of participant 
observer was a potential threat to credibility and dependability due to the biases and 
experiences of the researcher. Sanchez-Jankowski contended that these biases and 
experiences not only influence what is seen and not seen, but how it is seen. This threat 
was minimized by (1) selecting participants using purposeful and stratified random 
techniques to ensure diversity of perspectives were included in the data; (2) using 
verbatim transcripts as the only source for qualitative data collection and analysis; (3) 
coding data using first-order and second-order concepts with first-order concepts linked 
specifically to the conceptual framework resulting from quantitative analysis; (4) 
identifying the researcher’s role, experiences, and biases and continually considering 
each of these while transcribing, coding, and analyzing data; and (5) journaling 
throughout the data analysis process as a means to minimize participant observer 
influence and to assess if the coded data supported conclusions.    
 Finally, Sanchez-Jankowski (2002) noted that the participant observer role may 
influence the meaning, or conclusions, that are derived from the data. Sanchez-
Jankowski suggested that it was potentially difficult for the participant observer to 
accurately understand the interviewee’s understandings of reality given the participant 
observers experiences with the same events. This threat was minimized by: (1) trying to 
consistently increase understanding of interviewee’s responses through questioning 
techniques and reflection; (2) presenting thick, rich descriptions of the interview data 
for readers to review and draw conclusions; (3) discussing positive and negative aspects 
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of events and anonymous individuals within the data and conclusions; (4) securing 
external review of qualitative data analysis and conclusions by two qualitative 
researchers at CPU. 
 While the role of participant observer certainly presented a potential threat, the 
role of participant observer also increased trustworthiness. First, the researcher had 
extensive experiences in a variety of educational systems involved in the 
implementation. This experiential knowledge tied to the environment decreased the 
probability of a Type I or Type II error (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2002). Additionally, 
familiarity with the environment, allowed the participant observer to recognize 
important contextual conditions and cues that were important to answering the research 
questions (Sanchez-Jankowski, 2002). Additionally, familiarity with the environment 
and the events prior to the study allowed the participant observer to consciously 
reconstruct events and assess the representation of events contained within the data 
while also assessing the degree to which researcher bias was contributing to data 
analysis and conclusions. In short, the participant observer role contributed to the 
trustworthiness of the study. 
 In addition, strategies primarily used to increase the general trustworthiness of 
this study included: (1) the integration of findings from multiple data sources; (2) the 
use of thick, rich descriptions to facilitate a shared experience with the reader; (3) 
disclosure of the researcher’s biases; (4) prolonged time in the field primarily due to the 
researcher being a participant observer; (5) use of two peer debriefers at the conclusion 
of Phase II analysis to enhance accuracy of interpretations and findings – the peer 
debriefers were qualitative researchers who worked at CPU during the implementation 
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of the management innovation; (6) discussion of negative or discrepant information 
when it appeared in the data. 
 To summarize, threats to the trustworthiness of this study were identified. The 
researcher’s role as participant observer was identified as the greatest threat, and in 
response, the study incorporated specific strategies to minimize the identified threats. 
The role as participant observer also increased the general trustworthiness of the study 
and worked in tandem with other strategies to augment the overall trustworthiness of 
this study.  
Mixed method inference. The term inference has been used to describe validity within 
the context of mixed methods research (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Teddlie & 
Tashakkori, 2003). Specifically, Teddlie & Tashakkori (2003) noted inference was the 
“mixed methodology equivalent of validity” (p. 12). Inference within the context of 
mixed methods has two qualities: data quality and inference quality (Onwuegbuzie & 
Johnson, 2006; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003) 
 Data quality, as noted by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003), is driven by the 
following principle, “If the data do not represent the theoretical phenomena or the 
attributes under study, then nothing else in the design of the study maters” (p. 39). In 
essence, data quality is associated with the data collection methods of the study. The 
data collection procedures highlighted in this chapter ensured data quality. 
 Inference quality includes two components: design quality and interpretive rigor 
(Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). Design quality is based 
on the “methodological rigor of the mixed research study” (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 
2006, p. 55), and is ensured by methods that are rigorous and consistent with research 
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standards (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). The data 
collection procedures highlighted in this chapter demonstrate rigor and standards that 
are consistent with those standards highlighted in the literature. 
 Interpretive rigor applies to the “standards for evaluating the validity of 
conclusions” (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006, p. 55), or as stated by Teddlie and 
Tashakkori (2003), interpretive rigor “might be described as a process whereby the 
accuracy, or authenticity, of our conclusions/interpretation is assessed” (p.37).  
Essentially, interpretive rigor is concerned about authenticity of processes used in a 
study to facilitate conclusions. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) identified four criteria to 
help evaluate interpretive rigor: within-design consistency (consistency of the study’s 
design from which inferences emerge); conceptual consistency (consistency of the 
study’s inferences with each other and with current theory); interpretive agreement 
(consistency of inferences with inferences drawn by participants’ and other 
researchers); and interpretive distinctiveness (inferences are distinctive and alternatives 
eliminated). The two-phase, mixed method, sequential explanatory research design 
outlined in this chapter primarily incorporated within-design consistency, conceptual 
consistency, and interpretive agreement to increase interpretive rigor. Onwuegbuzie and 
Johnson (2006) noted the sequential mixed method design provides the “highest level of 
integration” (p53).   
 In summary, the research design incorporated specific elements to minimize 
threats to validity, trustworthiness, and inference associated with this study.  
 
 
   215 
 
Limitations of the Study 
The study sought to further understand how the factors of power, coupling, 
ambiguity, and subsystems interacted to influence the perceived legitimacy of a 
management innovation within an institution of higher education. The researcher 
attempted to integrate several complex theories associated with this phenomenon. From 
this perspective, the study was an exploration of Birnbaum’s (2001) theory related to 
the adoption of management innovations within the complexities of a higher education 
organization. As such, the study led to the further refinement of existing theory. 
Causation related to the study will be limited, and measurement issues of complicated 
constructs may occur.  
A mixed method approach was used to examine this phenomenon within a 
single institution of higher education. While the researcher and the reader may gain 
many particular insights into adoption of the merit pay system at Compass Point 
University, “grand generalization” may be limited (Stake, 1995, p. 7).    
Due to the originality of the survey instrument used and issues related to the 
measurement of complex constructs, reliability and validity may be of concern. The 
survey was field tested; however, the use of the instrument outside of the specific 
context related to this study should be approached with caution. 
The role of the researcher as participant observer is also identified as a potential 
limitation to this study. While an anonymous survey was used to collect data in Phase I 
and should not be impacted too greatly by the researcher as participant observer, the 
responses of individuals in the face-to-face interviews associated with Phase II may 
have been influenced by the existing relationship between the interviewer and the 
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interviewee. Answers provided by participants may not accurately reflect the actual 
situation.  
Additionally, participant responses may have been inaccurate due to the 
complexity of the phenomenon being explored. Participants may have been unfamiliar 
with the vernacular associated with the theoretical framework. Even when participants 
were familiar with the vernacular, a given word may have had different and even 
conflicting meanings among participants.  
The results of Phase I and Phase II analyses are presented in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Overview 
 Chapter IV highlights the results of data analysis used to answer the study’s six 
research questions consistent with the purpose of this study. The chapter will provide 
information concerning (1) Phase I survey respondents and data analysis; and (2) Phase 
II participants and data analysis.  
Phase I Quantitative Data Analysis 
Phase I Respondents 
 In Phase I, surveys were distributed to 250 full-time employees at Compass 
Point University. Web-based surveys were distributed to 220 employees via email, and 
30 paper copies were distributed by mail. From the request, 205 individuals responded: 
190 web-based responses and 15 mailed responses. Of those individuals responding, 14 
individuals using the web-based survey only provided demographic information and 
were not included in the analysis. In short, 191 respondents (76%) substantially 
completed the survey and were included in the data analysis. 
 With regard to the representativeness of the respondents, Table 4 illustrates that 
the respondents were representative of the sample and the larger population.  
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Table 4 
Representativeness of Sample and Respondents 
 
Category Population Sample Respondents 
 n % n % n % 
Subsystem 
Technical 
Administrative 
Total 
 
146 
284 
430 
 
34 
66 
100 
 
85 
165 
250 
 
34 
66 
100 
 
81 
110 
191 
 
42 
58 
100 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
Total 
 
237 
203 
430 
 
54 
46 
100 
 
141 
106 
250 
 
43 
57 
100 
 
107 
84 
191 
 
42 
58 
100 
Years of Employment (Mean)  
9.6 
 
9.4 
 
10.1 
 
 In addition, some respondents did not respond to one or more of the survey 
items. Missing data were infrequent and random. In general and as will be discussed in 
the next section, survey items with missing data were not included in data analysis.  
Phase I Quantitative Results 
 The purpose of this analysis was to broaden our understanding of how power, 
coupling, ambiguity, and subsystems influenced the perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption or rejection of the merit pay system at Compass Point University. 
The results of this analysis will be discussed within the context of the study’s six 
research questions. 
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Research Question 1. Did the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
influence individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) to adopt or reject the 
management innovation? 
An initial analysis investigated the degree to which the innovation-decision 
process model was supported by the data. Specifically, analysis examined whether there 
was a significant correlation between IA1 (0 = .71, s = 1.08), IA2 (0 = 1.01, s = .83), IA3 
(0 = -.38, s = 1.038) and IA4 (0 = 14.48, s = 21.50) for the sample (n = 184). As the 
analysis involved examining linear relationships between quantitative variables, a two-
tailed Pearson r correlation coefficient was computed. The analyses indicated 
significant (p < .05) relationships existed between IA1 and IA2 (r = .284, p<.0005), IA2 
and IA3 (r = -.186, p=.012), and IA3 and IA4 (r = .386, p<.0005). These relationships 
remained significant (p <.05) when using partial correlation analysis to control for the 
effects of the other relationships among the innovation-decision process variables.  
A series of regression analyses were then used to further examine these 
relationships. In the first analysis, IA4 was identified as the dependent variable with IA1, 
IA2, and IA3 identified as independent variables. Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken 
(2003) indicated that effect size in multiple regression may be discussed in terms of 
small, medium, and large effects with corresponding R2 thresholds .02, .13, and .26. 
Using the stepwise method, IA3 was identified in the model as having a medium effect 
(R2=.149) on the variance in IA4 and indicated IA3 was a significant predictor of IA4 
(F1,182=31.905, p < .0005,). No other independent variables were included in the model. 
Significance was further supported by a regression coefficient for the sample (β=8.0) 
that fell within the 95% CI (5.205, 10.795) for the actual population. In addition, the 
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95% CI did not include zero indicating that the observed value of B differed 
significantly from zero (p<.05).  
In the second analysis, IA3 was identified as the dependent variable with IA1 and 
IA2 identified as independent variables. Using the stepwise method, IA2 was identified 
in the model as having a small effect (R2=.034) on the variance in IA3 and indicated IA2 
was a significant predictor of IA3 (F1,182=6.494, p =.012). No other independent 
variables were included in the model. Significance was further supported by a 
regression coefficient for the sample (B=-.232) that fell within the 95% CI (-.412, -.052) 
for the actual population. In addition the 95% CI did not include zero indicating that the 
observed value of B differed significantly from zero (p<.05).  
In the final analysis, IA2 was identified as the dependent variable and IA1 as the 
independent variable. IA1 had a small effect (R2=.106) on the variance in IA2 and 
indicated IA1 was a significant predictor of IA2 (F1,186=22.082, p < .0005). Significance 
was further supported by a regression coefficient for the sample (B=.252) that fell 
within the 95% CI (.146, .358) for the actual population. In addition, the 95% CI did not 
include zero indicating that the observed value of B differed significantly from zero 
(p<.05).  
In general, the correlation, partial correlation, and multiple regression analyses 
were supportive of the innovation-decision process model: IA1 → IA2 → IA3 → IA4.  
Therefore, a series of four regression analyses was conducted to examine the 
degree to which perceived legitimacy influenced the innovation-decision process 
variables (IA1, IA2, IA3, and IA4). In the first analysis, IA4 was identified as the 
dependent variable. The independent variables included four measures of legitimacy 
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that were linked to survey questions (L1, L2, L3, L4), age, gender, position, degree 
type, years of employment, IA1, IA2, and IA3. Using the stepwise method, a significant 
model emerged (F3,158=13.770, p < .0005, R2=.207). The significance of each variable 
within the model was further supported by regression coefficients that fell within the 
95% CI and that did not include zero.  Significant variables are shown in Table 5.  
The second regression analysis identified IA3 as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables included L1, L2, L3, L4, age, gender, position, degree type, years 
of employment, IA1, and IA2. Using the stepwise method, a significant model emerged 
(F3,158=20.995, p < .0005, R2=.285). The significance of each variable within the model 
was further supported by regression coefficients that fell within the 95% CI and that did 
not include zero. Significant variables are shown in Table 5. 
In the third regression analysis, IA2 was the dependent variable. The 
independent variables included L1, L2, L3, L4, age, gender, position, degree type, years 
of employment, and IA1. Using the stepwise method, a significant model emerged 
(F4,159=9.007, p < .0005, R2=.185). The significance of each variable within the model 
was further supported by regression coefficients that fell within the 95% CI and that did 
not include zero. Significant variables are shown in Table 5. 
In the final regression analysis, IA1 was the dependent variable. The 
independent variables included L1, L2, L3, L4, age, gender, position, degree type, and 
years of employment. Using the stepwise method, a significant model emerged 
(F1,164=18.603, p < .0005, R2=.102). The significance of each variable within the model 
was further supported by regression coefficients that fell within the 95% CI and that did 
not include zero. Significant variables are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5  
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Legitimacy on the Adoption of a 
Management Innovation 
 
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable B 95% CI P 
IA4 IA3 5.396 2.131, 8.662  p=.001 
 L4 4.604 1.711, 7.497 p=.002 
 IA1 -3.165 -6.165, -.165 p=.039 
IA3 L4 .348 .225, .471 p<.0005 
 IA2 -.203 -.379, -.027 p=.024 
 L2 .163 .025, .302 p=.021 
IA2 Years of employment .015 .003, .028 p=.016 
 IA1 .244 .127, .361 p<.0005 
 L2 -.177 -.289, .064 p=.002 
 Gender .245 .012, .477 p=.040 
IA1 L2 .299 .162, .436 p<.0005 
 
 To summarize, data analysis related to the first research question confirmed that 
the innovation decision process followed a linear path that began with knowledge and 
understanding of the innovation (IA1), which lead to opinion formation and clarity of 
benefit (IA2), then to planned change in behaviors or activities (IA3), and ended with 
actual change of behavior (IA4). The analysis further indicated that perceived legitimacy 
of the innovation, as measured by L2 and L4, were predictors of innovation adoption, 
and that perceived legitimacy, to some degree, was influenced by years of employment 
and gender. In effect, the analysis confirmed that an increase in perceived legitimacy of 
the management innovation lead to increased adoption of the innovation. Figure 3 
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provides an overview of the model that emerged from analyses associated with 
Research Question 1. 
Figure 3. Emerging model reflecting the relationship between legitimacy and the 
innovation-decision process   
Research Question 2: Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
vary based on the organizational subsystem (technical and administrative) in 
which individuals work?  
A series of simple regression analyses was used to determine the extent to which 
position influenced legitimacy as measured by L2 and L4. In the first analysis, L2 was 
the dependent variable and position was the independent variable. The stepwise method 
indicated that position did account for a small amount of variation in L2 (R2=.036), and 
the analysis also indicated that position was a significant predictor of L2 (F1,187=6.969, 
p = .009, B=.423). Significance was further supported by a regression coefficient for the 
sample (B=.423) that fell within the 95% CI (.107, .739) for the actual population. In 
addition, the 95% CI did not include zero indicating that the observed value of B 
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differed significantly from zero (p<.05). In short, the analysis indicated individuals from 
the administrative subsystem, or nonfaculty, perceived the legitimacy of the innovation 
at slightly higher levels than faculty.  
In the second analysis, L4 became the dependent variable and position remained 
the independent variable. The analysis yielded no significant results. In short, analyses 
related to the second research question were conflicting, but generally indicated that an 
individual’s position within the institution may predict how that individual perceived 
legitimacy. 
Research Question 3. Did perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate 
the adoption of a management innovation influence how individuals perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation? 
 Two multiple regression analyses were used to determine the extent to which 
perceived use of power by administrators influenced perceptions of legitimacy as 
measured by L2 and L4. Five types of power were identified as independent variables 
and included in each analysis: legitimate power (LP1, LP2); reward power (RWP1, 
RWP2); coercive power (CP1, CP2, CP3); referent power (RFP1, RFP2); and expert 
power (EXP1, EXP2). Age, gender, position, degree type, and years of employment 
were also included as independent variables in each of the analysis.  
In the first regression analysis, L2 was identified as the dependent variable. The 
stepwise analysis yielded a significant model (F6,106=11.119, p < .0005, R2=.386) 
Significant variables included in the model are shown in Table 6. In the second 
regression analysis, L4 became the dependent variable, and the stepwise analysis 
yielded a significant model (F3,109=13.002, p < .0005, R2=.264). The significance of 
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each variable included in the two models was further supported by regression 
coefficients that fell within the 95% CI and that did not include zero. Significant 
variables are shown in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Power on the Perceived 
Legitimacy of a Management Innovation 
 
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable Beta 95%CI P 
L2 RFP1 .428 .220,.636 p<.0005 
 CP2 -.364 -.521, -.207 p<.0005 
 Yrs of Emp -.028 -.047, -.008 p=.005 
 RWP1 .292 .097, .486 p=.004 
 LP1 -.246 -.443, -.048 p=.015 
 EXP1 -.148 -.291, -.006 p=.042 
L4 CP1 .395 .246, .545 p<.0005 
 CP2 -.287 -.472, -.103 p=.003 
 LP2 .186 -.002,.369 p=.047 
 
Overall, the analysis indicated that the perceived use of coercive, reward, 
legitimate, and expert power by administrators to influence the adoption of a 
management innovation may possibly predict the degree to which individuals perceived 
the legitimacy of the management innovation. The analysis also indicated that years of 
employment contributed to perceived legitimacy, and more specifically, an increase in 
years of continuous employment led to decreased legitimacy. 
Research Question 4. Did the perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a 
proposed management innovation influence how individuals perceived the 
legitimacy of a management innovation?  
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A series of two multiple regression analyses was conducted to examine the 
degree to which coupling influenced the legitimacy of a management innovation as 
measured by L2 and L4. In the first analysis, L2 was identified as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables included four measures of coupling that were linked 
to survey questions (C1, C2, C3, C4), age, gender, position, degree type, and years of 
employment. Using the stepwise method, C1 was found to account for a large amount 
of variation in L2 (R2=.313) and was a significant predictor of L2 (F1,171=77.922, p 
=<.0005, B=.545). In the second analysis, L4 was identified as the dependent variable 
and the independent variables remained the same. Using the stepwise method, a 
significant model emerged (F3,137=44.690, p < .0005, R2=.445). The significance of 
each variable within the two models was further supported by regression coefficients 
that fell within the 95% CI and that did not include zero. Significant variables are 
shown in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Coupling on the Perceived 
Legitimacy of a Management Innovation 
 
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable Beta 95%CI P 
L2 C1 .545 .423, .666 p<.0005 
L4 C3 .404 .302, .505 p<.0005 
 C1 .310 .175, .445 p<.0005 
 Degree .364 .063, .664 p<.0005 
 
In general, the analyses indicated that legitimacy increased as individuals 
perceived greater coupling of the subsystem to the innovation, and to a lesser extent, 
legitimacy increased for individuals who had earned a master’s degree or higher. 
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Research Question 5. Does the perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and 
outputs influence how individuals perceive the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Two multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine the degree to 
which perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and outputs influenced how individuals 
perceived the legitimacy of a management innovation as measured by L2 and L4. In the 
first analysis, L2 was identified as the dependent variable. The independent variables 
included five measures of ambiguity that were linked to survey questions (A1, A2, A3, 
A4, A5), age, gender, position, degree type, and years of employment. Using the 
stepwise method, a significant model emerged (F2,114=52.452, p < .0005, R2=.479). In 
the second analysis, L4 was identified as the dependent variable and the independent 
variables remained the same. Using the stepwise method, a significant model emerged 
(F2,114=15.585, p < .0005, R2=.215). The significance of each variable within the two 
models was further supported by regression coefficients that fell within the 95% CI and 
that did not include zero. Significant variables for both models are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis of Ambiguity on the Perceived 
Legitimacy of a Management Innovation 
 
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable Β 95%CI P 
L2 A4 .491 .301,.681 p<.0005 
 A5 .245 .055,.435 p=.012 
L4 A1 -.285 -.411,-.159 p<.0005 
 A4 .358 .176,.540 p<.0005 
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In general, the analyses indicated that increased clarity of inputs, processes, and 
outputs may be a predictor of increased legitimacy of the management innovation.  The 
R2 statistics for the models were .215 and .479 indicating that the model had a moderate 
to large effect on the variation found in perceived legitimacy of the management 
innovation.  
Research Question 6. Did the factors of power, coupling, and ambiguity interact 
to influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Multiple regression analysis, correlation analysis, partial correlation analysis, 
and path analysis were utilized to develop a predictive model that explained how the 
factors of power, coupling, and ambiguity interact to influence perceived legitimacy of 
a management innovation which in turn influences the adoption of the management 
innovation. 
First, a series of multiple regression analyses were utilized to determine the 
collective and separate effects of power, coupling, and ambiguity on perceived 
legitimacy after controlling for age, gender, position, degree type, and years of 
employment. In the first analysis, L2 was identified as the dependent variable. The 
independent variables included: legitimate power (LP1, LP2); reward power (RWP1, 
RWP2); coercive power (CP1, CP2, CP3); referent power (RFP1, RFP2); expert power 
(EXP1, EXP2); general power (GP1, GP2, GP3); coupling (C1, C2, C3, C4); ambiguity 
(A1, A2, A3, A4); age; gender; position; degree type; and years of employment. Using 
the stepwise method, a significant model emerged (F8,72=19.552, p < .0005, R2=.685). 
In the second analysis, L4 was identified as the dependent variable. Using the stepwise 
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method, a significant model emerged (F4,76=23.548, p < .0005, R2=.553). Significant 
variables are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis on Power, Coupling, and Ambiguity 
on Legitimacy of a Management Innovation 
 
Dependent Variable Predictor Variable Β 95%CI P 
L2 A4 .405 .250,.560 p<.0005 
 RFP1 .442 .266,.619 p<.0005 
 C1 .178 .014,.341 p=.033 
 CP2 -.195 -.331,-.059 p=.005 
 LP1 -.276 -.437,-.114 p=.001 
 Position .376 .073,.678 p=.016 
 C4 .152 .050,.253 p=.004 
 A3 .175 .033,.317 p=.016 
L4 C3 .378 .233,.523 p<.0005 
 C1 .352 .151,.552 p=.001 
 CP2 -.284 -.467,-.100 p=.003 
 CP1 .214 .048,.380 p=.012 
  
 In general, the two analyses appeared to indicate that referent power (RFP1), 
coercive power (CP1, CP2), legitimate power (LP1), coupling (C1, C3, C4), ambiguity 
(A3, A4), and position are significant predictors of perceived legitimacy. In essence, the 
analysis confirmed power, coupling, and ambiguity interact to increase the perceived 
legitimacy of the management innovation. Figure 4 provides an overview of the model 
that continued to evolve after this series of analysis.  
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Figure 4. Emerging model reflecting the relationship between power, ambiguity, 
coupling, legitimacy and the innovation-decision process. 
 To further refine the model, multiple regression analyses were utilized to 
determine the extent to which power, coupling, and ambiguity interact to influence the 
innovation-adoption process (IA1, IA2, IA3, IA4). Four stepwise regressions were 
conducted utilizing IA1, IA2, IA3, and IA4 as dependent variables for each of the 
analyses. Independent variables for each of the analyses included: legitimate power 
(LP1, LP2); reward power (RWP1, RWP2); coercive power (CP1, CP2, CP3); referent 
power (RFP1, RFP2); expert power (EXP1, EXP2); general power (GP1, GP2, GP3); 
coupling (C1, C2, C3, C4); ambiguity (A1, A2, A3, A4); age; gender; position; degree 
type; and years of employment. A summary of the models from each analysis and 
significant variables is provided in Table 10.  
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Table 10  
Summary of Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis on Power, Coupling, and Ambiguity 
on the Innovation-Adoption Process 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Model Summary Predictor 
Variable 
Β 95%CI P 
IA4 F2,78=9.099, p < .0005, R2=.189 C3 2.712 .834,4.589 p=.005 
  GP2 2.199 .059,4.338 p=.044 
IA3 F3,76=13.792, p < .0005, R2=.353 C1 .421 .227,.616 p<.0005 
  CP1 .232 .086,.378 p=.002 
  A2 -.291 -.584,-.068 p=.011 
IA2 F2,77=4.945, p =.010, R2=.114 C1 -.196 -.375,-.018 p=.032 
  Yrs Emp .022 .002,.042 p=.035 
IA1 F2,77=7.296, p =.001, R2=.159 EXP2 .305 .106,.505 p=.003 
  A1 .160 .014,.306 p=.032 
 
 Generally, the multiple regression analyses indicated that coercive power (CP1, 
general power (GP2), expert power (EXP2), coupling (C1, C3), ambiguity (A1, A2), 
and years of employment were significant predictors of the innovation adoption process. 
Based on these analyses, Figure 5 has been modified to reflect the additional predictors 
of innovation adoption identified in this analysis. The hypothesized model also reflects 
relationships and predictors that are consistent with the results previously noted in 
answering Research Questions 1-5. 
Figure 5. Hypothesized causal model reflecting the influence of power, coupling, and 
ambiguity on the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation and the influence of 
perceived legitimacy on the adoption of a management innovation.  
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Three assumptions associated with multiple regression analysis were tested. 
First, the linearity assumption was tested.  Multicollinearity of the sample was 
discounted due to the use of stepwise regression analysis in determining predictor 
variables, which enters predictor variables to the model based on the strength of their 
relationships with the dependent variable while controlling for interactions with other 
predictor variables Also, partial correlation analysis, as will be discussed later, was used 
to eliminate predictor variables that did not maintain significant correlations (p<.05) 
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with the dependent variables while controlling for the influence of other predictor 
variables within the model.  
Second, histograms, normal p-p plots of standardized residuals, and descriptive 
statistics were utilized to test the normality assumption. Figures 6-11 present the 
histograms of the residuals and p-p plots for the six predictor models for the identified 
dependent variables (Legitimacy 2, Legitimacy 4, IA1, IA2, IA3, and IA4). The 
histogram for each model is located on the left and the p-p plot is located on the right. A 
normal curve with the same mean and standard deviation as the predictor model is 
included in each histogram for purposes of comparison.  
Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate that the distribution of residuals is 
reasonably reflective of the normal distribution curve suggesting that the normality 
assumption is met. The associated p-p plots further demonstrate that the normality 
assumption is met in that the residuals for each predictive model approximate the 
regression line.  
Figure 11 demonstrates that the distribution of residuals does not reflect the 
normal distribution curve suggesting that the normality assumption is not met. Upon 
closer examination, the distribution of residuals associated with the regression appears 
to be leptokurtic, or peaked, (2= 4.727) and positively skewed (1= 2.041). In part, the 
lack of normality appears to be linked to the dependent variable, IA4 ( = 14.4, 
s=21.287), which was also was leptokurtic (2= 4.459) and was positively skewed 
(1=2.055). These tendencies indicate most of the scores were distributed toward the 
lower end of the range (0 to 100) with a few scores in the upper range. Indeed, the 
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frequency distribution for the dependent variable indicated that of the 191 data points 
tied to the dependent variable, only eight exceeded 50.  
Figure 6. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and Legitimacy 
2.  
  
 
Figure 7. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and Legitimacy 
4.  
  
 
Figure 8. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and IA1.  
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Figure 9. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and IA2.  
  
 
Figure 10. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and IA3.  
  
 
Figure 11. Histogram and p-p plots of residuals with the predictor model and IA4 
  
 
Third, the homogeneity and linearity assumptions were tested using normal p-p 
plots of standardized residuals. Figures 12-17 present the scatterplots of the 
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standardized residuals for the six predictive models with the identified dependent 
variables (Legitimacy 2, Legitimacy 4, IA1, IA2, IA3, and IA4). All six figures indicate 
that while the standardized variance of residuals generally falls within the range of 2, 
the variance does not fall into a random display of points emanating from the means of 
the standardized scores. As a result, Figures 12-17 are heteroscedastic. Lomax (2001) 
and Cohen et al., (2003) indicated that while the regression coefficients remain unbiased 
when a violation of the homoscedasticity assumption occurs, the tests of significance 
are affected and may result in a larger number of Type II errors. Essentially, there may 
be a greater potential to reject falsely the significance of the predictor variables when 
the homoscedasticity assumption is violated, especially when smaller sample sizes are 
evident. However, Lomax (2001) and Pedhazur (1997) indicated the net effect linked to 
a violation of the homoscedasticity assumption was minimal. In fact, Pedhazur (1997) 
noted that the robustness of the regression analysis yields valid F tests in the face of 
most assumption violations. Therefore, while the scatterplots appear to indicate a 
violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption, it is not a serious violation given a 
sample size larger than 170 and the robustness of the regression analysis. 
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Figure12. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in Legitimacy 2.  
 
Figure 13. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in Legitimacy 4.  
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Figure 14. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in IA1.  
 
Figure 15. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in IA2.  
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Figure 16. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in IA3.  
 
Figure 17. Scatterplot of the standardized variance of residuals for the predictor model 
in IA4.  
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Path Analysis 
Next, a path analysis was used to further test the direct, indirect, and total causal 
effects of ambiguity, power, coupling, and legitimacy on the adoption of a management 
innovation. Basically, path analysis was used to further test the hypothesized causal 
model identified in Figure 5. The hypothesized model emerged from a critical analysis 
of the research related to the adoption of management innovations in higher education 
and from a series of multiple regression analyses associated with the first five research 
questions.  
The first step in completing the path analysis was to reclassify independent 
variables as exogenous variables and dependent variables became endogenous variables 
(Mertler & Vannatta, 2005; Pendhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). The 
hypothesized model included 19 exogenous variables: position, degree, years of service, 
coercive power (CP1, CP2), referent power (RFP1), expert power (EXP1, EXP2), 
reward power (RWP1), legitimate power (LP1), general power (GP2), coupling (C1, 
C3, C4) and ambiguity (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5). Endogenous variables include legitimacy 
(Legit2, Legit4) and the innovation-decision process variables (IA1, IA2, IA3, IA4).  
Next, correlation analysis was used to identify the significant correlations 
among the model’s exogenous and endogenous variables. Results of the correlation 
analysis are identified in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Correlation Matrix for Endogenous and Exogenous Variables  
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Paths that included variables that did not have significant relationships (p≥.05) 
were eliminated from the causal model with two exceptions. The path from CP2 → 
Legit4 and CP1 → Legit2 were retained in the model since previous stepwise regression 
analyses indicated the independent variables were significant predictors of the 
dependent variables. Table 12 identifies the eliminated paths.  
Table 12 
Summary of Paths Eliminated from the Causal Model Based on Correlation Analysis 
Variables/Path r P 
Position → Legit4 .077 .310 
A3 → Legit4 .075 .325 
 
Next, a series of partial correlation analyses were used to determine if the 
significant correlations were maintained while controlling for each of the other 
variables within the model. Fourteen significant relationships (p<.05) identified in the 
previous correlation analysis lost significance (p≥.05) when controlling for other 
variables within the model. As a result, fourteen paths were eliminated from the 
hypothesized causal model. Table 13 identifies the eliminated paths. 
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Table 13 
Summary of Paths Eliminated from the Causal Model Based on Partial Correlation 
Analysis  
 
Relationship Control Variables P 
C4 → Legit 2 C1, C3, A4, A5, EXP2, RFP1 p≥.05 
C4 → Legit 4 C3 p≥.05 
A1 → Legit 4 C3, CP1 p≥.05 
A1 → IA1 L2 p≥.05 
A2 → Legit 2 C1, C3, C4, A2, A4, A5, EXP1, EXP2, RFP1, CP1 p≥.05 
A2 → IA3 IA1, IA2 p≥.05 
RFP1 → Legit 4 C1, C4, A1, A4, A5, EXP1, EXP2, LP1, GP2, RWP1 p≥.05 
LP1 → Legit 2 A1, A2, A4, C1, C4, GP2, EXP1, EXP2, RWP1 p≥.05 
LP1 → Legit 4 A1, A3, A5, EXP2, C1, C4, CP1, GP1, EXP1 RFP1, RWP1 p≥.05 
GP2 → IA4 C3 p≥.05 
RWP1 → Legit 2 A4, A5, RFP1 p≥.05 
Yrs of Service → Legit 2 C1, A4, A5, RFP1, CP2 p≥.05 
Position → Legit 2 C1, A4, A5 p≥.05 
A3 → Legit 2 A2, A5, C1, C2, C3, C4, CP1, EXP1, EXP2, RFP1, RWP1 p≥.05 
 
 As with the correlation analysis, two exceptions were made with regard to 
eliminating paths based on the correlation analysis. The relationship between A4 and 
Legit4 was not significant when controlling for GP2. Since GP2 was later eliminated, 
the A4 → Legit4 path was retained. In addition, the relationship between CP1 and 
Legit2 was not significant (p=.053) when controlling for C3. Given that the relationship 
between CP1 and Legit2 remained statistically significant (p ≤ .002) when controlling 
for all other variables in the model, the CP1 → Legit2 path was retained in the model. 
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 To summarize, correlation and partial correlation analyses were utilized to 
examine further the causal effects of ambiguity, coupling, and power on perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation and subsequent adoption of the innovation by 
individuals. Sixteen paths and eight exogenous variables were eliminated from the 
hypothesized model. The eliminated paths and variables are shaded red in Figure 18. 
Figure 18.  Hypothesized causal model reflecting paths and exogenous variables 
eliminated based on correlation and partial correlation analyses.  
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Using the previous correlation analysis, covariant relationships among the 
remaining exogenous variables were added to the model. Additionally, error terms were 
added to each endogenous variable to represent any unexplained variance. The revised 
model reflecting the eliminated paths, eliminated exogenous variables, added 
covariances, and added error terms is presented in Figure 19.  
Figure 19.  Adjusted causal model  
Goodness of Fit 
The adjusted model was tested using SPSS and AMOS statistical software. The 
results, presented in Figure 20, indicated the model was a fairly good fit although 
goodness-of-fit indicators provided conflicting results. The significance test for the χ2 
statistic (χ2=130.96, df=83) yielded a p=.001 indicating that the model was not a good 
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fit for the observed data. However, a second indicator of goodness-of-fit was a χ2/df 
ratio of 1.58, which was below 2 indicating that the fit of data had not been reduced 
drastically by dropping paths during the analysis. Similarly, the analysis yielded a Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation Value (.055) that was slightly greater than .05 
and less than .08 indicating that the model was at least an adequate fit for the data. 
Finally, the analysis yielded a Normed Fit Index (.879) and a Comparative Fit Index 
(.948) that either exceeded or neared .90 further substantiating the fitness of the model.  
In essence, goodness-of-fit was not supported by one analysis while four other 
analyses indicated that the model was an appropriate fit for the observed data. Pedhazur 
(1997) when describing discontinuity between the significance of the χ2 statistic and 
other goodness-of-fit indicators noted “the searcher may conclude that the model fits the 
data fairly well” (p. 872). Additionally, the sample size for the analysis was small 
(n=191) given the number of variables (23): typically, 5 to 10 subjects per variable are 
expected (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). It is possible that the small sample size 
diminished statistical power, and that diminished power made it difficult to find 
significance (Coughlin, 2005; Pedhazur, 1997; Schumacker & Lomax, 2004).  In short – 
given  Pedhazur’s comment; given the fact that the χ2 statistic may not always be the 
best goodness of fit indicator (Cohen et al., 2003; Pedhazur, 1997; Wuensch, 2006); 
given the small sample size; and given that the χ2/df ratio, Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation Value, Normed Fit Index and Comparative Fit Index indicated that the 
model, at minimum, was an adequate fit for the observed data – the researcher 
concluded that the model was a fairly good fit for the data.  
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Figure 20. Causal model reflecting the influence of power, coupling, and ambiguity on 
the perceived legitimacy of a management innovation and the influence of perceived 
legitimacy on the adoption of a management innovation.  
Decomposition of Effects 
Decomposition of effects was the final step in the path analysis. Decomposition 
identified the direct, indirect, and total effects of each exogenous variable on each 
endogenous variable. Table 14 identifies the direct, indirect, and total effects associated 
with each endogenous variable as calculated by SPSS/AMOS. 
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Table 14 
Direct and Indirect Effects of Study Variables 
Endogenous Exogenous Direct Indirect Total 
Legitimacy 2 A4 .436 0 .436 
 C1 .296 0 .296 
 RFP1 .246 0 .246 
 CP1 -.029 0 -.029 
 A5 -.035 0 -.035 
 EXP1 -.055 0 -.055 
 CP2 -.214 0 -.214 
Legitimacy 4 C3 .351 0 .351 
 C1 .271 0 .271 
 CP1 .153 0 .153 
 CP2 -.211 0 -.211 
IA1 EXP2 .185 0 .185 
 Legit 2 .158 0 .158 
 Legit 4 .128 0 .128 
 C1 0 .082 .082 
 A4 0 .069 .069 
 C3 0 .045 .045 
 RFP1 0 .039 .039 
 CP1 0 .015 .015 
 A5 0 -.006 -.006 
 EXP1 0 -.009 -.009 
 CP2 0 -.061 -.061 
IA2 IA1 .311 0 .311 
 EXP2 0 .058 .058 
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 Legit 4 0 .04 .04 
 CP2 0 .031 .031 
 Yrs Emp .015 0 .015 
 C3 0 .014 .014 
 CP1 0 .011 .011 
 EXP1 0 .01 .01 
 A5 0 .006 .006 
 A4 0 -.08 -.08 
 C1 0 -.043 -.043 
 RFP1 0 -.045 -.045 
 Legit 2 -.232 .049 -.183 
IA3 C1 .286 .064 .35 
 CP1 .151 .024 .175 
 Legit 4 .173 -.005 .168 
 Legit 2 .037 .024 .062 
 C3 0 .059 .059 
 A4 0 .027 .027 
 RFP1 0 .015 .015 
 A5 0 -.002 -.002 
 Yrs Emp 0 -.002 -.002 
 EXP1 0 -.003 -.003 
 EXP2 0 -.008 -.008 
 IA1 0 -.042 -.042 
 CP2 0 -.049 -.049 
 IA2 -.134 0 -.134 
IA4 IA3 5.188 0 5.188 
 C3 3.887 .592 4.479 
 C1 0 1.992 1.992 
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 Legit 4 .937 .747 1.683 
 CP1 0 1.034 1.034 
 A4 0 .074 .074 
 RFP1 0 .042 .042 
 Legit 2 0 .17 .17 
 A5 0 -.006 -.006 
 EXP1 0 -.009 -.009 
 Yrs Emp 0 -.011 -.011 
 EXP2 0 -.216 -.216 
 CP2 0 -.392 -.392 
 IA2 0 -.694 -.694 
 IA1 -.954 -.216 -1.17 
 
Overview of Effects 
 Legitimacy. Nine variables were hypothesized to have a direct influence on 
Legit2:  C1, C3, A4, A5, RFP1, EXP1, CP1, and CP2. Five paths were found to be 
significant (p<.05): C1, A4, RFP1, CP1 and CP2 (see Table 15).  A4 had the largest 
total effect (.436) indicating that as responses to A4 (Question 30) increased by 1 there 
was a corresponding .436 increase on Legit2. C1 had a total effect of .296, RFP1 had a 
total effect of .246, and CP 2 had a total effect of -.214.  
With regard to Legit4, four variables were hypothesized to have a direct 
influence: C1, C3, CP1, and CP2. All four paths were found to be significant (p<.05). 
C3 had the largest effect (.351), followed by C1 (.271), CP2 (-.211), and CP1 (.153). 
In general, the decomposition of effects indicated that ambiguity, coupling, 
coercive power, and referent power had the greatest total effect on the perceived 
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legitimacy of the management innovation, and further confirmed that these paths within 
the hypothesized model significantly represented the relationships found within the 
data. 
Innovation adoption. The variables hypothesized to directly influence IA1 
included Legit2, Legit4, and EXP2. Two paths were identified as significant (p<.05): 
Legit2 and EXP 2 (see Table 15). EXP2 had the largest effect (.185), and Legit2 had a 
total effect of .158.  
The variables hypothesized to directly influence IA2 included IA1, Years 
Employed, and Legit2. All three paths were found to be significant (p<.01). IA1 had the 
largest effect (.311), followed by Legit2 (-.183). Years employed (.015) had a minimal 
total effect on IA2 and was eliminated from the model. 
The variables hypothesized to directly influence IA3 included IA2, Legit2, 
Legit4, CP1, and C3. Three paths were significant (p<.01): C1, Legit4, and CP1. The 
same three variables had the largest total effect: C1 (.35), Legit4 (.175), and CP1 (.168).  
 The variables hypothesized to directly influence IA4 included IA1, IA3, C3, and 
Legit4. Three of the paths were found to be significant (p<.05): IA3, Legit4, and C3 (see 
Table 15). IA3 was found to have the largest total effect (5.188) followed by C3 (4.479), 
C1 (1.992), and L4 (1.683). 
 In summary, the decomposition of effects indicated that legitimacy, coupling, 
and coercive power had the greatest total effect on the innovation adoption process and 
further confirmed that the paths within the hypothesized model significantly represented 
the relationships within the data. Additionally, the decomposition confirmed a path of 
IA1→ IA2 and IA3→ IA4; however, the path from IA2→ IA3 was not confirmed. 
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Table 15 
 Significance of Paths within the Hypothesized Model 
Variable 1  Variable 2 p 
C1 → Legitimacy 2 p<.001 
CP1 →  p=.49 
EXP1 →  p=.269 
A4 →  p<.001 
A5 →  p=.642 
CP2 →  p<.001 
RFP1 →  p<.001 
C1 → Legitimacy 4 p<.001 
C3 →  p<.001 
CP1 →  p=.005 
CP2 →  p=.001 
Legit 2 → IA1 p=.035 
Legit 4 →  p=.053 
EXP2 →  p=.01 
Employment → IA2 p=.008 
Legit 2 →  p<.001 
IA1 →  p<.001 
Legit 2 → IA3 p=.598 
C1 →  p<.001 
IA2 →  p=.074 
Legit 4 →  p=.005 
CP1 →  p=.002 
IA1 → IA4 p=.457 
IA3 →  p<.001 
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Legit 4 →  p=.544 
C3 →  p<.001 
 
Summary: Phase I Quantitative Analysis  
Correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis, and path analysis were 
utilized to answer six research questions associated with this study. The analyses 
indicated (1) higher perceived legitimacy of a management innovation lead to increased 
adoption of the management innovation; (2) that while an individual’s position within 
the institution may influence some variables that predict perceived legitimacy, an 
individual’s position has no direct influence on perceived legitimacy; (3) increased 
perceived use referent and expert power by administrators to influence the adoption of a 
management innovation increased the degree to which individuals perceived the 
legitimacy of the management innovation; (4) increased perceived use of coercive 
power by administrators to influence the adoption of a management innovation 
decreased the degree to which individuals perceived the legitimacy of the management 
innovation; (5) legitimacy of a management innovation increased as individuals 
perceived greater coupling of the subsystem to the innovation; and (6) the interaction of 
ambiguity, power, and coupling increased perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation which in turn lead to increased adoption of a management innovation. 
In short, the quantitative analyses of Phase I yielded a causal model that 
supported the use of ambiguity, coupling, referent power, coercive power, and expert 
power as significant predictors of perceived legitimacy which in turn was a significant 
predictor of innovation adoption. Figure 21 highlights the final causal model that 
resulted from the Phase I, quantitative analysis.   
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Figure 21. Causal model at the conclusion of Phase I quantitative data analysis.  
 
Phase II: Qualitative Data Analysis 
Phase II Respondents 
 In Phase II, fifteen individuals (n=15) from the total population participated in 
face-to-face interviews. Participants purposefully selected included the president, four 
vice-presidents, three academic deans, the faculty senate president, and the staff council 
president. Randomly selected participants included two faculty and three staff. 
Participants have been employed at CPU from two years to 31 years with a mean of 
14.27 years, which was higher than the population mean of 9.6 years. With regard to 
gender, 53% of participants were female, and 47% were male. These percentages 
reflected the percentages found in the population. Due to the purposeful sampling 
technique, interviewed participants included more individuals from the administrative 
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subsystems (66%) than the technical subsystem (34%); however, it is important to note 
that six of the participants from the administrative subsystem had at least five years 
experience as full-time faculty before becoming administrators, and all six teach at least 
one course each academic year. The length of interviews ranged from 17 minutes to 66 
minutes with an average interview lasting nearly 44 minutes.  
Phase II Qualitative Results 
The purpose of Phase II analysis was to qualitatively confirm, elaborate, and 
explain Phase I findings. Phase II applied a confirmatory thematic analysis to the 
personal interviews. Accordingly, the semi-structured interviews followed an interview 
guide linked to the Phase I causal model (see Appendix B).  
As noted in Chapter III, the confirmatory analysis included three processes: data 
transcription, data reduction, and explanation building. Recorded interviews were 
transcribed into a word processing document. A researcher-transcriptionist approach 
that utilized voice recognition software and a listen and repeat method was used to 
create verbatim transcripts (Matheson, 2007; Park & Zeanah, 2005). This approach 
increased the researcher’s familiarity with the data, thereby increasing trustworthiness 
of the interview data. Trustworthiness was also increased through member checking. 
Transcriptions of three interviews were returned to participants for verification of 
accuracy with only minor, grammatical corrections being noted.  
Data were then reduced using NVivo software. The data were coded based on 
the Phase I causal model. The researcher also used a journaling technique during the 
coding process as a reflective means to ask questions about the data and to highlight 
potential divergent or emergent themes within the data. After each interview, the coded 
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data were reviewed for the purposes of confirming or disconfirming identified variables 
and paths within the causal model. Coded text linked to each variable and path was 
reviewed by the researcher, and the causal model was then revised based on the 
analysis. This process was repeated for the remaining 14 interviews, which resulted in a 
causal model that integrated Phase I and Phase II data analysis (See Figure 22). The 
evolution of the causal model is provided in Appendix D. 
The balance of this chapter will (1) discuss specific results of the qualitative 
analysis linked to each variable and path within the Phase I qualitative model and (2) 
discuss variables and paths that have been added based on the qualitative analysis. 
Variables and Paths within the Phase I Causal Model  
The data analysis for this section will be discussed based on the following four 
questions, which are linked to the primary paths identified in the Phase I causal model: 
1. How did participants view perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system 
and the influence of that perceived legitimacy on the adoption of the 
merit pay system? 
2. How did participants view coupling of the merit pay system and its 
influence on legitimacy? 
3. How did participants view ambiguity of the merit pay system and its 
influence on legitimacy? 
4. How did participants view administrator use of power to influence the 
adoption of the merit pay system, and how did that use of power 
influence the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
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Qualitative Question 1. How did participants view perceived legitimacy of the 
merit pay system and the influence of that perceived legitimacy on the adoption 
of the merit pay system? 
 Four interviewees indicated the merit pay system had legitimacy. Six 
interviewees indicated the merit pay system had no legitimacy, and five interviewees 
indicated the merit pay system had elements that were legitimate as well as some 
aspects that were not legitimate.  
 With regard to those that perceived the merit pay system as legitimate, 
respondents characterized the merit pay system as “legitimate,”  “very legitimate,” 
“fair,” and a “good fit.” Some interviewees clarified their responses by linking 
legitimacy to rewards, equal opportunity for rewards, evaluation criteria, and capacity 
of the institution to provide rewards. Specific comments included:  
 It's legitimate in any institution of higher education and business because people 
respond to rewards.  
 It seems fair. It seems that everybody is equal, on equal ground, although there 
are differences in positions. 
 I think it is a good fit. I think there is merit to use it that way to encourage 
people to do a better job. 
 If you are asking about the original first year’s document and maybe the second 
year, they are not very legitimate documents. I think that what has evolved at 
this point potentially is a much more legitimate merit pay document in that it is 
clearly linked in the terms of the categories that are evaluated. It is linked to 
some other important documents, basically the tenure and promotion evaluation 
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documents. In that sense, it really is much more legitimate than anything we 
have had before. 
 I think a merit pay system implemented correctly and in an evolving and 
informative way has legitimacy.  
 I think that if we truly hold a standard of exceptional is exceptional, then merit 
pay can work very well. 
 Yes, I do [think the merit pay system is legitimate]. The budget has to be able to 
accommodate those merit increases, but I think it is a good system. 
Conversely, respondents also characterized the merit pay system as not being 
legitimate. Specific comments included:  
 I don’t think that right now it is [legitimate]. I think people need to, especially 
on the staff side of the house (the finance area, the student development area, 
and advancement), folks need to get used to being evaluated and understanding 
how their work performance affects them. 
 I think there are still some questions about that [the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system]. There was not an opportunity for some folks to have as much input as 
they could have. People do not even know what their job descriptions were.  
 Culturally, it was just such a far departure from what we had been doing. It was 
a radical, too radical, of a change. 
 I don’t think it had a legitimate fit. It did not do what it was supposed to do. 
 There seems to be a lot of good reasons not to implement [the merit pay system]. 
 I don’t see it as a good fit for us at all because we have a totally unreliable 
funding system.  
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 I’m not sure that it is legitimate to do merit pay if we are not doing some cost-
of-living type things or even trying to raise everyone. 
 I don’t think it’s a good fit in most parts. 
 With regard to adoption of the merit pay system, six interviewees indicated a 
change in their behaviors or activities to align with the merit pay system. One staff 
member indicated, “It has made me want to take more initiative. . . . It kind of has 
inspired me to take on more initiative, to look for more ways to improve what I’m 
doing.”  Similarly, an administrator commented,  
Some people really appreciated that it wasn't a good old boy system, and I think 
they worked toward getting a good evaluation. Some people tried to use the 
system, which we tightened it up afterwards, but tried to use the system. You 
could get credit for going and making a presentation. So they and a bunch of 
their buddies got together and went out and made a presentation where they just 
sat on a panel, and they really didn't do much work, if any, and they got credit 
for that. But at least they got off their duffs and did it. So, you know that's a 
positive thing. 
However, the majority of interviewees had not changed any behaviors or activities to 
align with the merit pay system. Specifically, nine indicated they had not changed. 
Interviewees were asked, “What changes have you made in your own work production 
since the merit pay system was implemented?” Interviewees responded: 
 Nothing except just trying to strategically package what I have done to fit the 
category. But, I’m doing exactly the same thing that I have exactly always done. 
 I perceive myself as having done all of these good things, and yet you evaluate 
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me below where I perceive. So why should I do any of that? 
 Zero. I’m going to keep doing what I’m doing, regardless.  
 It is not an incentive for me. It’s not like I’m going to say, “Okay I want to slack 
off, or gosh I could get merit pay.” It has not had any impact. 
 Actually, I would like to do less. That is my plan for my work future is to do 
less. 
 None. I don’t plan to make any changes.  
 It really doesn’t have an impact whether I do less or more. I’m just going to 
keep doing the same. 
 As a result of the merit pay system? Well, you know what I’m going to say. 
Same old same old.  
 I am doing the same job I was doing before and with about the same intensity. 
 None, not really. 
 Summary: Qualitative Question 1. Finally, interview data appeared to confirm 
that perceived legitimacy was linked to the adoption of the merit pay system. As 
illustrated in Table 16, the four respondents that affirmed the legitimacy of the merit 
pay system also indicated a change in behaviors or activities to align their work 
production with the merit pay system. Similarly, the six interviewees that viewed the 
merit pay system as not having legitimacy did not move toward adopting the merit pays 
system. 
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Table 16 
 Interview Responses to Perceived Legitimacy and Adoption of the Merit Pay System 
Interview Perceived Legitimacy Adoption 
1 Yes Yes 
2 Yes/No Yes 
3 No No 
4 Yes Yes 
5 Yes/No No 
6 No No 
7 Yes Yes 
8 No No 
9 No No 
10 Yes/No No 
11 No No 
12 Yes Yes 
13 No No 
14 Yes/No Yes 
15 Yes/No No 
 
Qualitative Question 2. How did participants view coupling of the merit pay 
system and its influence on legitimacy? 
 Interviewees discussed coupling in terms of linkages with the innovation’s goal, 
the university’s mission, existing university processes, personal motivation, or personal 
goals. Six of the fifteen interviewees discussed the merit pay system as being tightly 
coupled to at least one of these aspects. Six participants indicated the merit pay system 
was loosely coupled to at least one aspect. The remaining three interviewees indicated 
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the merit pay system was tightly coupled to some aspects while being more loosely 
coupled to others.  
 Respondents identified the merit pay system as being tightly coupled to at least 
one of four aspects. First, seven respondents communicated that the merit pay system 
was tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal of awarding performance-based salary 
increases. As noted by one interviewee, 
[The merit pay system] is more of a standard than across-the-board pay raises 
instead of kind of doing it helter-skelter with raises here and there and with 
some people making a lot more than other people. I think it is in line with what 
the university is trying to do.  
Similarly, another respondent indicated, “If we go through this and we can identify 
those things that truly mean that you exceeded, [if] we have clearly communicated 
standards in all those areas, it can be a useful tool.”   
Second, five respondents indicated that the merit pay system was tightly coupled 
to the teaching, research, and service mission of the institution. These individuals 
explained that changes in behavior that align with the merit pay system would help the 
university better achieve its mission. As noted by one of the participants,  
I think that if everyone is doing what they’re supposed to do and we are all 
getting high merit, then we are just that much more successful. By doing what 
we are all supposed to do, then that means that we are helping more students, 
[we are] promoting the university, we are looking for new grant money. We are 
doing all those things that we are supposed to be doing. All that together just has 
to add up to success. 
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Several of the interviewees, when asked about changing the framework of the merit pay 
system to align with seven institutional priorities, indicated that such a revision would 
still need to be coupled with the teaching, research, and service mission. As noted by 
one respondent: 
I think it would have been an entirely different looking document. It would have 
required us to reconceptualize entirely how we were going to go about doing 
evaluations. Now there are two different issues here. Evaluation of faculty is on 
teaching, scholarship, and service. If you wanted to do a merit pay evaluation or 
merit pay tied to accomplishing the seven priorities, many of which feed back 
into the three, you would have had to construct a merit pay document that asked 
you to take each of the seven priorities and figure out what it took to be 
meritorious upfront. . . . It would have been an entirely different looking 
document. In my opinion, it would have caused even more consternation on the 
part of faculty and staff because those seven priorities did not bubble up from 
below. They were imposed on the institution as part of the new president’s 
vision for what he wanted us to do.  
 In effect, the respondent indicated a revised merit pay process linked to the 
seven priorities would need to accommodate the teaching, scholarship, and service 
mission of the university. The linkage to the traditional mission appeared paramount. 
The respondent even acknowledged that refocusing the document on anything but the 
three-fold mission would cause consternation. The interviewee also highlighted the 
importance of collaborative processes, a point that will be discussed later in this 
analysis. 
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 The third university aspect to which respondents coupled the merit pay system 
was the university’s existing evaluation criteria and process. As highlighted by one 
interviewee,  
The faculty handbook clearly provides guidelines for faculty as to the 
expectations of their job about teaching, research, and service. We were further 
able to define, and have defined, those through this process. So, then we can 
begin to talk about what it means to go beyond, to be meritorious, exceptionally 
meritorious. 
Another interviewee shared,  
I think that what has evolved at this point potentially is a much more legitimate 
merit pay document in that it is clearly linked in terms of the categories that are 
evaluated. It is linked to some other important documents, basically the tenure 
and promotion evaluation documents. In that sense, it really is much more 
legitimate than anything we have had before. 
In essence, respondents clearly communicated a tight linkage between the merit pay 
system and the historical evaluation criteria and process of the university. The tight 
coupling with the historical documents and processes increased legitimacy of the merit 
pay system. 
 Finally, two respondents viewed the merit pay system as being tightly coupled 
to their individual goals.  As an example, one of the respondents noted,  
I think it [the merit pay system] has allowed us to move closer to one of my 
long-term goals, which is to tie the annual evaluations with promotion and 
tenure so that we ultimately emerge from this using the same document as a 
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basis for evaluation for all of those.  
 To summarize, the qualitative analysis indicated the merit pay system was 
perceived as tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal, the university’s historic mission, 
the university’s existing evaluation process, and to individual goals. The data confirmed 
that tight coupling of these aspects increased the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay 
system.  
 Six participants indicated the merit pay system was loosely coupled to at least 
one of  two aspects: the innovation’s goal of awarding performance-based salary 
increases; and personal motivation. First, the data analysis indicated legitimacy 
decreased when the merit pay system was perceived as being loosely coupled to the 
innovation’s goal. Previously, the analysis indicated legitimacy increased when 
individuals perceived a tight linkage between the innovation’s goal and the merit pay 
system. In tandem, the data underscored that the legitimacy of the merit pay system was 
impacted by the degree to which individuals perceived that changes in their behavior or 
activities to increase work production that aligned with the merit pay system would 
result in a corresponding salary increase.  
As noted by one respondent,  
It [the merit pay system] was dehumanizing. It created an atmosphere of a 
fictitious competition that was never to exist. . . .The difference between what 
they got in pay [was fictitious]. Most of us . . . never saw it as a competition. . . . 
But in their minds because it was tied to money, it became fictitious in that the 
difference between exceeds [expectations] and meets [expectations] was $200. It 
was laughable. And people were looking around at colleagues they had had for 
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years wondering who was going to pull the rug out from under them to get the 
exceeds and win the favor. 
Similarly, another respondent explained,  
When I saw that there was not going to be very much money set aside for merit, 
I guess that is when I started thinking that the better role for our faculty is to get 
out there and push the incentive pay policy as a way to really make gains, as 
opposed to trying to deal with merit. You’re always going to be disappointed at 
the end because there is just not much money there. 
For one respondent the lack of reward opportunity even outweighed perceived 
legitimacy linked to coupling of the merit pay system to the university’s historic 
mission. After affirming the linkage of the merit pay system to the historic mission, a 
participant was asked, “How did the linkage increase legitimacy?” The interviewee 
responded,  
I did not see it [linkage to historic mission] having much of an impact at all. I 
think a lot of that depends on the individual. First of all, the money, or at least 
the kind of money we are talking, is not a big driving force for me. I do not see 
any difference. I’m not sure. As I just stated, that money is going to affect the 
change. 
 Second, the data analysis indicated legitimacy decreased when the merit pay 
system was perceived as being loosely coupled to personal motivation. Seven 
interviewees, in general, shared that they were more intrinsically motivated than they 
were motivated by any reward associated with the merit pay system. As noted by one 
interviewee,  
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I think my supervisor just did not understand the motivation of faculty, which is 
not necessarily the dollar. If I wanted to make $200,000, I would walk down the 
street and get a job down there. It is not going to be some piddly raise that would 
change things. . . . I, myself, do not feel motivated by money. Like when they 
say you can get a raise. Well I’m going to work and do my thing no matter what. 
I’m probably the lowest paid person on campus. That does not bother me. 
Several interviewees linked motivation to work ethic. One interviewee commented, “I 
did not change the way I lead or act or my work ethic one bit because of his system.” 
Instead, she noted, “I did it because of my work ethic and my support of the institution. 
Every job is worth doing well and to the best of your capacity.” Similarly, another 
indicated, “I am pretty self motivated. A lot of my pride comes from the quality of work 
I do. I have always worked hard. It doesn’t matter.” 
Still others linked motivation to the benefit of helping others be successful.  
My reward for meritorious work here is in the students. I mean it really is. I 
guess a part of that is also being a part of an environment in which I grow. . . . I 
mean those to me are intrinsic values of doing a really good job and being 
committed and dedicated to what I do. 
In summary, personal motivation appeared more linked to extrinsic motivators 
(nonmonetary recognition) and intrinsic motivators (worth ethic, self fulfillment, 
gratification in helping others be successful) than to any financial motivators linked to 
the merit pay system. It may be legitimacy decreased because individuals perceived the 
incongruence of the management innovation with personal motivation and that loose 
coupling of the innovation with personal motivation decreased perceived coupling. 
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 Summary: Qualitative Question 2. In short, the data analysis associated with the 
second question confirmed that perceived coupling of the merit pay system to the 
innovation’s goal, the university’s historic mission, the university’s existing evaluation 
process, or to personal goals increased the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. 
As illustrated in Table 17, three respondents, who affirmed the merit pay system was 
tightly coupled to at least one of these areas, labeled the merit pay system as legitimate. 
Conversely, perceived legitimacy decreased with the five interviewees that viewed the 
merit pay system as loosely coupled to the innovation’s goal or to personal motivation. 
One of the interviewees (13) who viewed the merit pay system as tightly coupled did 
not perceive the merit pay system as legitimate.  
 On the whole, the interview data confirmed that perceived coupling of the merit 
pay system increased perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. The data further 
explained coupling by identifying the importance of tight linkages with (1) the 
innovation’s goal, (2) the university’s historic mission, (3) the university’s existing 
evaluation process, (4) personal motivation, and (5) personal goals. The analysis 
associated with coupling did not yield any new causal paths. 
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Table 17 
Interview Responses to Coupling and Perceived Legitimacy 
Interview Perceived Legitimacy Coupling 
1 Yes + 
2 Yes/No +/- 
3 No - 
4 Yes +/- 
5 Yes/No +/- 
6 No - 
7 Yes + 
8 No - 
9 No - 
10 Yes/No + 
11 No - 
12 Yes + 
 13 No + 
14 Yes/No + 
15 Yes/No +/- 
+= more tightly coupled than loose; increased legitimacy 
-= more loosely coupled than tight; decreased legitimacy 
Qualitative Question 3. How did participants view ambiguity of the merit pay 
system and its influence on legitimacy? 
The first three interviewees were asked to identify inputs, processes, and outputs 
associated with their work units. None of the respondents could identify inputs or 
processes. Hence, interview questions were modified to focus on unit outputs.  
All fifteen interviewees responded to questions related to identifying or defining 
unit outputs. However, as highlighted in the quotes below, many of these responses 
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included unit processes rather than outputs, potentially indicating unit outputs were 
more ambiguous than definable. Specific comments included:   
 I do requisitions for several different people, travel for a few. . . . I do a lot of 
things that you can’t see. 
 It is to create a learning environment and a co-curricular environment where our 
students can excel and where we can support the academic mission of the 
institution. 
 In [the area I supervise] there has been so much ups and downs and changes of 
folks over there, I don’t know that I can really answer that question for them. 
 Good teaching is students succeeding, high teaching evaluations, students 
getting accepted to graduate school, successful in their jobs. Service, I do not 
agree with the way they defined the service. . . . Research, I have always wanted 
to see a little bit more research. . . . I do think that it helped to include all the 
things that we do in those three categories so that we could get more rewarded 
for the work we do. 
 Products are graduates who are highly functioning and who get good jobs and 
who feel like they have been well served by the school. They [Faculty] should 
be good teachers. They should be able to mentor those students through the 
process of becoming professional business people. They should be active 
professionally in organizations that provide access for students. 
 They are not easily defined. Teaching is hard, but the document we have 
produced makes teaching kind of easy, I think. . . . Research becomes one in 
which I think that because of the nature of the college it is very easy for me to 
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evaluate scholarship, even if it is not my field. Grants are real easy. There are 
clear objectives standards. 
 I would hope that the major product would be that you have well-educated, well 
prepared graduates who would be competitive in professional areas, that 
students who graduate feel really good about their educational experience, feel 
good about the University, and that we would feel good about our graduates who 
are out in the professional community, or whatever they are doing in the 
community that they would be contributing members of society and maybe that 
we had some part in that. . . . It would be that students are going on to graduate 
programs, that they are being successful there, that they are well prepared 
educationally. I would hope that we are contributing something to the body of 
knowledge at some larger levels. 
 I think that the outputs are teaching, effective teaching. I think that is one of our 
outcomes. . . . I think that undergraduate research and grants are the other pretty 
strong output from the college. 
 Graduates who are successful in the field that they have been trained in. 
Additionally, interviewees were asked to describe the degree to which outcomes 
could be measured. Four of the fifteen interviewees noted outputs were more 
measurable than ambiguous. Six of the participants indicated outputs were more 
ambiguous than measurable, and the remaining individuals indicated outputs had both 
ambiguous and measurable characteristics.  
Within these comments, four themes emerged regarding the measurability of 
outcomes. First, six interviewees noted clear benchmarks increased legitimacy, and 
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conversely, the lack of clear benchmarks decreased legitimacy. As noted by one of the 
participants, “I think benchmarks are critical.” The interviewee then elaborated,  
It was difficult to identify benchmarks. At first they [faculty] didn't even want 
benchmarks, but then they saw how all of that could lead to unfairness. So they 
had to go ahead and do benchmarks. Once we got an agreement on the 
benchmarks, I think that's when things started to appear much more fair. 
 Furthermore, one staff interviewee noted benchmarks were not easily measured. 
The participant commented, “I do a lot of things that you can’t see. I think that I was 
evaluated on my loyalty and willingness to work to do whatever it takes to get my work 
done. Maybe I mean things that the ordinary person could not see.” Then the participant 
confirmed, “It would be easier for them [supervisors] to have it to judge [the things that 
you can see]. Doing them [requisitions] in a timely manner, getting things done. That is 
something that you can see.”  
Expressing the impact of unclear benchmarks, one interviewee commented on 
the process by which faculty had to apply to be awarded exceptional merit. The 
interviewee noted,  
Either you have a set of standards that you meet, or you don’t have. To just say 
that you’ve met the threshold and now you have to apply. . . . If we have to have 
an analysis after the fact, then we did not clearly define the standards. That is the 
problem that I have had with this all along. I felt like we never clearly defined 
the standards. If we did, it would not even be an issue. It should be in black-and-
white. If it is not, if there is ambiguity in there, then we did not do the job we 
needed to do. 
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The interviewee was concerned about the threshold, or trigger, for determining 
exceptional merit. The interview data consistently highlighted difficulty in establishing 
triggers linked to levels of performance, more specifically “bright lines” that 
distinguished merit from exceptional merit.  As noted by one interviewee, “I think that 
fundamentally I agree with merit; however, I think that it is difficult to determine what 
is above and beyond.” Interviewees noted that identifying these bright lines was equally 
challenging for faculty and staff. On the faculty side, one interviewee noted,  
The president said over and over again, “a bright line.” This marks going from 
merit to exceptional merit. . . . Even with our experience, I think we had real 
difficulty drawing those bright lines in which we thought we were creating clear 
demarcation between merit and exceptional merit. . . . The one area where we 
had the least applications was in teaching. . . . As a school that prides itself on 
being an institution about teaching, it was a bit troubling that we were giving 
more merit for research than for teaching. 
The interviewee then discussed similar difficulties associated with determining 
exceptional merit for staff. The interviewee shared, 
For staff members, especially take support staff, their job starts at eight in the 
morning. They get a lunch hour, and it ends at five o’clock. Even when they do 
things that are above the 8 to 5 scope, we have in place mechanisms about comp 
time. . . . Quite frankly, I don’t want my administrative assistants working 
beyond 8 to 5 trying to find things to do other than their job. I want them to 
perfect doing their job. . . . For some professional staff, you could see some 
parameters of above and beyond, but still even there, we still want professional 
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staff doing their job. If beyond their job, they are thinking about better ways to 
do their job that innovate for us, we need some mechanism to reward them for 
that idea. Within the context of their job, we don’t want them searching for new 
things to do that may take away from their job. 
 A second theme that emerged was the importance of processes used to establish 
benchmarks. More specifically, ten interviewees communicated the importance of an 
iterative process that involved key stakeholders in defining benchmarks. Participants 
seemed to indicate that these iterative dialogues provided opportunities to increase 
measurability and to develop common understandings. Comments further indicated the 
importance of these interactions at the institutional level and at the individual level. At 
the institutional level, the data appeared to reflect that legitimacy increased as more 
stakeholders were involved in defining measures and as the institution collectively had 
opportunities to experiment with the measures and then to refine those measures. One 
interviewee discussed the importance of the institutional process in establishing 
benchmarks for faculty. The participant reflected, 
. . . working through faculty Senate and the committee, we came up with that 
plan for the first year of 2006-2007, which was sort of jointly negotiated 
between faculty Senate and academic administrators as to what would constitute 
a merit evaluation. We met that summer at great lengths working on the 
document. We came up finally with a document that basically pleased no one 
and had some serious problems in it. We went through the process. The end 
result was not workable that first year. So, that first year we backed off. In 2006 
– 2007, we did a cost-of-living increase as you remember. Then, we went back 
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to work the following summer, the summer of 2007, and really did create a merit 
pay document for faculty that had some genuine triggers and marks in it that 
were workable. That is what we finally implemented and have continued to 
refine. 
While not reflecting the same collaborative process as others identified, the following 
statement, nonetheless, underscored perceived importance of a collaborative process. 
When the [faculty senate] committee writes the plan and gives it to the 
administration . . . , then it becomes something different than what we wrote, 
and it is not implemented in a way that we anticipated it to be implemented. We 
felt really good about what we had done, but then when it turned out to be 
altogether something different in which the faculty had very little say. For 
example, the thing about if you were to get meritorious teaching you had to have 
a score on your teaching evaluations of some number. . . . It’s just a silly number 
that someone pulled out. . . . It should change, but apparently it is not changing. . 
. . It became very closed off. They did not want to talk about it anymore. They 
were just done debating with the faculty about it.  
While the faculty benchmarks, to some degree, seemed to have been developed through 
collaborative processes that included key stakeholders, the development of staff 
standards was driven primarily by a few senior level administrators with little or no 
input from staff. One respondent noted, “ . . . it's easier with the staff to push it. You can 
just say we’re implementing it. So it is not the same as with the faculty where you get 
buy-in. So we just implemented it. It was a top-down approach.” The data seemed to  
 
   276 
 
indicate that this lack of staff involvement decreased legitimacy. As shared by one 
interviewee,  
With the staff, they did not know anything about it until it was already done. 
There was no staff input to the document at any point, I don’t believe. Certainly 
I don’t think my secretary had any input. The document was kind of created off -
base and imported in. . . . I think the staff were very suspicious. 
While the respondents indicated that staff were not involved in establishing the initial 
benchmarks and that this lack of involvement decreased legitimacy of the merit pay 
system, another interviewee discussed the importance of a collaborative process that did 
involve staff which occurred in the spring of 2009 prior to the third implementation 
cycle of the staff merit pay system. The respondent noted, 
Last week [we] went to the staff counsel, and we told the staff counsel you will 
be evaluated again, and we will use the form. . . . Where is their real rub with the 
staff? Without question, they don’t mind being evaluated. The rub was that there 
were three options: (1) doesn’t meet; (2) meets; or (3) exceeds. The rub was that 
somehow it all got tied to $200. Here’s what they said, “Yes, we want to be 
evaluated. What we would like for you to do is drop that third category, and 
make that an additional competition.” So that’s all it took. Now they can help us 
design a system with markers that they all buy in. . . . And then they suggested 
that we meet, and then they want to take it before all the staff and have an 
afternoon meeting to go over what we all have agreed on. . . . There is a solution 
that is legitimate.  
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Interviewees also communicated the importance of collaborative processes at the 
individual level. Interviewees consistently communicated the value of working with 
their supervisors to define benchmarks and expectations related to those benchmarks. 
As noted by one interviewee,  
He [my supervisor] has very specific and measurable things that I am working 
toward. I think that he also understands that taking all that time up front and 
laying those out makes it easier when you go to evaluate someone. 
When asked how the evaluation measures were set, the interviewee noted, “I wrote up a 
list, and then met with him about it. We then worked through each item. . . . He said, 
‘Well, how are you going to measure this?’ So I had to go back and think about how to 
measure that.” Then the respondent shared, “I think he [my supervisor] has done the 
most thorough evaluation that I have ever had.” 
The third theme associated with developing clear benchmarks was the 
importance of linking benchmarks to specific job functions.  Eleven interviewees 
mentioned the importance of benchmarks being tied to specific job junctions. The data 
seemed to indicate legitimacy increased when benchmarks were linked to specific job 
functions, and conversely, legitimacy decreased when benchmarks were not linked to 
job functions. As noted by one interviewee, “I think the [merit pay] form is better. It 
reflects a lot of the important work that we are doing in a way that was not done before. 
I think that is good.”  One supervisor noted, “It will force us to make sure our job 
descriptions are detailed and articulated because how can you evaluate if you’re not 
sure what your job is.” The importance of linkages to specific job functions was further 
underscored by an interviewee who noted, “[my merit evaluation] was more general 
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terms, general type things. I think that if there was more specificity to details of my job, 
it might be a little better.” And as shared by one respondent, “many people have so 
many different jobs here on campus, I don’t think it is really easy to put everybody on 
the same kind of scale. I think it may need to be more individualized by department or 
positions.”   
 Perhaps most telling of the importance of benchmarks being linked to job 
specific functions, were the events shared by one interviewee related to the disconnect 
between the benchmarks and their actual job. The interviewee noted,  
The second year was a little more thorough, and I perceived at that point that 
[my supervisor] did not know what the heck I had done during that year, and it 
was very demoralizing for me. I really had a hard time because I felt like I had 
done many things above and beyond the call. [My supervisor] did not even 
recognize that those things had been done. I felt like I had been sucker punched 
at that point. . . .Undoubtedly, she had not perceived that same thing, or not even 
recognized the effort that had gone into those things or perhaps did not even 
know that I had been doing those particular things. So I really felt . . . I started 
looking for a job basically is what I did at that point. 
 Consistency was the fourth theme associated with clear benchmarks. Nine 
interviewees shared that benchmarks increased the legitimacy of the merit pay system 
when implementation processes (1) consistently defined benchmarks across the 
organization; (2) evaluated individuals using consistent processes; and (3) consistently 
supported opportunities for faculty and staff to earn merit. As noted by one individual, 
“I just think it helps across campus to know that everyone is being judged basically on 
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the same terms.” Another participant described the challenges in implementing 
consistent evaluation process, “The challenge I see in merit pay is that you have to 
evaluate people fairly and accurately and really put a lot of effort into how you evaluate 
performance.” As noted by one participant, the lack of consistency led to decreased 
legitimacy. The participant noted, “I don’t think there was a consistency of 
understanding. This is obviously a whole lot of levels removed from the president on 
down, but I don’t think there was a consistency of understanding about the merit pay in 
general.” 
 One surprising area discussed by interviewees was the importance of consistent 
support and opportunities for individuals to earn merit. A staff member was the first to 
discuss this importance. The participant noted, “My job calls for me to work from 8 to 
5. There isn’t something that causes me to work after that, and I am being judged 
against people who may see that their job requires that.” Another interviewee 
elaborated, 
When the other people go to the symposiums, conventions, and things that is 
part of their work. I just sense that it gets measured in a different way, or at least 
they feel that it does. . . . I think it just doesn’t make it as much of an incentive 
as it would probably if it meant something. . . .Maybe something could be put 
into place for the underdogs to improve it, and I don’t know what it would be. 
You know I can’t go to national conventions. I can’t go to very many things at 
all. I don’t know what I can do except try to improve in everything. I do try to 
do that. 
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As shared by one participant, this lack of constancy increased ambiguity and decreased 
legitimacy of the merit pay system. The interviewee shared,  
I think, with some justification, a good many staff believe that they come in and 
do their job and it is really hard for some staff to perform above and beyond 
what their job is. There just is not the opportunity to do that. As a result, staff 
have become very negative about what we did. 
 Summary: Qualitative Question 3. In answer to the third question, data analysis 
confirmed clearly defined outputs that included measurable benchmarks linked to job-
specific functions and implemented consistently increased perceived legitimacy of the 
merit pay system. As illustrated in Table 18, four respondents who labeled outputs as 
more defined than ambiguous perceived increased legitimacy of the merit pay system. 
Conversely, five of the interviewees who shared outputs were more ambiguous than 
defined perceived the merit pay system as less legitimate.  
 On the whole, the qualitative analysis confirmed that clearly defined outputs 
increased legitimacy of the merit pay system. The data further explained the role of 
outputs by identifying the importance of (1) measurable outputs; (2) job-related outputs; 
and (3) clear benchmarks, or bright lines, linked to those outputs. The interview data 
also warranted the expansion of the causal model to include two additional paths: (1) 
development processes→ambiguity; and (2) implementation processes→ambiguity. 
Interviewees characterized the development process as: (1) dialogue; (2) collaborative; 
(3) experimental; (4) iterative; and (5) occurring at the individual and organizational 
level. With regard to the implementation processes, interviewees noted the importance  
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of (1) consistent evaluation processes; (2) consistent definitions tied to benchmarks; and 
(3) consistent support of opportunities for faculty and staff to earn merit.  
Table 18 
Interview Responses to Ambiguity of Outputs and Perceived Legitimacy of the Merit 
Pay System 
 
Interview Perceived Legitimacy Ambiguity of Outputs 
1 Yes More defined than ambiguous 
2 Yes/No Elements of both 
3 No More ambiguous than defined 
4 Yes More defined than ambiguous 
5 Yes/No Elements of both 
6 No More ambiguous than defined 
7 Yes More defined than ambiguous 
8 No More ambiguous than defined 
9 No More ambiguous than defined 
10 Yes/No More ambiguous than defined 
11 No More ambiguous than defined 
12 Yes More defined than ambiguous 
 13 No Elements of both 
14 Yes/No Elements of both 
15 Yes/No Elements of both 
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Qualitative Question 4. How did participants view administrator use of power to 
influence the adoption of the merit pay system and how did that use of power 
influence the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 Consistent with the Phase I model, the qualitative analysis confirmed the 
perceived use of referent, expert, and coercive power by administrators influenced the 
perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system.  
 Referent power. Nine interviewees confirmed that administrators used referent 
power to influence the adoption of the merit pay system. Interviewees often discussed 
the use of referent power in terms of the willingness of administrators to have 
conversations about the merit pay system. As noted by one interviewee,  
He explained it very well. He told me exactly how it would be used, and where I 
would fall, and kind of gave me the criteria for doing what is expected and not 
doing what is expected. He even gave me examples of what he would consider 
below expected performance and then also went on to explain what would be 
above and beyond that would qualify for higher merit pay. 
The interviewee continued, 
I think that because he was positive about it and his feelings towards it were 
positive, it would have taken away from any negative that I felt towards it. With 
him explaining it to me, [it] made me a lot more comfortable and took away any 
doubts and questions that I may have had about it. I think that has positive 
feelings about it reflected back on me. 
One administrator shared how he tried to “engender trust” with his staff by “allowing 
them a safe place to express their frustration.” He then elaborated,  
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What I use with my staff is, ‘are you talking to Bob, or are you talking to Dr. 
Smith?’ When you talk to Dr. Smith, you’re talking with me in my role as your 
supervisor. When you’re talking to Bob, you’re talking to me, as much as is 
possible, as a colleague in a safe place.  
Respondents indicated that administrators had these types of conversations with 
individuals and groups. When asked how administrators influenced the adoption, one 
respondent replied,  
[through] meetings with groups explaining what the process was going to do. I 
know that he met with the entire faculty. He met with faculty senate. He met at 
least with the departments for my college. He met with individuals. I think those 
things are important. 
These dialogues were characterized as “open,”  “honest,”  “calming,”  “good faith,” 
“continuing discussions,”  “personable,” and “trying to support them.”  Respondents 
described their administrators as “very fair,”  “positive,”  “responsive,” 
“understanding,”  “reasonable,”  “upfront,” and “accessible.”  Respondents also 
explained that these administrators listened, discussed issues, and then responded based 
on the discussion. An interviewee shared, “He [my supervisor] always listened to me. 
He never cut off the discussion. . . . As a result of our continuing discussions, he 
changed his mind.” 
 Interviewees indicated these conversations most often focused on clarifying 
processes and providing detailed information. As noted by one interviewee, 
I think success, at least within my college, was that my supervisor kept talking 
about it as a process. It was not a finished product. I tried to keep conveying to 
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faculty that we are all learning together. Whatever successes we had came from 
everyone trying to understand that it was a process. It was not an end.  
Another supervisor noted, 
I could go to my staff and try to frame this in a positive way, but also be open 
with them about what I perceived to be the negatives. There is lots of literature 
out there on merit pay, positive and negative. I know what it says. He [my 
supervisor] mainly influenced me through just talking and through sharing his 
beliefs. 
As noted in the previous two quotes, these conversations facilitated meaning making 
and the development of shared beliefs, which appeared to increase the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system. These conversations, as will be discussed later, also encouraged 
administrators to develop and share their knowledge and understanding to influence 
how individuals perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system; thus dialogue also 
facilitated the use of expert power.  
 The interview data also indicated that legitimacy of the merit pay system 
decreased when these conversations were absent. One individual clearly indicated how 
the absence of conversation adversely impacted the individual’s perception of the merit 
pay system. The participant explained, 
I did not even read my evaluation. I assumed it was going to be what it was 
going to be. I did not buy into the process that we were involved in. He handed 
me a letter. I signed it. I did not read it because it did not matter what I thought 
at that point. Once those perceptions are made by your supervisors you can 
argue the point, you can push the point, but does that affect you positively or 
   285 
 
negatively when you do that? You have to make that decision. I made the 
decision with him that if I argue the point it would be perceived negatively, and 
I did not read my letter. I signed it. I cannot tell you to this day what it was. . . . 
All I heard from him was his perception of me. 
 To summarize, the data seemed to indicate that administrators through 
conversations with individuals and groups developed mutual understandings of the 
merit pay system and its measures. These development and implementation processes 
facilitated the use of referent power by administrators which increased the perceived 
legitimacy of the merit pay system. 
 Expert Power. Second, seven interviewees confirmed that administers used 
expert power to influence the adoption of the merit pay system. Two common themes 
emerged related to expert power. 
 Expert power was used when administrators shared personal knowledge and 
details about the implementation of the merit pay system. Interviewees noted the 
following: 
 [My supervisor] knew exactly what he was doing. 
 [My supervisor] explained it very well. He told me exactly how it would be 
used, and where I would fall, and kind of gave me the criteria for doing what is 
expected and not doing what is expected. He even gave me examples of what he 
would consider below expected performance and then also went on to explain 
what would be above and beyond that would qualify for higher merit pay. 
 [My supervisor] did come to a couple of meetings and answered some questions. 
“How is this going to go? What happens if there is no money? You know we set 
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ourselves up to get these bonuses and then there’s no money, what do we do?” 
In those meetings he appeared to be very open to questions and reasonable about 
it. He was also very upfront. I remember what one faculty member asked him if 
he thought that this was an unethical system. He said, “No, I don’t. You work 
hard. You get money.” The meetings were really effective and calmed a lot of 
fears about the system. 
 He has very specific and measurable things that I am working toward. I think 
that he also understands that taking all that time up front and laying those out 
makes it easier when you go to evaluate someone. 
 Two interviewees noted that the lack of supervisor knowledge related to the 
merit pay system decreased legitimacy of the merit pay system. One interviewee who 
had not received a favorable merit review indicated the administrator did not know what 
he was doing or did not care what he was doing. When asked which influenced the 
supervisor’s decision, the interviewee noted,  
I think both. I think she had forgotten to think about some of them. I just think 
that when she looked at my job description and what she expects of me. Yes, I 
do all of those things I think that she expects of me, which means I am doing my 
job. Okay. I think that when she was thinking about that she did not think 
around the edges. She did not think about what other things that I was involved 
in. I think both of those would be true. 
 Another interviewee expressed frustration with administrators who were unable 
to tell her consistently how to complete the evaluation form. She noted, “I just think that 
it is so unclear about what goes where because that seems to be a big deal. ‘What goes 
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where?’ ‘This really belongs here and this really belongs there.’ Well, tell me it belongs 
here.”  
 Second, interviewees noted that administrators used expert knowledge when 
they shared research and literature related to the merit pay system. One interviewee 
noted the administrator “would provide us with literature about the evaluation process 
from other institutions, from sort of the academic side of studying the evaluation.” 
Another noted, “. . . he did research to point out other models that had been tried. He 
talked about some of the successes.” 
 In summary, administrators used personal knowledge to provide details related 
to the merit pay system and also shared knowledge gained from research literature to 
increase understanding of the merit pay system. In other cases, some interviewees 
indicated administrators lacked knowledge related to the details for the merit pay 
system or lacked knowledge related to actual job performance. From the interview data, 
it appeared that perceived use of expert power of administrators to answer questions and 
provided details related to implementation of the merit pay system increased legitimacy 
of the merit pay system, and conversely, perceived lack of knowledge decreased 
perceived legitimacy. 
 Reward and Coercive Power. Before examining data related to the administrator 
use of coercive power, it is important to understand how interviewees discussed the use 
of reward power. As communicated by one interviewee a “merit pay system is a reward 
system that individuals who are willing to work toward extending our standings will 
receive a higher reward than those who are not willing to do so.” Similarly, another 
interviewee indicated, “Well, I think it [the merit pay system] was an attempt to try to 
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reward faculty for going the extra mile and to not reward faculty that obviously were 
falling short of their responsibilities and probably the latter more than the former.” All 
fifteen interviewees identified this two prong purpose of the merit pay system: to 
reward those who are performing well and to not reward, or punish, those who are 
underperforming.  
 It is within this two-prong purpose that respondents discussed the influence of 
reward and coercive power. First, thirteen of the respondents shared that the rewards 
were minimal, nonexistent, or never a reality. Specific comments included: 
 . . . we weren't even able to give out the money in that system very well because 
of the little amount of money we had. 
 I think the biggest problem we have with the merit system right now is no 
money. Some people are saying, ‘What does it matter if I'm evaluated high or in 
the middle or even towards the bottom. As long as they don't fire me, there is no 
money.’ So, there is no reward. If you put in a merit system, you've got to have a 
reward system. 
 The second year when we had the new document and really went through the 
process and determined, as it turned out, that a third of the faculty hit the 
exceptional merit trigger, then we came back and did not have money to put into 
it. . . . The decision was made to just simply do stipends based upon whether you 
did not meet standards: you got nothing; met the standards: you got an amount; 
were exceptional: you got more. That was a stipend. It did not stay in your 
salary. It was pretty minimal. I think that may have had the most negative effect 
upon continuing perceptions and doing evaluations to lead to merit pay. I have 
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heard from [some individuals] that it was a stupid, horrible process that did not 
lead to more money, which is what they wanted out of it. 
 It was a real killer of morale both on the faculty side and the staff side in that 
great promises were made that merit would reward people and there were no 
real tangible rewards. 
 I don’t think it [the merit pay system] is very effective because obviously there 
has not been any money. If you’re connecting evaluation to pay or reward or to 
whatever you want to say, I do not think it achieves that. 
 I don’t think that we can do a merit evaluation every year without money. . . . I 
feel like you have to put some real money into it. I think it would be much easier 
that if you did not have much money to put into it to just give across-the-board 
raises. I think people would be far more accepting of that situation then they 
would setting up standards for them to meet and then the value degraded as a 
result. 
 From what I’ve seen in higher education given the fact that there is always a 
limited pool of money, I’m not sure how you build a merit pay system that is 
going to work. I think maybe in an industry model – where I’m not sure they 
have unlimited money, but maybe money is not quite so tight – that kind of 
reward system will work. AIG will give their people bonuses whether it 
bankrupts the company or not. I am sure they were meritorious. If we have a 
limited piece of pie and you don’t have enough to really do any cost-of-living 
raises, how can you justify spending more money to do merit pay particularly if 
you’re not convinced that money affects change in people? 
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 I also think that in higher education, particularly in a state-supported institution 
where limited funding is available, unless you have a true meaningful reward 
that you can attach to merit pay, I’m not sure that it fits very well in the system 
that we have. 
Interviewees also emphasized the importance of reward from a nonmonetary 
perspective. They often noted the importance of recognition by administrators and 
peers. As noted by one administrator, “I don’t think they were motivated by money. 
They just saw that ‘Wow, they really are paying attention to me.’” In another 
conversation, the importance of administrator recognition was also discussed; however, 
in this conversation, the lack of recognition became a disincentive.  
Interviewee:  I am not an extrinsic person. The intrinsic reward of being 
recognized for a job well done was far more important than any 
amount of money. 
Interviewer:  Can you talk about intrinsic reward? Was some of that tied to 
your supervisor? 
Interviewee:  Yes, absolutely tied to her because she is very important in my 
world. Because I do always function with such great loyalty and 
service, I always try to do everything I do as quickly as I can do it 
and as well as I can do it. Now understand there are some things 
that are just part of the job, but I had also been called on to do 
huge projects that were not anywhere related to my job. I think 
that is what got me the second time around, but it wasn’t whether 
I got merit or no merit or some merit, it was the fact that she did 
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not perceive what I was doing. It was personal. Okay, it got 
personal at that point. 
In essence, the interview data appeared to confirm the absence of monetary and 
nonmonetary rewards and the absence of administrator use of reward power adversely 
influenced the legitimacy of the merit pay system and its subsequent adoption.  
 Second, the discussion of coercive power occurred within the context of the two 
prong purpose of the merit pay system: to reward those who are performing well and to 
punish those who are underperforming. Thirteen interviewees indicated the perceived 
use of coercive power by administrators adversely influenced legitimacy of the merit 
pay system. Within these responses, two themes emerged. Respondents often discussed 
the use of coercive power in terms of the removal of an entitlement, cost-of-living 
adjustments, and they indicated the loss of the entitlement was seen as coercive in that 
the only way to receive pay increases was to participate in the merit pay system. 
Interviewees shared the following comments: 
 On the staff side, the problem I think is that they're getting paid, a lot of them, 
especially at our university, so low. The salaries are so low that a lot of people 
say, ‘I just need a living wage. Why are you messing with me, and saying I don't 
get more money.’ They don't understand that if you work harder you could make 
more money, and so do that. They're saying ‘Hey, I've got to feed my family.”  
 I think it is exactly what was needed at the time, and I'm just disappointed that, 
as everyone is, about the economy that it really doesn't have the rewards. I mean 
it is a reward system but, when you have no rewards it makes it hard to push 
people forward. Why do you want to evaluate someone poorly other than if you 
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wanted to terminate that person if you can't reward those who are doing well?  
 This [the merit pay system] was just striking at people’s hearts and their wallets, 
which is even worse. If perhaps, he had waited. It was kind of like he [my 
administrator] came in and said, “Oh well, this is not working, and you’re not of 
value. Why are you getting paid?” It was almost like, I felt like he was doing it 
because he thought we were not good enough. I think a lot of people had that 
feeling. . . . It seems like he thought the reason we were doing it was because we 
were lame, and he needed to pump us up a little bit. 
 The real crux and opposition at whatever level and rank, junior or senior rank, to 
doing merit pay was that it was all merit pay or nothing. The traditional cost-of-
living increase was set aside. That is what offended or upset many faculty, 
whether they were junior faculty or senior faculty, more than anything at all. 
 I believe the administrator was less interested in merit and was more interested 
in the no merit side. I think he was interested in having a mechanism in which 
he could say there were large numbers of people who were not doing their jobs. 
I think he was quite shocked to discover how many people were doing more 
than their job. 
 I think both sides [faculty and staff] actually saw it as an insult at one level. That 
somehow, somewhere, someone was thinking that they were not doing their job. 
That will be a struggle that we face for a long time-sort of an “us versus them” 
mentality with the administration being the “them.” 
 It was a real killer of morale both on the faculty side and the staff side in that 
great promises were made about merit would reward people and there were no 
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real tangible rewards.  
 My perception was that it was implemented, and I did attend quite a few of those 
meetings, so kind of my perception was that it was almost implemented to 
address personnel issues that were not being addressed because that was 
something I kept hearing, “We can identify the dead wood and to put in 
measures to try to help people improve their performance because we have not 
done a very good job of doing that.” 
 My problem with the merit system is that that we do not put enough money into 
the merit on a consistent basis. I don’t see us being able to do that on a 
consistent basis. I think we are whipping a lot of horses and not getting 
anywhere. 
 People are tired of doing the same thing and getting paid less, less effectively in 
that the cost of living has gone up and perhaps inflation. People might feel 
justified in doing less quality work because of that. People might be less 
motivated to come to work, or to try something new if her supervisor asked 
them to do it, or they might leave. 
 Everybody that is doing a good job should be making a living wage, or a decent 
wage. If the only way that you can reward people for merit is to reduce what 
you’re doing for others, then I think the limited pot of money that education 
seems to get regardless of where you at, that seems to be one of the sticking 
points I think, certainly one of the problems with implementing it. 
 They are upset with the university. They’re upset with the college because we 
are having to do this. They do not feel it is right. They did not like the track that 
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we were taking. They were afraid. They thought it was wasted time because all 
of them knew going in that universities don’t have any money. Why are we 
doing this for $500? It does not make any sense. We are putting people against 
each other. Being forced to go out and do professional development activities 
that we are not even supported to do. We have a very limited travel budget. We 
have very limited time. We have a small faculty that have to do already so many 
other things, and now we’re being told that that if we don’t do these other 
things, we might not even get the little cost-of-living increases that we used to 
get. 
 Interviewees repeatedly discussed being coerced into adopting the merit pay 
system through conflicting statements made by administrators. For example, one 
interviewee noted, “I think we got mixed messages all along the way. ‘Everyone can 
achieve merit,’ but ‘Merit means merit.’ He [the administrator] would say that 
sometimes in the same meeting.” The interviewee continued, “With those two mixed 
messages coming from the very top, faculty, depending upon what they wanted to hear, 
came into the process with very different expectations.”  
 The adverse impact of these conflicting messages was perhaps most reflected in 
a conversation with one of the staff members.  
 Interviewer:  Let’s say that everyone across campus did the best they could to 
score the highest they could on the merit pay system. What do 
you think the impact would be on the University?  
 Interviewee: Well, the university would think there is something wrong. 
 Interviewer: Why? 
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 Interviewee:  I don’t think that you are allowed to score that high, to get an 
evaluation that would put you at the top. I just don’t know. You’d 
have to be perfect to do that, and that is not me. 
 The second theme that emerged was the use of specific terminology that 
reflected coercion. Common phrases that reflected the use of coercive power included: 
“top-down,”  “terminated,”  “push people forward,”  “retribution,”  “hurtful,”  “get rid 
of,”  “unfair,”  “striking at people’s hearts and wallets,”  “lame,”  “not good enough,”  
“suspicion,”  “fictitious competition,”  “bully pulpit,”  “beaten,”  “imposed,”  
“resented,”  “shoved at you,”  “whipping a lot of horses,”   “having to do this,”  and 
“forced.”  Specific interviewee comments included:   
 . . . with the staff there is less difficulty because it's a top-down arrangement. 
You know, it's more like a business. We are going to do this. We would like for 
you to buy into it, but if you don't too bad. I hate to say it that way, but the 
bottom line is there is a top-down relationship in the staff. People can be 
terminated for insubordination if they don't go along with the system.  
 I mean it is a reward system, but when you have no rewards it makes it hard to 
push people forward. Why do you want to evaluate someone poorly other than if 
you wanted to terminate that person if you can't reward those who are doing 
well? 
 It [the merit pay system] was not being seen as a positive. It was being seen as a 
negative. It was being seen as – retribution is too strong of a word, but I can’t 
think of another one right now – that it was hurtful. 
 I think there were some staff who thought that this was a way to get rid of them. 
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They did not have a standard that they knew that they were supposed to be 
working toward. “How can you judge me and then base my raise, which was 
very limited anyway, on what I did not know I was supposed to be doing. It is 
unfair to tell me now when you did not tell me in the front end. 
 This was just striking at people’s hearts and their wallets, which is even worse. . 
. . It was almost like I felt like he was doing it because he thought we were not 
good enough. . . . It seems like he thought the reason we were doing it was 
because we were lame, and he needed to pump us up a little bit. 
 I think that the document to me appeared to come from a place of suspicion. 
“We’re going to ferret out every last thing you’re doing. We’re going to make 
you put it on a form.” 
 It [the merit pays system] created an atmosphere of a fictitious competition that 
was never to exist. 
 . . . a bully pulpit is not always bad, but I would not have beaten the people 
down. 
 It [the merit pay system] was imposed so quickly without getting the populace 
ready for what was about to happen or why it was being done. That ruined the 
effectiveness of it. Also, people resented it. 
 I think because there were so many different ideas about really what it was. I 
think it made it difficult to implement because I don’t think there was a lot of 
support for it. I think that made it difficult. I think the lack of support ends up 
with the idea that this is being shoved at you. So, then it does become resistance. 
 My problem with the merit system is that that we do not put enough money into 
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the merit on a consistent basis. I don’t see us being able to do that on a 
consistent basis. I think we are whipping a lot of horses and not getting 
anywhere. 
 They are upset with the university. They’re upset with the college because we’re 
having to do this. They do not feel it is right. They did not like the track that we 
were taking. They were afraid. They thought it was wasted time because all of 
them knew going in that universities don’t have any money. Why are we doing 
this for $500? It does not make any sense. We are putting people against each 
other. Being forced to go out and do professional development activities that we 
are not even supported to do. We have a very limited travel budget. We have 
very limited time. We have a small faculty that have to do already so many other 
things, and now we’re being told that that if we don’t do these other things, we 
might not even get the little cost-of-living increases that we used to get. 
 In short, individuals indentified a two prong purpose of the merit pay system: to 
reward and to punish. The analysis indicated administrators had limited opportunity to 
use reward power due to a lack of funding. In the absence of funding, interviewees 
perceived the use of coercive power as the primary means of implementing the merit 
pay system. The analysis further suggested the perceived use of coercive power by 
administrators adversely impacted the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system.  
 Summary: Qualitative Question 4. In summarizing the qualitative analysis 
associated with the fourth question, the interview data indicated that administrator use 
of power influenced the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. As illustrated in 
Table 19, the four respondents who affirmed legitimacy of the merit pay system also 
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indicated the use of referent, expert, and reward power by administrators contributed to 
increased legitimacy. One of the interviewees also indicated the use of coercive power 
decreased the legitimacy but overall maintained that the merit pay system was a good fit 
for the university. Of the six respondents who indicated that the merit pay system was 
not legitimate, one interviewee noted the negative influence of referent, expert, and 
coercive power outputs; one interviewee noted the negative influence of referent, 
coercive, and reward power; two interviewees noted the negative influence of coercive 
and reward power; and two interviewees noted the positive influence of referent and/or 
expert power and the negative influence of coercive and reward power. In essence, the 
data appeared to indicate the negative influence of coercive and reward power on the 
perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system, and hinted that the negative use of 
coercive and reward power had a greater influence on perceived legitimacy than 
referent and expert power.  
 On the whole, the interview data confirmed that the perceived use of referent 
and expert power by administrators increased perceived legitimacy of the merit pay 
system. The data also confirmed that the perceived use of coercive power by 
administrators decreased perceived legitimacy of the merit pays system. The interview 
data further explained coercive power through associations with (1) removal of 
entitlements to cost-of-living increases; and (2) failure to deliver monetary rewards. The 
qualitative analysis associated with power warranted the addition of one new variable: 
reward power; and four paths: (1) development process→expert power; (2) 
development process→referent power; (3) implementation process→expert power; and 
(4) reward power→legitimacy.  
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Table 19 
Interview Responses Related to the Perceived use of Power by Administrators and 
Perceived Legitimacy of the Merit Pay System 
 
Interview Perceived 
Legitimacy 
Referent Power Expert 
Power 
Coercive 
Power 
Reward 
Power 
1 Yes + +  +/- 
2 Yes/No -  - - 
3 No - - - - 
4 Yes + + - + 
5 Yes/No   - - 
6 No   - - 
7 Yes + + - + 
8 No   - - 
9 No +  - - 
10 Yes/No + + - - 
11 No -  - - 
12 Yes + +  + 
 13 No + + - - 
14 Yes/No +  - - 
15 Yes/No + - - - 
+ =  type of power discussed in terms of increasing legitimacy 
- =  type of power discussed in terms of decreasing legitimacy 
Blank =  no response 
 
Summary: Phase II Qualitative Analysis  
Thematic analysis qualitatively confirmed, explained, and expanded the Phase I 
causal model. The analyses confirmed (1) perceived legitimacy influenced the adoption 
of the merit pay system; (2) legitimacy of the merit pay system increased as individuals 
perceived greater coupling of the merit pay system to the innovation’s goal, the 
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university’s mission, existing processes, personal motivation, and personal goals; (3) 
legitimacy of the merit pay system increased as individuals perceived  increased clarity 
of outputs; (4) increased perceived use of referent power and expert power by 
administrators increased the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system; and (5) 
increased perceived use of coercive power by administrators decreased perceived 
legitimacy of the merit pay system. 
Qualitative analysis further explained the Phase I causal model by identifying 
three new variables and 20 characteristics. Table 20 summarizes the new variables and 
characteristics added to the model. 
Table 20 
Characteristics Added to the Causal Model Based on Qualitative Analysis 
New Variable Existing Variable Characteristics Added 
 Coupling Linkage to innovation’s goal 
  Linkage to existing mission 
  Linkage to existing processes 
  Linkage to personal goals 
  Linkage to personal motivation 
 Ambiguity Measurable outputs 
  Job-related outputs 
  Clear benchmarks 
 Coercive Power Removal of entitlement 
  Failure to deliver 
Reward Power  Monetary 
  Nonmonetary 
 
   301 
 
Development process  Dialogue 
  Collaborative 
  Experimental 
  Iterative 
  Individual & Organizational 
Implementation Process  Consistent processes 
  Consistent definitions 
  Consistent support 
 
Finally, the Phase I causal model was expanded as a result of qualitative 
analysis. Specifically, eight paths were added to the model. Table 21 summarizes the 
paths added to the model. 
Table 21 
Summary of Paths Added to the Causal Model Based on Qualitative Analysis 
Path Added Variable 
Development Processes → Referent Power 
Development Processes → Expert Power 
Development Processes → Ambiguity 
Development Processes → Coupling 
Implementation Processes → Ambiguity 
Implementation Processes → Expert Power 
President Influence → Development Process 
Reward Power → Legitimacy 
 
In summary, the qualitative analyses of Phase II yielded a model that supported 
the use of ambiguity, coupling, referent power, coercive power, reward power, and 
expert power to predict perceived legitimacy of a management innovation, became 
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significant predictors of innovation adoption. Figure 22 highlights the model that 
integrates findings from Phase I quantitative analysis and Phase II qualitative analysis.  
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Figure 22. Final model integrating quantitative and qualitative analysis 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Introduction and Organization 
 
The purpose of this study was to broaden our understanding of how power, 
coupling, ambiguity, and subsystems influenced the perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption or rejection of a management innovation within the context of a 
higher education organization. To accomplish this purpose and to answer the project’s 
six research questions, a two-phase, mixed method, sequential explanatory research 
design was used. In Phase I, a researcher-designed survey was used to collect 
quantitative data from 191 faculty, administrators, and staff at a university 
implementing a management innovation.  Correlation, partial correlation, multiple 
regression, and path analyses provided answers to the study’s research questions and 
yielded a causal model reflecting the interaction of the hypothesized variables. In Phase 
II, data from 15 face-to-face interviews confirmed, further explained, and expanded 
quantitative findings resulting in a causal model that integrated quantitative and 
qualitative results.  
Accordingly, Chapter V highlights results, conclusions, and suggestions related 
to the study. More specifically, the chapter will provide a discussion of (1) results 
linked to each research question; (2) conclusions linked to the study’s variables, 
relationships, and relevant literature; (3) recommendations for practice; and (4) 
recommendations for future research.  
Results 
The results section summarizes findings related to the study’s six research 
questions. 
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Research Question 1. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
influence individuals (administrators, faculty, and staff) to adopt or reject a 
management innovation within higher education? 
Quantitative and qualitative data supported the role of legitimacy as a predictor 
of innovation adoption. Regression analysis revealed legitimacy was a significant 
predictor of knowledge formation, opinion formation, planned change, and actual 
change related to the management innovation with p values ranging between <.0005 
and .021.  Also, decomposition of effects within the path analysis confirmed legitimacy 
had significant effects on knowledge formation, opinion formation, and planned change 
with p values ranging from <.001 and .035. Qualitatively, six of the fifteen interviewees 
indicated they had changed behaviors to align with merit pay system, and the remaining 
nine interviewees indicated they had made no changes in behaviors. Interestingly, of the 
six interviewees who said they had changed behaviors, four described the management 
innovation as “legitimate,”  “very legitimate,”  “fair,” or a “good fit.”  Of the nine who 
indicated they had not changed behaviors to align with the merit pay system, six 
specifically indicated the management innovation was not legitimate. In essence, the 
quantitative and qualitative data indicated perceived legitimacy was a significant 
predictor of knowledge, option formation, planned behavior change, and actual 
behavior change related to the management innovation. 
In association with Research Question 1, the study examined the innovation-
decision process path proposed by Rogers (1995). Correlation, partial correlation, and 
multiple regression analyses indicated that (1) formation of knowledge was a significant 
predictor of opinion formation (R2=.106; p<.0005; F1,186=22.082); (2) opinion formation 
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was a significant predictor of planned change in behavior or activities (R2=.034; p=.012; 
F1,182=6.494); and (3) planned change was a significant predictor of actual change 
(R2=.149; p<.0005; F1,182=31.905). While R2 statistics indicated the independent 
variables had a small to medium effect on the dependent variables, the effects were 
significant with p values ranging between <.0005 and .012. Additionally, the path 
analysis generally supported the innovation-decision process. Decomposition of effects 
supported causal paths between (1) knowledge and understanding of the merit pay 
system and opinion formation; and (2) planned change and actual change; however, the 
decomposition of effects did not confirm the path between opinion formation and 
planned change. Overall, and with some caution, the quantitative data appeared to 
confirm the innovation-decision process.  
Research Question 2. Did perceived legitimacy of a management innovation 
vary based on the organizational subsystem (technical and administrative) in 
which individuals worked? 
 Quantitative data yielded mixed results with regard to variance of perceived 
legitimacy based on organizational subsystem. Data from the regression analyses 
indicated an individual’s position within the organization accounted for a small, but 
significant (R2=.036; F1,187=6.969, p=.009, β=.423) amount of variation within one of 
the legitimacy variables (L2); however, position accounted for no significant amount of 
variation within the second legitimacy variable (L4). Additional regression analyses 
associated with Research Questions 3-6 yielded no significant results when position was 
included as an independent variable within step-wise models. Finally, partial 
correlations conducted as part of the path analysis indicated that position did not 
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maintain a significant relationship with legitimacy (L2) when controlling for coupling 
(C1) and ambiguity (A4, A5). In the end, an individual’s position within an organization 
only appeared to have significant covariate relationships (p<.05) with coupling 
(r=.182), ambiguity (r=.187), and expert power (r=.185) indicating that perhaps staff 
and administrators within the technical subsystem had a stronger relationship with 
coupling, ambiguity, and the use of expert power than faculty within the technical 
subsystem. Overall, the quantitative data indicated position within the organizational 
subsystem had no, or at least very limited, influence on perceived legitimacy, and 
therefore, was not included as a predictive variable in the final causal model. 
Research Question 3: Did perceived use of power by administrators to facilitate 
the adoption of a management innovation influence how individuals perceived 
legitimacy of a management innovation?  
In general, quantitative and qualitative data analysis of the study indicated the 
perceived use of expert, referent, coercive, and reward power by administrators 
influenced perceived legitimacy of the management innovation.  
Regression analysis indicated perceived use of referent power had a significant 
effect (p<.0005) on perceived legitimacy. Decomposition of effects within the path 
analysis further confirmed perceived use of referent power by administrators had a 
significant direct effect (β=.246, p<.001) on legitimacy. With regard to qualitative data, 
nine of fifteen interviewees confirmed administrators used referent power to influence 
the legitimacy of the management innovation. The interview data indicated that, 
through conversations with individuals and groups, administrators developed mutual 
understandings of the management innovation, which increased the perceived 
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legitimacy of the merit pay system. In summary, data analysis indicated that perceived 
use of referent power by administrators increased perceived legitimacy of the 
management innovation.  
Quantitative analyses yielded mixed results related to the influence of expert 
power on perceived legitimacy. Regression analysis indicated perceived use of expert 
power had a significant effect (p<.05) on perceived legitimacy. On the other hand, 
decomposition of effects within the path analysis revealed perceived use of expert 
power by administrators did not have a significant direct effect (p=.269) on legitimacy. 
In part this inconsistency, may be explained by interaction between legitimacy and the 
other variables of interest that were included initially in the causal model. While the 
quantitative data appeared inconsistent, results from the qualitative analysis were clear. 
The qualitative data substantiated that the use of expert power positively influenced 
perceived legitimacy. Seven interviewees confirmed administrators used expert power 
to influence the perceived legitimacy of the management innovation.  The data 
highlighted how administrators used personal knowledge to provide detailed 
information about the merit pay system. The data also indicated that administrators 
shared personal knowledge gained from research to increase legitimacy of the merit pay 
system. Failure of administrators to use expert power appeared to adversely influence 
perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. On the whole, the integrated analysis 
supported perceived use of referent power by administrators as a predictor of perceived 
legitimacy.  
On the other hand, quantitative and qualitative appeared to indicate that the 
perceived use of coercive power adversely influenced the perceived legitimacy of the 
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management innovation. Regression analysis indicated perceived use of coercive power 
was a significant predictor (p<.01) of perceived legitimacy. Decomposition of effects 
within the path analysis revealed perceived use of coercive power by administrators had 
a significant direct effect with (p<.01) on legitimacy. While significant beta statistics 
(β=-.364, .395, -.287, -.214, .153, -.211) generated by regression and path analyses 
provided mixed results with regard to positive or negative influence, the qualitative data 
clearly indicated the negative influence of coercive power on perceived legitimacy. 
More specifically, thirteen of the fifteen interviewees noted the negative impact of 
perceived use coercive power by administrators on the perceived legitimacy of the 
management innovation. These individuals associated the removal of cost-of-living 
raises and the failure to provide meaningful and promised pay raises with the use of 
coercive power by administrators. Overall, data analysis associated with this study 
indicated perceived use of coercive power by administrators adversely influenced the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system.  
Finally, qualitative data suggested that the perceived failure of administrators to 
use reward power adversely influenced perceived legitimacy. This adverse effect, at 
least to some degree, appeared linked to the two prong purpose of the management 
innovation as identified by all fifteen interviewees: (1) to reward individuals who 
performed their jobs well; and (2) not to reward, or punish, those who were 
underperforming. Thirteen of the fifteen interviews shared that the use of monetary and 
nonmonetary rewards associated with the management innovation was minimal, 
nonexistent, or never a reality. In essence, the data analysis appeared to indicate that the 
absence of rewards and the subsequent absence of the perceived use of reward power by 
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administrators was perceived as a failure of the management innovation to fulfill one of 
its purposes, which ultimately led to decreased legitimacy of the merit pay system and 
subsequent decisions by individuals to not change behaviors or activities to align with 
the management innovation.  
 Overall, data analysis from the study substantiated that perceived use of referent 
and expert power increased perceived legitimacy of the management innovation while 
the perceived use of coercive power decreased perceived legitimacy. The absence of 
reward power within the context of the stated purpose of the management innovation 
also contributed to decreased legitimacy. Most notably, the quantitative data and 
qualitative data revealed that the negative effect of reward and coercive power on 
perceived legitimacy had greater influence than any positive influence linked to referent 
and expert power. 
Research Question 4. Did the perceived degree of coupling of a subsystem to a 
proposed management innovation influence how individuals perceived the 
legitimacy of a management innovation?   
On the whole, data analysis confirmed coupling of a subsystem to the proposed 
management innovation influenced perceived legitimacy.  
Regression analyses indicated coupling was found to account for a large amount 
of variation in perceived legitimacy with R2 statistics equaling .313 and .445, and 
correspondingly, was identified as a significant predictor of legitimacy (p<.0005). 
Decomposition of effects within the path analysis further confirmed coupling had a 
significant direct effect on legitimacy (β=.296, .351, .271; p<.001). The qualitative data 
also indicated perceived coupling of a subsystem to the proposed management 
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innovation influenced perceived legitimacy. More specifically, legitimacy increased 
when individuals perceived the innovation was tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal, 
the university’s historic mission, the university’s existing evaluation system, personal 
goals, and personal motivation. Further, qualitative data indicated legitimacy was 
influenced by processes used to develop or refine the management innovation. 
Development processes increased perceived coupling when those processes occurred 
among individuals and groups; incorporated collaborative strategies; encouraged 
dialogue among stakeholders; facilitated experimentation with the innovation; and 
allowed for the development of iterative versions of policies and procedures. In short, 
data analysis of the study verified that when individuals identified the management 
innovation as tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal, the university’s historic mission, 
the university’s existing evaluation system, personal motivation or personal goals, 
perceived legitimacy of the management innovation increased.  
Research Question 5. Did the perceived ambiguity of inputs, processes, and 
outputs influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Generally, quantitative and qualitative analysis indicated ambiguity of outputs 
influenced perceived legitimacy of the management innovation. The data were 
inconclusive regarding the influence of ambiguity of inputs and processes on perceived 
legitimacy. 
Regression analyses indicated ambiguity accounted for a large amount of 
variation in perceived legitimacy with R2 statistics for the various models equaling .215 
and .479, and correspondingly, was identified as a significant predictor of legitimacy 
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(p<.0005). Decomposition of effects within the path analysis further confirmed 
ambiguity had a significant direct effect (β=.436; p<.001) on legitimacy. The qualitative 
data further substantiated that legitimacy increased when outputs were clearly defined; 
included measurable bench marks; were linked to job-specific functions; and were 
implemented consistently. Essentially, data analysis associated with the study 
substantiated that increased clarity with which outputs were defined and measured as 
well as linked to job specific functions and consistently measured, increased perceived 
legitimacy of the management innovation.   
Research Question 6. Did the factors of power, coupling and ambiguity interact 
to influence how individuals perceived the legitimacy of a management 
innovation?  
Generally, the study indicated power, coupling, and ambiguity influenced how 
individuals perceived legitimacy of the management innovation. More specifically, 
decomposition of effects within the path analysis confirmed coupling (β=.296, .351, 
.271; p<.001), ambiguity (β=.436; p<.001), referent power (β=.246; p<.001), and 
coercive power (β=-.214, -.211, .153; p<.001, <.001, .005) had the greatest total effect 
on perceived legitimacy when accounting for interactions among all variables. As 
previously noted in the conclusions for Research Questions 1-5, qualitative data 
consistently confirmed the quantitative findings. In addition, the qualitative data further 
explained these interactions by identifying ten specific characteristics associated with 
these variables (see Table 20, Chapter IV). The qualitative data also warranted the 
addition of three new variables (reward power, development processes, and 
implementation processes), ten characteristics associated with these variables, and eight 
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new paths (see Tables 20 and 21, Chapter IV).  In summary, the data analysis associated 
with this study confirmed that ambiguity, coupling, referent power, coercive power, 
reward power, and expert power influenced perceived legitimacy of the management 
innovation, which in turn influenced innovation adoption. Ultimately, this study yielded 
a causal model that integrated these findings (see Figure 23). 
Figure 23. Final causal model without variable characteristics 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to broaden our understanding of how power, 
coupling, ambiguity, and subsystems influenced the perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption or rejection of a management innovation within the context of a 
higher education organization. In light of this purpose, this section will provide a 
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discussion of conclusions linked to the study’s variables, relationships, and relevant 
literature. 
Innovation Adoption 
Initially, the literature pointed to the work of Rogers (1995) as a possible 
framework to understand the cycle of rejection identified by Birnbaum (2001). The 
pattern of adoption found within this study appeared consistent with Rogers’ (1995) 
innovation-decision process model. First, individuals developed knowledge and 
understanding related to the management innovation. Knowledge and understanding 
then became a significant predictor of opinion formation where individuals formed 
either positive or negative opinions about the management innovation. In turn, opinion 
formation was found to be a significant predictor of planned change in behaviors or 
activities, which ultimately predicted whether individuals adopted the management 
innovation as demonstrated through changed behaviors or activities to align with the 
management innovation. In short, the study yielded findings consistent with the 
innovation-decision process model developed by Rogers. 
Legitimacy and the Relationship with Innovation Adoption 
Next, the study sought to understand how legitimacy influenced the adoption of 
the management innovation. Birnbaum (2001) hinted that management innovations 
were introduced into higher education organizations as a means to increase perceived 
legitimacy of the organization and its leaders with external constituents. Indeed, the 
introduction of the management innovation in this study appeared to be introduced by 
the president as a potential means to increase legitimacy among individuals within and 
external to the organization.  
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Further, Birnbaum (2001) suggested that perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation by individuals and subsystems within the organization played a role in the 
eventual adoption or rejection of the management innovation. Legitimacy was defined 
using three characteristics. First, legitimacy was defined as a label assigned by 
individuals to identify the validity of the management innovation. The study appeared 
to support this characteristic of the definition. Within the interview data, individuals 
consistently described the management innovation as “legitimate,”  “very legitimate,” 
“fair,” and “a good fit.” 
Second, based on the work of French and Raven (1959), legitimacy was defined 
as a positive-neutral-negative perception of the management innovation. However, 
individuals participating in the interviews mostly discussed legitimacy using 
dichotomous terms with the use of more neutral terms noticeably absent. Hence, the 
study did not yield results consistent with the anticipated positive-neutral-negative 
response and might be an area for future exploration. 
Third, legitimacy was defined as a label that emerged as the result of an 
evaluative process used by individuals to determine the alignment of the innovation 
with internalized norms and values. The study appeared to support that individuals used 
an evaluative process to determine the legitimacy of the merit pay system. The basis of 
this evaluative process appeared to be internalized norms manifested as beliefs and 
values associated with power, coupling, and ambiguity related to the specific 
management innovation. Consistent with the literature, these internalized norms 
appeared to be constructed individually and socially within the context of the 
development and implementation processes associated with the adoption of the merit 
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pay system (French & Raven, 1959; Linton, 1945; Pfeffer, 1982; Yukl, 2001). The role 
of development and implementation processes will be discussed later in this chapter. 
With regard to the influence of legitimacy on innovation adoption, the results of 
the study indicated perceived legitimacy of a management innovation influenced 
individuals to adopt or reject the management innovation. Individuals who perceived 
the innovation as legitimate were more likely to change behaviors and activities to align 
with the management innovation. Conversely, those who did not perceive the 
innovation as legitimate were less inclined to change behaviors and activities to align 
with the management innovation.  
In summary, findings partially supported the study’s definition of legitimacy in 
that it was a label assigned by individuals to identify the validity of the management 
innovation, and it resulted from evaluation processes linked to internalized norms and 
values. The findings did not support legitimacy being defined as a positive-neutral-
negative perception of the management innovation. Finally, the study’s findings 
appeared consistent with assertions made by Birnbaum (2001) who suggested that 
legitimacy of a management innovation played a role in the adoption of management 
innovations given that individuals who perceived the management innovation as more 
legitimate were more likely to change behaviors than those who perceived the 
innovation as less legitimate. The study clearly supported the use of legitimacy as a 
predictor of innovation adoption.  
Rogers (1995) also established that innovations, when introduced to 
organizations, followed paths toward diffusion. Diffusion is the process through which 
innovations spread through an organization and is the process used by members of the 
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organization to develop mutual understandings of the innovation. Hence, acceptance or 
rejection of a management innovation was examined as a social process. If social 
processes linked to organizational context influence innovation adoption, it seemed 
logical that those characteristics that distinguish higher education from business 
organizations may influence the eventual adoption or rejection of a management 
innovation.  Accordingly, this study examined literature and identified three 
characteristics that distinguished higher education organizations from business 
organizations: (1) plurality of power (Baldridge et al., 1977; Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & 
March, 1986); (2) ambiguity tied to the production function (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001; 
Brock & Harvey, 1993; Cohen & March 1986); and (3) coupling of subsystems 
(Birnbaum, 1988; Besse, 1973; Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; Mintzberg, 1979). 
Conclusions related to these characteristics are highlighted in the next three sections of 
this chapter. 
Power and the Relationship with Legitimacy 
The study indicated perceived use of power by administrators influenced 
perceived legitimacy of the management innovation. The study revealed four types of 
power that influenced perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system: referent, expert, 
coercive, and reward. The perceived use of referent and expert power increased 
perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system, while the perceived use of coercive power 
and the failure of administrators to use reward power decreased legitimacy.  
The positive influence of referent and expert power is consistent with the 
literature. Consistent with the suggestions of French and Raven (1959) and Yukl (2002), 
interviewees noted administrators were engaged in dialogues and were accessible 
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during the development and implementation of the management innovation. These 
activities (i.e., the use of referent power) increased desire of individuals to identify with 
leaders’ opinions and insights related to the management innovation. Interviewees also 
noted administrators used expert power to influence perceived legitimacy of the 
management innovation by sharing detailed knowledge, information, experiences, and 
literature about the management innovation (French & Raven, 1959; Hickson et al., 
1971; Patchen, 1974).  
Higher education organizations are often characterized as normative 
organizations. The works of Etzioni (1961), Mintzberg (1983), Patchen (1974), and 
Pfeffer (1981) underscore the positive impacts linked to the use of referent and expert 
power in normative organizations, where social relationships, individual choice, and a 
desire for autonomy govern the context in which individuals make decisions related to 
management innovations.  Therefore, it was not surprising to find the negative effects of 
coercive and reward power, which are often more associated with utilitarian or coercive 
organizations such as businesses or prisons. 
Increased diffusion and sustainability of the management innovation is another 
aspect highlighted in the literature. French and Raven (1974), Thambian and Gemmill 
(1974), Yukl and Falbe (1991), and Warren (1968) noted that change in behavior linked 
to the use of reward and coercive power may be short lived. Conversely, change in 
behavior linked to administrator use of referent and expert power may be sustainable 
and may increase diffusion of the innovation within the organization. The study 
examined this phenomenon as a single snapshot in time only two years after the 
adoption of a management innovation. Given the short time period from the 
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introduction of the innovation until when the study was conducted, findings do not 
reflect any long-term effects of power on changed behavior. Therefore, future research 
in this area may want to seek increased understanding related to the longitudinal effect 
on perceived legitimacy and behavior change of individuals, units, and subsystems 
where leaders primarily use referent and expert power to influence the adoption of 
management innovations. 
Finally, the study suggested that the use of power may be consistent with two 
additional themes supported in the literature. First, the willingness of administrators to 
use power appeared linked to perceived benefits of the innovation for the administrators 
and their followers (Blau, 1974; Hollander, 1958; Jacobs, 1970; Kelman, 1958). Those 
administrators who saw mutual benefits appeared more willing to use power. 
Administrators discussed benefits in terms of alignment with personal goals, unit goals, 
and critical need.  
Second, the study indicated that the willingness of administrators to use power 
was linked to organizational hierarchy. Higher level administrators were perhaps more 
willing to use power to influence the adoption of the management innovation than 
administrators at lower levels (Birnbaum, 2001; French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 
1979). The qualitative data suggested the president, vice presidents, and academic deans 
strategically used referent power to influence adoption of the innovation with groups 
and individuals. The majority of these efforts focused on shaping policies and 
procedures related to development and implementation processes. Beyond this handful 
of senior administrators, interviewees indicated that the use of power by administrators 
was minimal. Within the faculty subsystem, interviewees had difficulty describing the 
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influence of administrators beyond the president, vice president, and deans. (However, 
it is important to note that interview data were not specifically collected from any 
midlevel administrators.) Potentially, some administrators at lower levels were not 
willing to use power to influence the adoption of the management innovation because of 
tensions between the needs, beliefs, and values of followers and the demands of the 
organization (Mintzberg, 1979).  This conflict may be particularly true within the 
faculty subsystem where department chairs may view their faculty role as more 
important than their administrator role, especially on issues where the conflict is more 
pronounced. 
Finally, willingness of administrators to use power to influence the adoption of 
management innovations may possibly be linked to how administrators perceived 
coupling of the subsystem to the management innovation and the degree to which 
ambiguity of unit outputs could be minimized. Understanding the factors that influence 
the willingness of administrators to use power to influence the adoption of management 
innovations may be an important area for future research.  
Overall, the study supported three findings related to power: (1) perceived use of 
referent and expert power by administrators increased perceived legitimacy of the merit 
pay system; (2) perceived use of coercive power decreased legitimacy; and (3) failure of 
administrators to use reward power decreased legitimacy. The study also suggested the 
willingness of administrators to use power might be linked to perceived benefit and 
organizational hierarchy.  
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Ambiguity and the Relationship with Legitimacy 
 Ambiguity is a second characteristic that distinguished higher education 
institutions from business organizations. More specifically, the relevant literature for 
this study suggested four ambiguities tied to the production function: goal ambiguity; 
ambiguity of inputs, outputs, and technical processes; ambiguity in measuring inputs 
and outputs; ambiguity tied to technical processes that convert inputs to outputs 
(Birnbaum, 1988, 2001; Boyer, 1990; Brock & Harvey, 1993; Cohen & March, 1986; 
Gross & Grambsch, 1974; Jones & Taylor, 1990; Kerr, 2001).  
 The results of the study appeared consistent with the literature with regard to 
ambiguity of goals, inputs, and processes. Interviewees consistently described goals 
within the ambiguous context of the university’s historic mission of teaching, research, 
and service. Perhaps most notably, the study highlighted the difficulty individuals had 
identifying inputs and processes to the point that interview questions related to 
identifying inputs and processes were suspended after the third interview. 
While the interview data indicated individuals had difficulty defining goals, 
inputs, and processes, individuals appeared to find it easier to define and measure 
outputs. As a result, the study confirmed that legitimacy of the management innovation 
increased when individuals perceived outputs that were more clearly defined. More 
specifically, the study substantiated that outputs that were clearly defined, consistently 
measured, and linked to job specific functions increased perceived legitimacy of the 
management innovation. Further, it appeared that development and implementation 
processes played an important role in identifying and measuring outputs and facilitating 
   322 
 
linkages with job specific functions. Conclusions related to the influence of 
development and implementation processes will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Within the context of defining, measuring, and linking outputs to job specific 
functions in the faculty subsystem, individuals often discussed specific difficulties 
related to the teaching, research, and service mission of the university. Individuals often 
contrasted degrees of ambiguity and clarity tied to the three-fold mission. Some 
interviewees discussed the difficulty of defining and measuring teaching while others 
discussed the same for research, which lead to several questions. If individuals 
perceived differing levels of ambiguity related to outputs, how was perceived 
legitimacy impacted? Did individuals deconstruct management innovations and perhaps 
view its parts with differing levels of legitimacy based on ambiguity of outputs that 
were linked, or coupled, to a specific component of the innovation and thereby 
influenced individuals to change behaviors or activities to align with that component? 
Indeed some of the qualitative data hinted at this possibility and may be an area worthy 
of future research. 
Overall, the study yielded findings consistent with the literature with regards to 
goal, input, and process ambiguity. On the other hand, the study appeared to support 
that outputs could be defined and measured within a higher education organization, and 
that development and implantation processes potentially played an important role in 
defining and measuring outputs. Most notably, the results of the study indicated 
perceived legitimacy increased when outputs were defined, consistently measured, and 
linked to specific job functions. 
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Coupling and the Relationship with Legitimacy 
 Subsystems that tend to be more loosely coupled than tightly coupled were the 
third characteristic that distinguished higher education from business organizations. The 
study indicated perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system increased when 
individuals identified that the management innovation was tightly coupled to the 
subsystem, and more specifically, when the management innovation was tightly coupled 
to how individuals within the subsystem perceived the linkage to the innovation’s goal, 
the university’s historic mission, and the subsystem’s existing evaluation system. If the 
management innovation was linked to these three areas, perceived legitimacy seemed to 
increase, and conversely, if the management innovation was perceived as not aligning 
with these three areas, legitimacy decreased. The innovation’s goal, the university’s 
historic mission, and the subsystem’s existing evaluation system appeared to be the 
three critical elements common to the management innovation and the organization’s 
administrative and faculty subsystems. This finding seemed to align with Birnbaum’s 
(1988) thought that tight and loose coupling manifests based on the perceived linkages 
common to the innovation and the subsystem.  
 In addition, perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system appeared to increase 
when individuals identified that the management innovation was tightly coupled to an 
individual’s personal motivation or personal goals. Personal motivation, at least for this 
study, was discussed in terms of extrinsic (i.e., nonmonetary recognition) and intrinsic 
motivation (i.e., worth ethic, self fulfillment, gratification in helping others be 
successful). Personal goals were most often discussed in terms of an individual’s 
leadership goal (i.e., the management innovation helped achieve a personal leadership 
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goal). In essence, the linkage of legitimacy to both personal and organizational elements 
appeared supportive of Birnbaum’s cybernetic assumption that coupling is influenced 
by contextual factors. Basically, the study confirmed that the beliefs and values of 
individuals influenced perceived coupling to the management innovation, which in turn 
influenced how they perceived legitimacy of the merit pays system. Birnbaum also 
noted that influence of contextual elements made it difficult to predict how an 
innovation would be received by individuals. Essentially, the study confirmed 
contextual elements influenced legitimacy and the subsequent adoption of the 
innovation.  The study also confirmed the influence of developmental processes on 
coupling. Therefore, it would appear, at least from a practical perspective, that leaders 
could increase probability of innovation adoption when care is given to facilitate 
developmental processes that include characteristics highlighted in this study.  
 In summary, the research findings for this study indicated perceived legitimacy 
of the merit pay system increased when the management innovation was perceived as 
tightly coupled to the innovation’s goal, the university’s historic mission, the 
subsystem’s existing evaluation system, personal motivation, and personal goals. 
 Basically, the study appeared to indicate that the three factors that distinguished 
business organizations from higher education influenced perceived legitimacy of the 
merit pay system. The perceived use of referent and expert power by administrators 
increased perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system. The use of coercive power and 
the failure to use reward power decreased perceived legitimacy. Perhaps most 
influential in predicting perceived legitimacy, was the degree to which outputs could be 
defined, measured consistently, and linked to specific job functions and the degree to 
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which individuals perceived the purpose of the management innovation was tightly 
coupled to  the innovation’s goal, the university’s historic mission, the subsystem’s 
existing evaluation system, personal motivation, and personal goals. 
Organizational Subsystem and the Relationship with Legitimacy 
Also of interest in this study was to broaden our understanding of the degree to 
which an individual’s position within a given organizational subsystem influenced 
perceived legitimacy of a management innovation.  The study indicated an individual’s 
position within the organizational subsystem had no, or at least very limited, influence 
on perceived legitimacy. This finding was a bit surprising, at least initially, especially in 
light of Birnbaum (1998, 2001) who suggested that adoption failed as the management 
innovation moved from the administrative subsystem to the faculty subsystem. It was 
anticipated that perceived legitimacy of the management innovation would have been 
lower among the faculty subsystem. It was thought that the innovation’s attempt to 
impose centralized controls was incompatible with values, beliefs, decision making 
processes, and power structures of the faculty subsystem, which are generally more 
normative and support autonomy of faculty (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001; Besse, 1973; 
Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1979). It was also 
anticipated that perceived legitimacy of the management innovation might have 
increased among the administrative subsystem due to the congruence with its values, 
beliefs, decision making processes, and power structures that are more utilitarian than 
the normative aspects of the faculty subsystem (Birnbaum, 1988, 2001; Besse, 1973; 
Corson, 1960; Etzioni, 1964; French & Raven, 1959; Mintzberg, 1979). Given the 
literature, why then did position within the organizational subsystem not influence 
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perceived legitimacy? Answers to three additional questions may assist in 
understanding this issue. 
First, did the management innovation seek to create organizational controls that 
centralized and formalized organizational structures (Birnbaum, 2001; Mintzberg, 
1979)? Indeed, the management innovation was an attempt by the organization to adopt 
a merit pay system that rewarded salary increases to individuals who performed at 
higher levels while not rewarding, or punishing, those that performed at lower levels. 
Inherent in this innovation was the need for the organization to centralize and formalize 
processes necessary to consistently determine level of job performance and to determine 
reward or punishment. 
Second, did characteristics of subsystems at Compass Point University align 
with characteristics identified in the literature? It appeared that CPU was made up of 
two fairly distinct subsystems: a faculty subsystem and an administrative subsystem. 
From the interview data and participant observer knowledge, the faculty subsystem 
seemed to reflect values, beliefs, decision making processes, and power structures that 
were more normative than deterministic or utilitarian. However, the interview data did 
not reflect an administrative subsystem that aligned with characteristics identified in the 
literature in that interviewees consistently described the importance of normative 
decision making processes in the adoption of the management innovation. Although 
there was an expectation of shared governance within the administrative subsystems, a 
culture of shared governance with corresponding structures, processes, and procedures 
to facilitate shared governance did not exist. Given that the adoption of the management 
innovation within the administrative subsystem appeared to be more autocratic than 
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normative, there is a potential that actual development and implementation processes 
within the administrative subsystem contributed to administrator use of coercive power, 
increased ambiguity, and decreased coupling which in turn decreased legitimacy of the 
merit pay system.  There is also a potential that the development and implementation 
processes were influenced by the absence of a shared governance culture within the 
administrative subsystem as well as the beliefs and values held by key administrators as 
related to the actual management innovation and shared governance.  
Correspondingly, did development or implementation processes within the 
faculty subsystem increase perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system? While the 
management innovation was introduced to each subsystem by the president of the 
university, development processes were quite divergent. As reflected in the interview 
data and based on participant observer knowledge, the processes used to develop and 
implement the management innovation were unique to each subsystem. While the 
development and implementation processes within the administrative subsystem were 
more autocratic, the processes within the faculty subsystem were more normative. 
Within the faculty subsystem, the management innovation was developed and 
implemented using collaborative processes that involved faculty and academic 
administrators. It was implemented using iterative processes that provided opportunity 
for experimentation and refinement. It was clearly linked to the historic teaching, 
research, and service mission, and a great deal of time and energy focused on 
developing clear benchmarks linked to job specific functions: teaching, research, and 
service. Essentially, the development process within the faculty subsystem clearly 
aligned with the values and expectations associated with shared governance of the 
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faculty subsystem, all of which, as reflected in the quantitative and qualitative data, 
increased coupling and decreased ambiguity which in turn increased perceived 
legitimacy of the management innovation. 
In summary, the study indicated an individual’s position within the 
organizational subsystem had no, or very limited, influence on perceived legitimacy. 
Initially, this finding appeared inconsistent with the literature which suggested 
individuals within the administrative subsystem might perceive the legitimacy of the 
management innovation at higher levels than individuals within the faculty subsystem. 
In part, it appeared development and implementation process may have contributed to 
this inconsistency and underscored the importance related to the congruence of the 
innovation’s purpose as well as the congruence of the innovation’s development and 
innovation processes with the values, beliefs, decision making processes, and power 
structures of the organizational subsystem. In other words, the organizational subsystem 
within which an individual is employed, whether the administrative subsystem or the 
faculty subsystem, may not be of importance in predicting perceived legitimacy and 
subsequent adoption of the management innovation. Instead, it appeared that alignment 
of the innovation’s purpose and adoption processes with the subsystem’s values and 
beliefs may be more predictive of perceived legitimacy.  
Given this finding and in light of the literature, it may be important for future 
research to further explore the degree to which an individual’s position within the 
technical and administrative subsystems and the values of those subsystems interact to 
influence perceived legitimacy and adoption of a management innovation. Additional 
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understanding may also be gleaned by breaking down the unit of analysis into smaller 
subsystems within the administrative and technical subsystems.  
Development and Implementation Processes 
 Up to this point, this section has highlighted conclusions within the study that 
support (1) the use of referent power, expert power, coercive power, reward power, 
ambiguity, and coupling to predict the degree to which individuals perceive legitimacy 
of a management innovation; and (2) the use of perceived legitimacy of a management 
innovation to predict subsequent adoption or rejection of the innovation. The discussion 
section has also highlighted how an individual’s position in a given subsystem within an 
organization did not necessarily influence how that individual perceived the legitimacy 
of a merit pay system. Next, the discussion of conclusions will focus on two findings 
that emerged from the qualitative data that were not tied directly to the literature 
reviewed in preparation for this study or to the study’s research questions, but none the 
less, were equally important in understanding those factors that influenced the adoption 
of the management innovation. 
 First, the study appeared to highlight the importance of processes used to 
develop the management innovation. Development processes, as supported by the 
qualitative data, are those activities facilitated by administrators to contextualize the 
management innovation to a higher education setting from the point of introduction of 
the innovation to the organization through the first implementation and subsequent 
reimplementation of the management innovation. Contextualizing the management 
innovation appeared to involve refinement of the innovation to align with the existing 
beliefs, values, processes, and resources of the organization. These development 
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processes increased perceived coupling, decreased ambiguity, and facilitated the use of 
referent and expert power when those processes occurred at individual and group levels; 
incorporated collaborative strategies; encouraged dialogue among stakeholders; 
facilitated experimentation with the innovation; and allowed for the development of 
iterative versions of policies and procedures related to the management innovation. 
 Second, the study underscored the importance of implementation processes. 
Implementation processes were those activities used by administrators to facilitate 
implementation of the management innovation, and more specifically, those activities 
that encouraged individuals to change behaviors or activities to align with the 
management innovation. While these processes contained many of the same 
characteristics as the normative processes associated with development phase, the 
innovation processes also focused on consistency of implementation as related to macro 
processes. In effect, the study highlighted importance of (1) consistently defining 
benchmarks across the organization; (2) using consistent processes to determine 
successes related to the innovation; and (3) consistently providing opportunities and 
support for individuals to experience success related to the innovation.  
While the importance of development and implementation processes were not 
anticipated findings of the study, the importance is consistent with the literature. First, it 
appeared that such processes provided opportunities for individuals, among other 
things, to examine compatibility of the innovation with current values and experiences, 
to experiment with the innovation, and to observe results, all of which were processes 
necessary for diffusion as advocated by Rogers (1995). Second, such processes 
provided opportunities for leaders to encourage individuals and the organization to 
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evolve, solve problems, develop a shared vision related to the innovation, and learn 
about the management innovation (Birnbaum, 1998; Johnson, 1998; Senge, 2000). 
These types of interactions also provided a means to increase richness of observations, 
perspectives, and solutions related to the management innovation and ultimately 
supported greater access to the organization’s potential, increased organizational 
intelligence and wisdom, and a provided a wider understanding of the organization’s 
environment (Senge, 2000; Wheatly, 1999), or as noted by Senge, such interactions 
achieved “more accurate, more insightful, and more empowering views of reality.” (p. 
292). Finally, development and implementation processes allowed administrators to 
become transformational leaders in that these processes provided opportunities for 
leaders to influence followers’ emotions and values in a variety of individual and group 
settings (Bass, 1985, 1996; Burns, 1978). 
 While the literature appeared supportive of the development and implementation 
processes that emerged from the study, there is additional significance related to these 
processes. Prior to this study, the literature certainly substantiated that such processes 
helped organizations to learn, make meaning of problems, and develop dynamic 
solutions to these problems. However, the literature seemed unclear as to why 
organizational learning and meaning making facilitated changed behavior. This study 
potentially provided a clearer understanding of intermediate variables connecting 
learning and meaning making processes to adoption. In essence, the study indicated 
development and implementation processes influenced coupling and ambiguity, which 
influenced perceived legitimacy and ultimately changed behavior. Hence, as an 
extension of this study, future research may want to focus on exploring if these 
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processes have the same effect on other innovations, solutions to problems or threats, or 
strategic planning effort faced by business, higher education and governmental 
organizations. In other words, do processes described in this study increase coupling 
and decrease ambiguity related to other innovations, solutions, or strategic plans across 
organizational sectors? Subsequently, does legitimacy of the innovation, solution, or 
plan increase? And then as a result, do behaviors and activities change to align with the 
innovation, solution, or plan? 
 The potential linkage of the study’s findings to the business sector is significant. 
This linkage may broaden our understanding of the adoption of management 
innovations within complex business organizations. These complex organizations have 
emerged over the past two decades due to acquisitions, mergers, and other strategies 
that have led to even larger conglomerates and multi-national corporations. Indeed, a 
modern corporation may reflect a montage of histories, cultures, goals, purposes, 
values, beliefs, and understandings (Lipman-Blumen, 1998). In many cases, these 
diversities may lead to organizational characteristics that are more representative of 
higher education organizations (dispersion of power, loosely coupled subsystems, and 
ambiguity tied to the production function, specifically ambiguity of process) than 
characteristics associated with the historic business organization. Indeed, the use of 
traditional business and leadership strategies, like vertical integration, within these 
complex business organizations have been found to be detrimental to organizational 
learning (Sorenson, 2003). Therefore, the findings of this study may be useful in 
understanding the adoption of management innovations within complex business 
organizations, and is certainly an area that warrants future research.  
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Leadership within the Cybernetic Model 
 Generally, the study appeared consistent with many of Birnbaum’s (1988) 
suggestions for effective cybernetic leaders.  
 First, the study confirmed the role of transactional and transformational 
leadership in the adoption of management innovations. The role of transaction 
leadership was diminished considerably in that administrators were unable to effectively 
use reward power due to limited resources. It also appeared that the monetary rewards 
associated with the management innovation either diminished or obscured the potential 
influence of nonmonetary rewards, and as a result, use of nonmonetary reward power 
was used minimally, if at all, by administrators even though several interviewees 
underscored the importance of nonmonetary rewards. As discussed previously, the 
study also confirmed the role of transformational leadership in the adoption of 
management innovations. Leaders appeared to influence individuals to change 
behaviors and activities to align with the management innovation primarily through the 
use of expert and referent power, which focused on working with followers to identify 
linkages of the management innovation with beliefs and values held by individuals 
within a given subsystem. However, one area seemingly overlooked by many 
administrators was the linkage of the management innovation to personal goals or 
personal motivation. It appeared that additional linkages with these areas would have 
increased adoption of the management innovation. In short, the study supported a 
balanced role of transactional and transformational leadership in the adoption of a 
management innovation. 
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 Second, Birnbaum (1988) indicated that the successful adoption of a 
management innovation was linked to the capacity of leadership within the various 
subsystems of an organization. Such an approach would disperse power and increase 
capacity of administrators within subsystems to influence adoption of the innovation. In 
this study, administrator involvement within subsystems, beyond the president, vice 
presidents, and deans, was limited. The study was inconclusive as to exactly why this 
occurred, but three possibilities exist. First and as discussed earlier, there was an 
unwillingness of lower level administrators to use power to influence the adoption due 
to loose coupling of the innovation to the administrator’s subsystem and lack of 
perceived benefits. A second possibility may be timing related to the adoption of the 
innovation. The mandate to implement perhaps did not provide an adequate amount of 
time to involve administrators at lower levels. Finally, these administrators may not 
have had time to cultivate knowledge and understanding related to the adoption of the 
innovation. Several interviewees noted that formal training opportunities for 
administrators to develop skills and knowledge related to the management innovation 
were limited or nonexistent. In summary, evidence within the study suggested that 
administrator influence at lower levels within the organization was absent, and appeared 
at some level, to adversely impact the adoption of the management innovation. 
 Next, Birnbaum (1988) suggested that the role of administrators and subsystems 
was to monitor and respond to inputs as a means to maintain equilibrium within the 
subsystem. As noted previously, individuals within the study were unable to identify 
inputs of the organization. Absent of ability to identify inputs, monitoring of inputs 
appeared impossible. Hence, the results of the study, at least initially, appeared 
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inconsistent with Birnbaum’s cybernetic model and one of his proposed roles for 
leaders. But, what if the adoption of the management innovation actually was an input? 
Looking closer at the cybernetic model, Birnbaum noted that when new inputs, perhaps 
innovations in this case, move outside acceptable system limits, leaders look to 
historical processes that have been successful, such as an ad hoc committee or blue 
ribbon task force, to return stability to the system. The focus is on stabilizing the input 
not the output or the technical process. What often emerges from the ad hoc committee 
is a new subsystem in response to the new input.  
 Given Birnbaum’s description, the study seemed to suggest that the management 
innovation introduced to the system was responded to as a new input, and the new input 
was outside of acceptable limits. As a result, several ad hoc committees and task forces 
were formed. Since the innovation was in the early stage of adoption, no new 
subsystems had emerged at the time of the study, but certainly, this idea of innovation 
as input may be an area of interest worthy of future exploration. 
 Consistent with Birnbaum’s (1988) suggestion, the study underscored the 
importance of interpreting a management innovation within the contextual beliefs and 
values of subsystems. As previously noted, the adoption took two divergent paths linked 
to the two subsystems. Within the faculty subsystem, the process was decentralized and 
stakeholders, absent administrators from lower levels, were allowed to develop linkages 
with the subsystems beliefs, values, historic mission, and existing processes. Within the 
administrative subsystem, the process was centralized and more autocratic than 
normative. In fact, the development process hardly reached beyond core involvement of 
the senior administrators, and as a result, the management innovation did not 
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incorporate values and beliefs consistent with the administrative subsystem, which 
somewhat inconsistent with the literature, valued normative decision making processes. 
In essence, the study underscored the importance of decentralized processes that 
allowed administrators to use referent and expert power to develop and implement a 
management innovation that was consistent with the values and beliefs of the subsystem 
thereby increasing perceived coupling and decreasing ambiguity.  
 Finally, the literature suggested that adoption of a management innovation was 
contingent upon the capacity of leadership to introduce the innovation as a response: a 
response to a crisis; a response to a problem that had been identified through data 
collection procedures; a response to a successfully adopted innovation in another 
subsystem; a response to improve selected activities within a specific subsystem. Based 
on interview data and knowledge of the participant observer, the management 
innovation was introduced as a response to a perceived problem that had been identified 
by the chief executive officer of the organization. The problem was identified as the 
lack of a merit pay system. Inconsistent with Birnbaum, the problem was identified as a 
lack of system and was not supported by data. Subsequently, qualifiers were added to 
the problem: across-the-board, cost-of-living raises are not fair in that they provide no 
means to reward performance and no means to financially punish those who do not 
perform. Still later, the lack of a merit pay system was qualified through linkages with 
salary inequities across campus. (It is important to note that in response to this qualifier 
a consultant was hired to perform a salary study. The consultant found less than ten 
individuals across campus who were paid above or below anticipated salary ranges 
based on internal and external comparisons.) Finally, the lack of a merit pay system was 
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qualified by noting that the system would put in place consistent job descriptions and an 
evaluation system for nonfaculty. In essence, it appeared that although the innovation 
was introduced as a problem, it was not introduced as a problem resulting from the 
institution’s data collection procedures and that qualifiers were added to substantiate the 
problem. It is possible that legitimacy of the management innovation was adversely 
impacted by the failure to introduce the innovation in response to a problem that was 
linked to data generated within one of the organizational subsystems. On the other hand, 
the innovation adoption within the faculty subsystem was introduced as a response to 
improve evaluation activities within the subsystem. The study indicated that this linkage 
contributed, at some level, to increased coupling. Hence, it appeared that the importance 
of introducing the merit pay system extended beyond the organizational level and into 
subsystems further supporting one of Birnbaum’s primary assumptions of cybernetic 
organizations: balance between centralized and decentralized elements. Given the 
consistency of these two tangential findings with Birnbaum’s cybernetic model, future 
research related to the specifics of how innovations are introduced to organizations as 
well as to subsystems may provide increased understanding related to the adoption of 
management innovations.  
Summary of Conclusions 
 In summary, this study yielded findings in five areas. First, the study further 
substantiated Rogers’ (1995) innovation adoption process. Second, the study 
substantiated that as perceived legitimacy of a management increased changed 
behaviors or activities to align with that management innovation increased. Third, this 
study confirmed that those characteristics that distinguish higher education institutions 
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from business organizations (plurality of power; ill-defined goals, input, outputs and 
technical processes; and subsystems that are loosely coupled) influenced how 
individuals perceived legitimacy of the management innovation. More specifically, 
legitimacy increased when (1) outputs were defined, measurable, and linked to specific 
job descriptions; (2) the purpose of the management innovation was tightly coupled to 
the innovation’s goal, the university’s mission, the university’s existing processes, 
individual goals, and individual motivation; and (3) administrators used referent or 
expert power. Fourth, this study indicated that the use of normative processes in 
developing and implementing innovations increased perceived coupling and decreased 
perceived ambiguity related to the management innovation while encouraging 
administrator use of referent and expert power. Finally, the study yielded results that 
were consistent with Birnbaum’s (1998) suggestions for effective leadership within a 
cybernetic organization.  
Recommendations for Practice 
 In light of the results and conclusions, the study supported several 
recommendations for higher education policy makers and administrators. With regard to 
policy makers, the study suggested: 
 Policy makers exercise diligent thought and restraint before establishing policies 
or positions that encourage chief executive officers to adopt management 
innovations or before affirming recommendations from chief executive officers 
that their institutions adopt a management innovation – ideally, policy makers 
should hold to the understanding that the success of a management innovation 
increases when the innovation bubbles up from a subsystem within an 
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organization rather than being imposed on the organization by an administrator 
or a policy maker; 
 Policy makers understand the time and resources required to develop and 
implement management innovations and to establish policies and procedures 
that require chief executive officers to allocate required time and resources 
necessary to ensure successful adoption of the management innovation; and 
 Policy makers develop policies and procedures and allocate resources to 
increase the leadership capacity of administrators throughout the hierarchy of an 
organization, especially those in lower levels of the hierarchy.  
With regard to administrators, the study suggested: 
 Administrators exercise diligent thought and restraint before implementing a 
management innovation; 
 Administrators allocate time and resources required to introduce, develop, and 
implement the management innovation; 
 Administrators introduce the management innovation as a response based on 
Birnbaum’s guidelines and that careful consideration go into creating language 
and processes that introduce the management innovation; 
 Administrators develop professional development programs to increase 
leadership capacity within all subsystems and subunits of the organization; 
 Administrators use development processes at the organization and subsystem 
levels that: 
o Incorporate collaborative strategies, 
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o Encourage dialogue among stakeholders (faculty, staff, and 
administrators), 
o Facilitate experimentation with the innovation, 
o Accommodate development of iterative versions of policies and 
procedures related to the innovation, and  
o Primarily rely on administrators using referent and expert power; and 
 Administrators use implementation processes at the organization and subsystem 
levels that: 
o Incorporate collaborative strategies, 
o Encourage dialogue among stakeholders (faculty, staff and 
administrators),  
o Facilitate experimentation, 
o Accommodate development of iterative versions of policies and 
procedures related to the innovation, 
o Primarily rely on administrators using referent and expert power, and 
o Ensure consistency of processes, definitions, and support and access to 
resources to support implementation of the innovation. 
Figure 23 provides a potential model that incorporates administrator recommendations 
supported by this study. 
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Figure 24. Suggested leadership model for the adoption of management innovations 
within higher education. 
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Recommendations for Research 
 As highlighted throughout this chapter, several topics emerged as potential areas 
of research. Those topics are restated in the following bulleted statements. 
 Legitimacy, for this study, was defined as a positive-neutral-negative perception 
of the management innovation based on the work of French and Raven (1959). 
Individuals participating in the interviews mostly discussed legitimacy using 
dichotomous terms with the use of more neutral terms noticeably absent. Hence, 
the study did not yield results consistent with the anticipated positive-neutral-
negative responses and might be an area for future exploration. 
 French and Raven (1974), Thambian and Gemmill (1974), Yukle and Falbe 
(1991), and Warren (1968) noted that changes in behavior linked to the use of 
reward and coercive power may be short lived, while changes in behavior linked 
to administrator use of referent and expert power may be sustainable and may 
increase diffusion of the innovation within the organization. This study 
examined the phenomenon as a single snapshot in time two years after the 
adoption of the management innovation. Given the short time period from the 
introduction of the innovation until when the study was conducted, findings do 
not reflect any long-term effects. Therefore, future research in this area may 
want to seek increased understanding related to the longitudinal effect on 
perceived legitimacy and behavior change of individuals, units and subsystem in 
which leaders primarily use referent and expert power. 
 Understanding the specific factors that influence the willingness of 
administrators to use power, particularly administrators within lower levels of 
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the organization, to influence the adoption of management innovations may be 
an important area for future research.  
 Within the context of defining, measuring, and linking outputs to job specific 
functions in the faculty subsystem, individuals often discussed specific 
difficulties related to the teaching, research, and service mission. Some 
interviewees discussed the difficulty of defining and measuring teaching while 
others discussed the same for research. If individuals perceived differing levels 
of ambiguity related to outputs, how did this difference impact perceived 
legitimacy? Did individuals deconstruct management innovations and perhaps 
view its parts with differing levels of legitimacy based on ambiguity of outputs 
that may be linked, or coupled, to a specific component of the innovation and 
thereby influenced individuals to change behaviors or activities to align with 
that component? Indeed some of the qualitative data suggested this possibility, 
and it may be an area worthy of future research. 
 While the literature appeared supportive of the development and implementation 
processes that emerged from the study, there is additional significance related to 
these processes. Prior to this study, the literature substantiated that such 
processes helped organizations to learn, make meaning of problems, and 
develop dynamic solutions to these problems. However, the literature seemed 
unclear as to why organizational learning and meaning making facilitated 
changed behavior. This study potentially provided a clearer understanding of 
intermediate variables connecting learning and meaning making processes to 
adoption. In essence, the study indicated development and implementation 
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processes influenced coupling and ambiguity, which influenced perceived 
legitimacy and ultimately changed behavior. Hence, as an extension of this 
study, future research may want to focus on exploring if these processes have 
the same effect on other innovations, solutions to problems or threats, or 
strategic planning effort faced by the organization including business, higher 
education and governmental organizations. In other words, do processes 
described in this study increase coupling and decrease ambiguity related to other 
innovations, solutions, or strategic plans across organizational sectors? 
Subsequently, does legitimacy of the innovation, solution, or plan increase? And 
then as a result, do behaviors and activities change to align with the innovation, 
solution, or plan? 
 Birnbaum noted that when new inputs, perhaps innovations in this case, move 
outside acceptable system limits, leaders look to historical processes that have 
been successful, such as an ad hoc committee or blue ribbon task force, to return 
stability to the system. The focus is on stabilizing the input not the output or the 
technical process. What often emerges from the ad hoc committee is a new 
subsystem in response to the new input. Given Birnbaum’s description, the 
study seemed to suggest that the management innovation introduced to the 
system may have been responded to as a new input, and the new input was 
outside of acceptable limits. As a result, several ad hoc committees and task 
forces were formed. Unfortunately, the innovation was in the early stage of 
adoption, so no new subsystems had emerged at the time of the study, but 
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certainly, this idea of innovation as input may be an area of interest worthy of 
future exploration. 
 It may be important for future research to further explore the degree to which an 
individual’s position within the technical and administrative subsystems and the 
values of those subsystems interact to influence perceived legitimacy and 
adoption of a management innovation. Additional understanding may also be 
gleaned by breaking down the unit of analysis into smaller subsystems within 
the administrative and technical subsystems.  
 Future research related to the specifics of how innovations are introduced, 
imposed or as a response, to organizations as well as to subsystems within the 
organization may provide increased understanding related to the adoption of 
management innovations. 
Summary 
 Throughout the twentieth century there was a growth in research related to 
understanding organizational structure and function. Organizational theory emerged in 
concert with the prevailing organizational paradigm – Frederick Taylor’s scientific 
management theory. Organizational theory grew from the simple, mechanistic view to 
today’s perspective where higher education institutions are viewed as dynamic 
organizations made up of complex networks of formal and informal subsystems.  
In the last part of the twentieth century, several management innovations were 
introduced into higher education that appeared to be incongruent with this dynamic and 
complex organizational perspective. Such efforts continue today. Nationally, the Higher 
Education Opportunity Act (2008) included increased accountability provisions. In 
   346 
 
response, accrediting bodies in higher education have increasingly incorporated linear, 
outcome-based measures into accreditation standards.  
In general, such efforts seek to increase effectiveness and efficiency through 
standardization of the production function. Standardization of the production function 
appeared to be incompatible with at least three characteristics that distinguish higher 
education organizations from businesses: power that is more dispersed than centralized; 
subsystems that are more loosely coupled than tightly coupled; and multiple 
organizational goals that tend to be ambiguous and at times conflicting.  
In 2001, Birnbaum identified a cycle of adoption and rejection associated with 
the adoption of management innovations. Birnbaum noted that leaders continued to 
introduce management innovations into higher education for a number of reasons in 
spite of these documented cycles of rejection. As demonstrated in this study, the failed 
implementation of a management innovation is costly, time consuming, and can lead to 
devastating morale among faculty, staff, and administrators as well as 
disenfranchisement. As noted by one individual in this study “I felt like I had been 
sucker punched.” 
In spite of such negative consequences, Birnbaum concluded that the adoption 
of management innovations provided a number of benefits to organizations, and 
theorized that increased legitimacy tied to the innovation, the organization, and its 
leaders played an important role in the adoption of management innovations. However, 
before this study, there did not exist a clear understanding of what factors influenced the 
adoption of a management innovation within higher education. Additionally, there did 
not exist a clear understanding of how perceived legitimacy of a management 
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innovation influenced the adoption of that innovation nor did there exist a clear 
understanding of the factors that contributed to the development of perceived legitimacy 
within the context of higher education.  
 Therefore, the results of this study were significant in that the study confirmed 
Birnbaum’s suspicion that legitimacy played a role in the adoption of a management 
innovation. In addition, the study identified through literature and confirmed through 
data analysis several factors that influenced perceived legitimacy of the merit pay 
system including coupling, ambiguity, and power. Perhaps most important, the results 
of the study were incorporated into a practical model that can be used by policy makers 
and administrators to increase successful adoptions of management innovations and 
minimize adverse effects associated with wasted time, wasted resources, and 
disenfranchised individuals, thus providing a means to break the failed cycle of 
adoptions identified by Birnbaum.  
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APPENDIX A: INNOVATION ADOPTION SURVEY 
 
Section I. Demographic Information 
Please select one response for each of the following items. 
1. Gender 
 Male 
 Female 
 
2.  Age: ________ 
 
3. Highest degree earned 
 Less than a high school diploma 
 High school diploma 
 Associate’s degree 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree (M.Ed., MBA) 
 First-Professional Degree (J.D., M.D.) 
 Doctoral degree (Ph.D., Ed.D., D.P.A., etc.) 
 
4. Years of continuous full-time employment at CPU (if less than 1 year, enter “0”): 
_____ 
 
5. Please identify your position and the campus unit with which you are most closely 
affiliated.  
 Faculty (not including deans or department chairs).  
 College of Education and Psychology 
 College of Health and Sciences 
 College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences 
 School of Business 
 Library 
 Non-Faculty 
 President’s Office 
 Academic Affairs 
 Student Development 
 Administration and Finance 
 Advancement and Development 
 Athletics 
 Communications and Marketing 
If non-faculty, please select one of the following job classifications. 
 Senior-level administrator (president, vice presidents, associate and 
assistant vice presidents, dean of students, athletic director, 
communications and marketing director) 
 Mid-level administrator (all other administrators who directly supervise 
full-time employees including academic deans, academic department 
chairs, unit directors, program directors, etc.) 
 Professional staff 
 Support staff 
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Section II. Merit Pay Perceptions
This section seeks to understand your views about the merit pay system that was implemented at 
CPU and to understand how those views may be influencing your attitudes and behaviors related 
to the merit pay system. Over the past two years, supervisors at CPU have used a merit pay 
system to rank employee job performance in one of three categories: (1) exceeds expectations or 
exceptional merit; (2) meets expectations or base merit; and (3) does not meet expectations or no 
merit. Salary increases or stipends have been distributed based on these categories. Please use 
your experiences with the merit pay system and its related processes as a basis for responding to 
the following statements.   
Instructions: On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the level at which you disagree 
or agree with each of the following statements: 1 = Strongly Disagree (SD); 
2 = Disagree (D); 3 = Neutral (N); 4 = Agree (A); 5 = Strongly Agree (SA). 
If the item is not applicable to you, please leave blank. 
SD         D           N           A        SA 
6. I understand the level at which I must perform in order to 
meet “exceptional merit”. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
7. On my most recent evaluation, I feel my performance was 
accurately quantified and reflected my actual 
performance. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
8. I can change or adjust how I work – my work processes – 
to achieve a higher level of performance expected in the 
merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
9. The merit pay system is a fair and objective method to 
evaluate my job performance at CPU. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
10. CPU’s merit pay system provides an incentive for me to 
increase my work productivity. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
11. I feel that if I improve my work performance, I will 
receive a corresponding salary increase based on the way 
the merit pay system is supposed to work. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
12. On my most recent evaluation, the merit pay system 
proved to be a valid approach for evaluating my 
performance as an employee. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
13. I know and understand how the merit pay system works. 1         2         3         4         5 
14. I know and understand the evaluation criteria used in the 
merit pay system (i.e., I understand the level at which I 
must perform in order to receive the corresponding level 
of evaluation). 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
15. I have formed a clear opinion (positive or negative) about 
the potential benefits of the merit pay system to me. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
16. I plan to change behaviors or activities as an employee to 
align my job performance with the evaluation criteria of 
the merit pay system.  
1         2         3         4         5 
 
17. What would you say has been your percent of actual 
change (0% to 100%) in your behavior or activities 
related to the criteria of the merit pay system? 
 
 
_____ % of change in actual 
behaviors or activities 
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Regarding your response to question 17, please indicate the degree to which 
the following factors influenced your percent of actual change on a scale 
from 1 to 5 with 1 = No Influence and 5 = Significant Influence. If the item is 
not applicable to you, please leave blank. 
No                                   Significant 
Influence                            Influence
18. The merit pay system is a good fit for me and for CPU or 
the merit pay system makes sense.  
1         2         3         4         5 
 
19. The influence of the president. 1         2         3         4         5 
20. The influence of senior administration. 1         2         3         4         5 
21. The opportunity to increase my salary. 1         2         3         4         5 
22. The opportunity for increased recognition as an CPU 
employee. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
23. Negative consequences for not changing (i.e., no salary 
increase, negative comments by peers, negative 
evaluation by supervisor). 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
24. Lack of employee production benchmarks, or production 
benchmarks that are difficult to measure. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
25. My lack of understanding and knowledge of the merit pay 
system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
26. Lack of my supervisor(s)’ understanding and knowledge 
of the merit pay system 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
27. Please list any additional factors that have influenced your percent of actual change 
reflected in your answer to question 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions 28-31 seek to understand the degree to which you and your unit 
can define its inputs and outputs. For example, cotton is milled to produce 
fabric. Cotton is the input. Fabric is the output. In a higher education setting, 
students complete courses to earn a degree. Students are the inputs. 
Graduates are the outputs. Please leave blank if you do not have an answer 
or if the item is not applicable to you. 
 
 
SD         D           N           A        SA 
28. I can identify the inputs and outputs for my work unit. 1         2         3         4         5 
29. I can measure the inputs and outputs for my work unit. 1         2         3         4         5 
30. The merit pay system identifies my work outputs. 1         2         3         4         5 
31. The merit pay system measures my work outputs and 
rewards me for it. 
1         2         3         4         5 
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Section III. Administrator Role 
Section III seeks to understand your perceptions of how the administrator over your unit has 
influenced your attitudes and behaviors related to the merit pay system. Please consider any 
changes in your attitude and behaviors at this point in time as compared to when you first learned 
about the merit pay system. What has been the influence of your administrator on those changes? 
When the term administrator is used, it is referencing the person who is responsible for 
completing your merit pay evaluation.  
Instructions: Please indicate your rating for each of the following items. 
Please leave blank if the item is not applicable to you. 
No                                   Significant 
Influence                            Influence 
32. On a scale of 1 to 5, please rate the extent to which the 
administrator(s) in your area have influenced your 
attitudes and behaviors of the merit pay system.   
1         2         3         4         5 
 
With regard to your response to question 32, please indicate the degree to 
which each of following situations contributed to your attitudes and 
behaviors of the merit pay system. 
SD         D           N           A        SA
33. I appreciated the leadership authority of my 
administrator(s) and followed their leadership. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
34. I knew the administrator(s) would reward a change in my 
attitude or behavior related to the merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
35. I wanted to avoid any negative consequences that might 
result from my unwillingness to align my attitudes and 
behaviors with the expectations of my administrator(s).  
1         2         3         4         5 
 
36. I trusted my administrator(s) and knew that they would do 
good things for me if I followed their leadership related to 
the merit pay system.  
1         2         3         4         5 
 
37. I knew the administrator(s) had knowledge and expertise 
with regard to the merit pay system, and I chose to follow 
their leadership on this issue. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
38. I did not want to risk the relationship with my 
administrator(s) and therefore conformed to their 
expectations with regard to the merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
39. My administrator(s)’ positions within the organization 
influenced my attitudes and behavior with regard to the 
merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
40. I anticipated that incentives would be provided by my 
administrator(s) if I conformed to their expectations 
reflective in the merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
41. When I have followed the administrator(s)’ judgment and 
experience in the past, I have been pleased with the 
outcome for me. Therefore, I followed the 
administrator(s)’ lead on the merit pay system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
 
42. I thought I might be penalized by my administrator(s) for 
not following their leadership related to the merit pay 
system. 
1         2         3         4         5 
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43. Please indicate the merit rating you received on your most recent evaluation. 
  No Merit – Does not meet expectations 
  Base Merit – Meets expectations 
  Exceptional Merit – Exceeds expectations 
  I am a recent employee and have not yet been evaluated 
 
44. From your perspective, did this rating accurately reflect your level of employee 
performance for the evaluation period? 
  Yes 
  No 
  I am a recent employee and have not yet been evaluated 
 
45. If no, please provide information as to why you think it did not accurately reflect 
your employee performance.  
 
 
 
46. What future changes would you suggest be made to the merit pay system? 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
Formal Interview Questions – Interview 1 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. What did you hope the merit pay system would accomplish within the 
university? To what degree has that been accomplished? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
 
Power 
A. As president, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on individuals your direct reports? Indirect 
reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. I suspect there were some across the university that responded well and some 
that didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the University? 
B. How did you perceive the University would be impacted if everyone aligned 
their work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between the University and the 
merit pay system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that the 
University’s inputs and outputs were easily defined? What about measured? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these inputs and outputs impacted 
how you perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how 
others in your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
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Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. Can you perhaps limit that list to the one or two things that contributed most to 
that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might you approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 2 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically within your unit? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
Power 
A. As vice president, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit 
pay system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on your direct reports? Indirect reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. I suspect there were some across your unit that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of the president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. How do you perceive that the president would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what has the president done to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
D. Based on your perceptions, how did the president use power to facilitate your 
adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
E. How have these perceptions about the president and his use of power impacted 
your perception about the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and your unit? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
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Ambiguity 
A. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
unit’s outputs were easily defined?  What about measured? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
C. What were the major issues did you and the president worked through during the 
implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. Can you perhaps limit that list to the one or two things that contributed most to 
that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might you approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 3 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically within the School of Business? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change, if you were a 
faculty/nonfaculty (insert other subsystem than the subsystem of the subject) 
member. 
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
 
Power 
A. As Dean of the School of Business, how did you try to influence the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on individuals your direct reports? Indirect 
reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. I suspect there were some across your unit that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
E. What is your perception of the vice president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
F. How do you perceive that the vice president would use the merit pay system? 
G. Based on your perceptions, what did the vice president do to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
H. Based on your perceptions, how did the vice president use power to facilitate 
your adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
I. How have these perceptions about the vice president and his use of power 
impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
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C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the inputs and outputs within the School of Business? 
B. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units inputs and outputs were easily defined? What about measured? 
C. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
D. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these inputs and outputs impacted 
how you perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how 
others in your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. How has your own work production changed? 
C. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
D. What were the major issues that you and the vice president worked through 
during the implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 4 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically within your school? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What about implementation of the merit pay system, was it implemented 
differently for faculty vs. nonfaculty?  
C. If so, what do you perceive contributed to these differences? 
D. Are there other differences between that faculty and nonfaculty perceptions of 
the merit pay system? 
 
Power 
A. As Dean, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on individuals your direct reports? Indirect 
reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. I suspect there were some across your unit that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
E. What is your perception of the vice president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
F. How do you perceive that the vice president would use the merit pay system? 
G. Based on your perceptions, what did the vice president do to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
H. Based on your perceptions, how did the vice president use power to facilitate 
your adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
I. How have these perceptions about the vice president and his use of power 
impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
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B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the inputs and outputs of the College? 
B. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units inputs and outputs were easily defined? What about measured? 
C. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
D. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these inputs and outputs impacted 
how you perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how 
others in your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. How has your own work production changed? 
C. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
D. What were the major issues that you and the vice president worked through 
during the implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 5 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about your understanding of how the merit pay system 
was implemented.  
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy of a merit pay system at The 
university? How does it fit? Why?  
B. There are two components of the merit pay system: the evaluation component 
and the merit component. What are your perceptions about the legitimacy of 
each component? Are they equally legitimate? Is one more legitimate than the 
other? Why? 
 
Years of Service: 
A. How did senior faculty who had been here 15 or 20 years responded differently 
to the merit pay system than perhaps junior faculty would only been here three 
or four or five years? Did you see differences? If so, what were they? 
B. How much more quickly or more slowly did the senior faculty come to 
conclusions about the system than perhaps the younger faculty? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change if you were a 
nonfaculty, a staff member?  
B. What are the difference that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. When we first started implementing the merit pay system, how did you perceive 
that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
B. Is that how it was used? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate the 
alignment of your attitudes and behaviors with the merit pay system? 
D. Based on your perceptions, how has the supervisor used their power to facilitate 
changes in your attitudes and behaviors of the merit pay system? 
E. How has your supervisor impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe the linkage between the 
merit pay system and the teaching, research and service mission of the 
university? 
B. How did this linkage between the merit pay system and the mission of the 
university impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system?  
   376 
 
Ambiguity 
A. At the point we implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
Did you think that they would be easily measured? What are the differences in 
measuring the three: teaching, research and service? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. How has your own work production changed since the merit system was 
implemented? 
B. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented? What were some of the major issues that you had to 
work through? 
C. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 6 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Years of service 
A. How were people’s attitudes, opinions and behavior toward  the merit pay 
system impacted by their years of service at the institution? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What about implementation of the merit pay system, was it implemented 
differently for faculty vs. nonfaculty?  
C. If so, what do you perceive contributed to these differences? 
D. Are there other differences between that faculty and nonfaculty perceptions of 
the merit pay system? 
 
Power 
A. As Dean, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on your direct reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of the vice president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. How do you perceive that the vice president would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, how did the vice president use power to facilitate 
your adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
D. How have these perceptions about the vice president and his use of power 
impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the teaching, research and service mission of the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
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C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of the College? 
B. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
What about measured? 
C. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
D. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. In general, what changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the 
merit pay system was implemented? 
B. How has your own work production changed? 
C. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
D. What were the major issues that you and the vice president worked through 
during the implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 7 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy of a merit pay system at The 
university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change if you were a 
faculty member?  
B. What are the difference that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. What is your perception of your supervisor as related to the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
B. When we first started implementing the merit pay system, how did you perceive 
that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
C. Is that how it was used? 
D. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate the 
alignment of your attitudes and behaviors with the merit pay system? 
E. Based on your perceptions, how has the supervisor used his power to facilitate 
changes in your attitudes and behaviors of the merit pay system? 
F. How has your supervisor impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of your unit? 
B. How are these measured? 
C. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. Have you formed an opinion about the merit pays system? 
B. What has influenced that opinion? 
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C. How has your own work production changed since the merit system was 
implemented? 
D. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented?  
E. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 8 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically how it was implemented on the staff side 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What about implementation of the merit pay system, was it implemented 
differently for faculty vs. nonfaculty?  
C. If so, what do you perceive contributed to these differences? 
D. Are there other differences between that faculty and nonfaculty perceptions of 
the merit pay system? 
 
Power 
A. How did you see the vice presidents trying to influence the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
B. What impact do you think that supervisors had on the implementation of the 
merit pay system?  
C. I suspect there were some staff across campus that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
D. How do you think the influence of supervisors differed from the influence of the 
vice presidents in terms of the implementation? 
E. How do you think the influence of supervisors differed from the influence of the 
vice presidents in terms of changing employee performance? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of your supervisor as related to the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
B. How do you perceive that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what did your supervisor do to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes or behaviors as related to the merit pay system? 
D. Based on your perceptions, how did the supervisor use power to facilitate your 
adoption of the merit pay system? 
E. How did your supervisor impact your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
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Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of your unit? 
B. How are those outputs measured? 
C. How do you think the clarity of outputs impacted how you perceived the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. Have you formed an opinion about the merit pays system? 
B. What has influenced the development of that opinion? 
C. How has your own work production changed since implementation of the merit 
pay system? 
D. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented?  
E. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 9 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically how it was implemented in your unit. 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What about implementation of the merit pay system, was it implemented 
differently for faculty vs. nonfaculty?  
C. If so, what do you perceive contributed to these differences? 
D. Are there other differences between that faculty and nonfaculty perceptions of 
the merit pay system? 
 
Power 
A. As Dean, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on your direct reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. How do you perceive that your influence differed from the influence of your 
department chairs in terms of changing employee performance? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of the vice president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. How do you perceive that the vice president would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, how did the vice president use power to facilitate 
your adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
D. How have these perceptions about the vice president and his use of power 
impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
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C. How did your perceptions about the linkage between your unit and the merit pay 
system impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of the College? 
B. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
What about measured? 
C. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
D. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. Have you formed an opinion about the merit pays system? 
B. What has influenced the development of that opinion? 
C. How has your own work production changed since implementation of the merit 
pay system? 
D. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented?  
E. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 10 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy of a merit pay system at The 
university? Is it a good fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate your 
performance? Was it a good fit? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change if you were a 
faculty member?  
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty? 
Power 
A. What is your perception of your supervisor as related to the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
B. When we first started implementing the merit pay system, how did you perceive 
that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
C. Is that how it was used? 
D. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate changes 
in your work to align with the merit pay system? 
E. Based on your perceptions, how has the supervisor used his power to change 
your work behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
F. How has your supervisor impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did this linkage impact how you perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of your unit? 
B. How are these measured? 
C. How did the ability to measure these outputs impact how you perceived the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. Have you formed an opinion about the merit pays system? 
B. What has influenced that opinion? 
C. How has your own work production changed since the merit system was 
implemented? 
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D. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented?  
E. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 11 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and more specifically within your unit? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate 
employee performance? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in how the merit pay system 
was implemented for faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. As vice president, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit 
pay system?  
B. What impact did your influence have on your direct reports? Indirect reports?  
C. What types of leadership activities were more successful than others in 
implementing the merit pay system? 
D. What types of power did you try to use to influence change in attitudes and 
behaviors as related to the merit pay system? 
E. I suspect there were some across your unit that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of the president-your supervisor- as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. How do you perceive that the president would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what has the president done to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
D. Based on your perceptions, how did the president use power to facilitate your 
adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
E. How did the president and his use of power impact your perception about the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and your unit? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
   388 
 
C. How did the linkage impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. At the point you implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
unit’s outputs were easily defined?  
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. What are the outputs of your unit? 
D. How are they measured? 
E. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
C. What were the major issues did you and the president worked through during the 
implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. Can you perhaps limit that list to the one or two things that contributed most to 
that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might you approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 12 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy of a merit pay system at The 
university? Is it a good fit? Why? 
B. What are your perceptions about the use of a merit pay system to evaluate your 
performance? Was it a good fit? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change if you were a 
faculty member?  
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. What is your perception of your supervisor as related to the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
B. When we first started implementing the merit pay system, how did you perceive 
that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
C. Is that how it was used? 
D. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate changes 
in your work to align with the merit pay system? 
E. Based on your perceptions, how has the supervisor used his power to change 
your work behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
F. How has your supervisor impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the goals of your unit, or the university? 
B. How did you perceive your unit would be impacted if everyone aligned their 
work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did this linkage impact how you perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. What are the outputs of your unit? 
B. How are these measured? 
C. How did the ability to measure these outputs impact how you perceived the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. Have you formed an opinion about the merit pays system? 
B. What has influenced that opinion? 
C. How has your own work production changed since the merit system was 
implemented? 
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D. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented?  
E. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 13 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and how it was implemented for faculty? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. There are two aspects of the merit pay system: the evaluation component and the 
merit component. What are your perceptions about the legitimacy of each 
component? Are they equally legitimate, one more legitimate than the other? 
Why? 
  
Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in how the merit pay system 
was implemented for faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. How did the president try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
B. What types of leadership activities of the president were more successful than 
others in implementing the merit pay system? 
C. What types of power did the president try to use to influence change in attitudes 
and behaviors as related to the merit pay system? 
D. What was the overall impact of the president’s influence, activities and use of 
power on the faculty senate? On the implementation in general?  
E. How did the president and his use of power impact perceptions about the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
F. How did the vice president try to influence the implementation of the merit pay 
system?  
G. What types of leadership activities of the vice president’s were more successful 
than others in implementing the merit pay system? 
H. What types of power did the VP try to use to influence change in attitudes and 
behaviors as related to the implementation of the merit pay system? 
I. How did the vice president and his use of power impact perceptions about the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
J. What is your perception of your supervisor as related to the implementation of 
the merit pay system?  
K. How do you perceive that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
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L. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate change in 
your understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
M. Based on your perceptions, how did your supervisor use power to facilitate your 
adoption and your unit’s adoption of the merit pay system? 
N. How did your supervisor and their use of power impact your perceptions about 
the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe linkages between the merit 
pay system and the teaching, research and service mission of the university? 
B. How did you perceive the university would be impacted if all the faculty aligned 
their work production with the criteria of the merit pay system?  
C. How did this linkage between the merit pay system and the mission of the 
university impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. At the point we implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
Did you think that they would be easily measured? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. What are the outputs of your unit? 
D. How are they measured? 
E. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in your work production/behaviors have changed since the merit 
pay system was implemented? 
B. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor when we first started 
implementing the merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be 
worked through?  
C. What were the major issues did the faculty senate have to work through during 
the implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. Can you perhaps limit that list to the one or two things that contributed most to 
that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might you approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 14 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about how the merit pay system was implemented within 
the university and how it was implemented within the Academic Affairs unit? 
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy (the use) of a merit pay 
system at The university? How does it fit? Why? 
B. There are two components of the merit pay system: the evaluation component 
and the merit component. What are your perceptions about the legitimacy of 
each component? Are they equally legitimate? Is one more legitimate than the 
other? Why? 
 
 Organizational subsystems 
A. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty employees? 
B. What are the differences that you perceive, if any, in how the merit pay system 
was implemented for faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Years of Service: 
A. How did senior faculty who had been here 15 or 20 years responded differently 
to the merit pay system than perhaps junior faculty would only been here three 
or four or five years? Did you see differences? If so, what were they? 
B. How much more quickly or more slowly did the senior faculty come to 
conclusions about the system than perhaps the younger faculty? 
 
Power 
A. As vice president, how did you try to influence the implementation of the merit 
pay system?  
B. What types of leadership activities did you find to be more successful than 
others in implementing the merit pay system? 
C. What types of power did you try to use to influence change in attitudes and 
behaviors as related to the merit pay system? 
D. What impact do you think that your influence, activities and use of power had 
on the perceived legitimacy of the merit pay system?  
E. I suspect there were some across your unit that responded well and some that 
didn’t. Why do you think there were these differences? 
 
Switch to you as an employee 
A. What is your perception of the president-your supervisor-as related to the 
implementation of the merit pay system?  
B. How did you perceive that the president would use the merit pay system? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what did the president do to facilitate change in your 
understanding, attitudes and behavior as related to the merit pay system? 
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D. Based on your perceptions, how did the president use power to facilitate the 
adoption of the merit pay system? 
E. How did the president and his use of power impact your perception about the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how faculty perceived the 
legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe the linkage between the 
merit pay system and the teaching, research and service mission of the 
university? 
B. How did this linkage between the merit pay system and the mission of the 
university impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system? How do you think that it impacted the faculties overall perception about 
the legitimacy of the merit pay system? 
 
Ambiguity 
A. At the point we implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
Did you think that they would be easily measured? What are the differences in 
measuring the three: teaching, research and service? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. What are the outputs of the academic affairs unit? 
D. How are they measured? 
E. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. What changes in work production/behaviors have changed since the merit pay 
system was implemented? 
B. What types of questions did your direct reports ask you about implementing the 
merit pay system? What were the major issues that had to be worked through? 
C. What were the major issues did you and the president worked through during the 
implementation of the merit pay system? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. Can you perhaps limit that list to the one or two things that contributed most to 
that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might you approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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          Formal Interview Questions – Interview 5 
 
General 
A. Why do you perceive the merit pay system was put in place? 
B. Can you talk a little bit about your understanding of how the merit pay system 
was implemented.  
 
Legitimacy 
A. What are your perceptions regarding the legitimacy of a merit pay system at The 
university? How does it fit? Why?  
B. There are two components of the merit pay system: the evaluation component 
and the merit component. What are your perceptions about the legitimacy of 
each component? Are they equally legitimate? Is one more legitimate than the 
other? Why? 
 
Years of Service: 
A. How did senior faculty who had been here 15 or 20 years responded differently 
to the merit pay system than perhaps junior faculty would only been here three 
or four or five years? Did you see differences? If so, what were they? 
B. How much more quickly or more slowly did the senior faculty come to 
conclusions about the system than perhaps the younger faculty? 
 
Organizational subsystems 
A. How would your perceptions of the merit pay system change if you were a 
nonfaculty, a staff member?  
B. What are the differenced that you perceive, if any, in the use of a merit pay 
system to evaluate faculty versus nonfaculty? 
 
Power 
A. When we first started implementing the merit pay system, how did you perceive 
that your supervisor would use the merit pay system? 
B. Is that how it was used? 
C. Based on your perceptions, what has your supervisor done to facilitate the 
alignment of your attitudes and behaviors with the merit pay system? 
D. Based on your perceptions, how has the supervisor used their power to facilitate 
changes in your attitudes and behaviors of the merit pay system? 
E. How has your supervisor impacted your perception about the legitimacy of the 
merit pay system? 
 
Coupling 
A. Based on your perceptions, how would you describe the linkage between the 
merit pay system and the teaching, research and service mission of the 
university? 
B. How did this linkage between the merit pay system and the mission of the 
university impact your overall perceptions about the legitimacy of the merit pay 
system?  
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Ambiguity 
A. At the point we implemented the merit pay system, did you perceive that your 
units outputs as related to teaching, research and service were easily defined? 
Did you think that they would be easily measured? What are the differences in 
measuring the three: teaching, research and service? 
B. How did that perception change as you implemented the merit pay system?  
C. How do you think the ambiguity or clarity of these outputs impacted how you 
perceived the legitimacy of the merit pay system? What about how others in 
your unit perceived the legitimacy of the system? 
 
Willingness to adopt 
A. How has your own work production changed since the merit system was 
implemented? 
B. What types of questions did you ask your supervisor as the merit pay system 
was being implemented? What were some of the major issues that you had to 
work through? 
C. What changes to your work production are you planning to make in the future? 
 
Confirming/Exploring Questions 
A. Overall, what have been the successes of the merit pay system? 
B. What contributed most to that success? 
C. Overall, what have been the not so successful aspects of the merit pay system? 
D. Again, what do you think contributed to the not so successful aspects? 
E. Knowing what you know now, how might we approach the implementation of 
the merit pay system differently if you had a chance to start over?  
F. What are the next steps that you think the University needs to take with regard 
to the merit pay system? 
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APPENDIX C: FIELD TEST 
 
SELECTED FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE ADOPTION OF MANAGEMENT 
INNOVATIONS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
 
FIELD TEST 
Introduction 
 A field test associated with the aforementioned project was conducted during a 
ten-day period in January 2009. The field test was conducted at Compass Point 
University, a regional university in the Midwest, and included 35 participants. The 
purpose of the field test was to: (1) establish content validity of questions contained in 
the instruments; (2) to improve the clarity of the questions contained in the instrument; 
(3) to assess the appropriateness and practicality of the study; and (4) to anticipate and 
resolve any potential problems related to data collection. Accordingly, this paper 
provides: (1) a discussion and evaluation related to the clarity questions contained in the 
survey and interview; and (2) a discussion and evaluation of the project’s sampling and 
data collection procedures. 
Survey and Interview Instruments 
Initially, five previous employees at Compass Point University were invited to 
participate in the field test. These individuals included two faculty and three staff. Each 
individual received a packet that included an introductory letter and review instructions. 
The packet also included the survey and interview questions. An additional sheet that 
defined the variables of interest was also included. Each participant was asked to 
complete the survey and to review the interview questions.  
Following the completion of the survey and interview, the researcher contacted 
each participant for a debriefing session. In this session, participants were asked to 
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identify survey or interview questions that were confusing or that appeared irrelevant 
based on their experiences and also to identify additional questions not asked of them. 
Participants offered no suggested changes to the questions contained in the interview 
guide. Responses from the field test participants and discussions with the researcher’s 
dissertation chair led to the following modifications being made to the survey: 
 Question 4 was revised to provide instructions to individuals employed less than 
a year. 
 Question 5 was revised to include a category for librarians. Librarians at CPU 
are considered faculty  
 Question 6 was edited for grammar and flow 
 Question 7 was edited for grammar and flow 
 Question 15 was modified to provide clarification regarding positive or negative 
opinions 
 Question 18 was simplified 
 Question 19 was segmented into two questions and simplified 
 An option for new employees that have yet to be evaluated was added to 
Questions 42 and 43 
 At the beginning of each major section within the survey, a phrase was added to 
clarifying that respondents do not have to answer items or questions that are not 
applicable. 
The survey was then distributed to 25 full-time employees at CPU. Of those 
individuals, 19 completed the survey. A review of responses indicated that these 19 
individuals answered 100% of the questions. The high response rate and the absence of 
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any unanswered items, led the researcher to conclude that no additional survey 
modifications were warranted.  
Sampling and Data Collection Procedures 
Sampling and data collection techniques were the primary administrative 
procedures examined as part of this field test. 
Sampling procedures 
A proportional stratified random sampling technique was used to select thirty 
individuals for participation in the field test. This technique was used to ensure the 
sample was representative of the population with regard to two strata: (1) participants 
from the technical subsystem (all faculty-time faculty); and (2) participants from the 
administrative subsystem (all full-time staff and administrators). The following 
procedures were used to select participants: 
1. A list of all full-time employees was obtained from the human resources 
office at CPU. The list included employees name, title, and employment 
date. 
2. Employees were classified into the technical or administrative subsystem. 
3. The number of full-time employees totaled 430 with 146 employees (34%) 
representing the technical subsystem and 284 (66%) representing the 
administrative subsystem. 
4. Employees were sorted by employment date and subsystem. 
5. Within each subsystem, employees were assigned sequential numbers. The 
most tenured employee within each subsystem was assigned the number 1 
and the most recent employee assigned the last number: 146 for the last 
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employee within the technical subsystem; and 284 for the last employee 
within the administrative subsystem. 
6. A list of random numbers was then generated using www.random.org. 
7. A total of 30 individuals were selected for participation in the field test: 10 
(33.3%) individuals from the technical subsystem, and 20 (66.6%) 
individuals from the administrative subsystem. 
 
Evaluation of sampling procedures 
 In short, the purpose of the sampling technique was to ensure the random 
selection of participants who were proportionally reflective of the technical and 
administrative subsystems within the larger population. The identified sampling 
procedures achieved this purpose and will be used for the full study. 
Data collection procedures 
An anonymous survey was the primary data collection method associated with 
the field test. The survey was developed using SurveyMonkey and was distributed in an 
electronic, web-based format via the email system at Compass Point University. The 
administration of the survey included three contacts with the study’s participants. Table 
1 provides summary of the distribution method. 
Table 1. Summary of Proposed Survey Distribution Method 
Contact Day Method Mode 
1 1 Pre-notice letter Email 
2 3 Survey packet Email/Web 
3 10 Thank-you/reminder Email 
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Table 2 outlines the features included in the development and administration of 
the survey to enhance completion and return rates.  
Table 2. Survey Development and Administration Features to Increase Return 
Rates 
Phase Feature 
Survey 
Development 
 
Short entry boxes 
 
Multiple-item screens that group questions tied to the same variable 
 
A graphic indicator on each page demonstrating progress toward completing the survey 
 
Survey 
Administration 
 
Pre-notice letter and email 
 
One thank you/reminder emails 
 
$2 cash incentive distributed with pre-notice letter  
 
A $300 gift certificate awarded to two randomly selected individuals who completed the 
research survey 
 
 
Data collection procedures discussion and evaluation 
The goal of the data collection procedures was a 50% response rate that yielded 
a representative sample based on job classification, gender, age, and years of 
employment. Of the 30 selected for the field test, 19 surveys were completed, or a 63% 
response rate. However, five of the selected participants did not have email addresses 
and did not have an opportunity to participate in the survey. In reality, only 25 survey 
invitations were actually distributed yielding an actual response rate of 76%.    
With regard to the representativeness of the sample, Table 3 illustrates that the 
respondents were very representative of the sample and the larger population.  
Table 3. Representativeness of Sample and Respondents 
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Category Population Sample (Pilot) Respondents (Pilot) 
Subsystem 
Technical 
Administrative 
 
34% 
66% 
 
33% 
67% 
 
42% 
58% 
Gender 
Female 
Male 
 
54% 
46% 
 
43% 
57% 
 
42% 
58% 
Age (Mean) NA NA 44 
Years of Employment (Mean) 10 years 8 years 10 years 
 
Initially, it appeared that the respondents were not representative of the sample 
with regard to the technical and administrative subsystems; however, Table 4 illustrates 
that the respondents indeed were reflective of the sample when those not receiving the 
email invitation are excluded. 
Table 4. Subsystem Representativeness with Revised Sample 
Category Revised Sample (Pilot) Respondents (Pilot) 
Subsystem 
Technical 
Administrative 
 
40% 
60% 
 
42% 
58% 
 
 To summarize, data collection strategies exceeded the projected response rate, 
and respondents were representative of the sample and population. Two data collection 
processes will be changed for the full study: (1) the invitation and survey will be 
distributed and collected in a paper format for those individuals that do not have email; 
   403 
 
and (2) age will not be used to determine representativeness of the sample due to the 
unavailability of data for the population. 
Summary 
 A field test for this study was conducted with 35 participants. The survey 
instrument and research procedures were evaluated, and modifications were made based 
on this feedback. Overall, the sampling and data collection procedures associated with 
the field test proved appropriate and practical, and the modified items within the survey 
instrument and interview appeared clear and valid. 
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APPENDIX D: EVOLUTION OF CAUSAL MODEL BASED ON INTERVIEWS 
 
Interview 1 
 
 
Interview 2 
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Interview 3 
 
 
Interview 4 
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Interview 5 
 
 
Interview 6 
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Interview 7 
 
 
Interview 8 
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Interview 9 
 
 
Interview 10 
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Interview 11 
 
 
Interview 12 
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Interview 13 
 
 
Interview 14 
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Interview 15 
 
